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Water policy under the 1956 Water Act actively discouraged participation and water 
was managed centrally. The principles enshrined in the National Water Act (no 36 of 
1998), designed in line with international sustainable development goals that actively 
encourage participation of a wide range of stakeholders operating closest to the 
resources that are being used, require a shift from governing through direct controls to 
governance where the state interacts with a wide range of interest groups. Although 
policy seemingly embraces a new water management paradigm, the old is being 
resurrected with all the contradictions and contortions that precipitated the shift in 
focus from the old to the new in the first place. There is on the one hand an 
undeveloped notion of what participation should entail, but there is also a culture in 
the domain of water that negotiates meanings around technical rather than social 
discourses. It is the absence of knowledge, the unequal power relationship between 
water users and the inhibition of agency that makes participation so difficult and 
keeps those who have knowledge, in - and those who do not have knowledge, out, 
with the unintended consequence of strengthening bonds between those who have 
had, in the past, privileged access to water. Those who suffer water deprivation have 
not been able to use their franchise to improve their access to water and their access to 
decision-making bodies in the water sector. Repeated failures to achieve reform are 
costly in terms of finance, and they are costly because they affect the production of 
trust and make it difficult to retain the 'spirit of the law.' The changing role of the 
state and the influence that state policy and intervention has in developing or 
hindering the production of trust and the perpetuation or production of shame is 
pivotal. Trust is a valuable but volatile resource and the broader set of analytic tools 
have provided a scafIold using the following set of analytic themes: style of 
government, way in which bureaucrats accept or resist change, ability of non-state and 
state actors to develop synergistic relationships, equalising of power, meaningful 
transfer of knowledge and creation of an agency-enhancing and agency-enabling 
environment. Trust is a product of a set of 'ideal' conditions, public officials being 
trustworthy, trading credit slips between water users, having a sense of agency and 
being able to trust. The ideals of trust present trust as a product of democratic 
processes and in these ideal conditions trust, as an experience, is reproduced and 
smoothes relationships. The study expands on the theme of trust by introducing the 
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Chapter One: Thesis rationale and approach to trust and 
transformation 
This chapter introduces the themes of transfounation, water and trust, and locates 
these themes within the broad context of poverty and democracy. The first section of 
the chapter elaborates on the analytic themes that are used in the study and discusses 
how the themes were developed for the investigation. The second part of the chapter 
provides a rationale for the chosen methodology and discusses how the choice of 
methods contributed to the development of the study. The generalised theory of trust 
is seated broadly within discourse on democracy but the thesis engages with the 
construct of trust, within the specific context of transfounation from an autocratic to a 
democratic regime and, in particular, in the water sector. Six themes have been 
developed that provide a setting for this exploratory journey. 
The thesis addresses a number of inter-related questions concerning changed state 
responsibility for the delivery of water to consumers and how this changed role of the 
state affects trust relations at the local level. The thesis interrogates present day 
policy against the historical context of water delivery in South Africa. It poses two 
questions 1) in what ways does the state maintain strong central powers while 
relinquishing managerial responsibility for delivery of water and integrated resource 
management and 2) how the changing state responsibility for this delivery, in 
particular the devolution of responsibility to local government affects trust between 
different spheres of government and between government and 'ordinary' water users. 
Tbeorists like Amartya Sen (1999) have argued that human development is a process 
of enlarging people's choices (Clark 2003). Engaging communities in decision-
making processes is not proposed as a replacement for state involvement. Government 
agents can strongly affect the level and type of social capital that is available to 
sustainable development efforts (Ostrom 2000, p. 173). The progressive inclusion of 
various groups into decision-making and management of water matters is provided for 
in the legislative frameworks that have been put into place by the ANC government 
and that are necessary scaffolding in the building of South Africa as a democratic 
nation. The empirical data gathered during the study suggests, however, that 











to develop democratic water management are insufficient to drive reform in the water 
sector. 
The central task of the study is to test the applicability and relevance of theoretical 
assumptions about trust and to consider the usefulness of shame as an inhibitor to the 
building of trust. The task is considered crucial in order to understand the obstacles 
that exist to achieving the necessary reform in the water sector and in order to ground 
this understanding within a rigorous theoretical framework that traces the history of 
ideas of trust, shame and participation. 
The chapter is organised under three main sections: 1) introduction, 2) methods and 3) 
structure of thesis. The introduction stresses the importance of water and the 
relationship between (i) water deprivation and poverty. It makes the linkage between 
inclusion and democracy, thus preparing the development, in later chapters, of 
features of participation and non-participation. (ii) The political context of 
transformation is then outlined briefly. (iii) Institutions are considered as providing 
both opportunities and obstacles to reform, and this concern is introduced to the 
reader in the discussion below. (iv) Thematic schema and (v) the evolution of these 
themes provide the background for the reader to learn about (vi) the rationale for the 
study. 
The largest portion of the chapter is taken up in elaborating on methods and 
discussing the limits and advantages of the multi-methods approach that was deemed 
best suited to the investigation of trust and its usefulness in understanding 
transformation in the water sector. 
1. Introduction 
(i) Water and poverty 
Communities and living orgamsms are adapted to and dependent on natural 
hydrological cycles. Cities throughout the world expand in proportion to their water 
supply and civilizations have been shaped by rivers, desertification and short-term 
water abundance in the form of floods. Scarcity of water curtails econonnc 
production, food security and health, and in extreme cases can lead to death. 











service delivery in the past, those who are poor in water are also poor in the human 
and social capital to claim access to water, despite their constitutional rights to this 
access. As this inquiry into trust and transformation unfolds, it becomes apparent that 
those who have an undersupply of water and social resources remain deprived of 
opportunities to make decisions about the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of the resource (National Water Act no 36 of 1998). The 
restriction of opportunities also restricts the production of trust and in some cases 
reproduces shame. 
Democratisation is not only about delivering services but is as Dryzek (1996) and 
others (Clark 2003; Freire 1972; Kanbur 2002; Minogue 1998; O'Donnell 1994; 
Ingelhart 1999; Offe 1999; Green 1999; Warren 1999) affirm, about the progressive 
inclusion of various groups and categories in political life (Dryzek 1996, p. 475). 
(ii) The eye of the storm 
There is no greater narrative in our country's transition than that of the transformation 
from a regime of autocracy and domination to a democratic one. The thesis navigates 
into the 'eye of the storm,' supported by a wide range of theorists whose common 
interest is to uncover the obstacles and opportunities that make the transformation 
viable, and in so doing to secure the progressive deepening of South Africa's 
democracy. The narrative of transition to democracy is intercepted by the story of 
water. The slogan 'Some for all for ever' reverberates as the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry's (DWAF's) commitment to redressing the inequalities of the 
past and ensuring a sustainable future. The trajectories of the current transformation 
in the water sector are also interlocked tightly with global and national permutations 
in macro-economic policy. South Africa's new status as a democracy propels it into 
the global neo-liberal regime, a regime that sits uneasily alongside the values so 
loudly proclaimed in the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights (Act no 108 of 
1996). 
The Water Law Review Process was formalised in 1998 to pave the way for the 
legislative scaffolding that was needed to ensure that the anticipated reforms, stating 
principles that would ensure the transformation from the old to the new, would not 











the ANe government away from the spirit of the RDP to the neo-liberal macro-
economic Growth and Redistribution Policy (GEAR) does not make the difficult task 
of making the 'spirit of the law' a reality any easier. Tensions between water as a 
public good and water as an economic good, precarious linkages between two core 
binding policies, the National "Water Act (no 36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act 
(no 108 of 1997) and between hasty outcomes and long-term sustainable delivery are 
acute. 
Policy that underpins reform in the water sector is unequivocal in its support for 
participation and inclusion of all stakeholders, and makes specific reference to those 
water users who were disenfranchised and excluded from decision-making processes 
under the past regime. DW AF (2003) claims 'Transformation is one of the 
mechanisms to achieve equity' (2003, p. 32). 
(iii) Institutional opportunities and obstacles 
Within the development context, the focus on civil society and inclusivity is not on 
individual rights but is rather on shared solidarity (Seligman 1997). The concept of 
belonging is at the core of theoretical discourse known as social capital. Trust is an 
attitudinal or cognitive component of social capital. It appears that those who have 
learnt to trust one another have understood that the benefits of co-operation are worth 
the transaction costs. These abstract theories advanced by theorists are explored in the 
study and although those who trust are more eloquent in the newly constructed water 
management systems, there is also reason to believe that they have more to gain by 
co-operating with one another. 
In the ideal, institutions, committees, forums can have positive effects and have 
the potential to further the project of democracy. They can too, it has been 
suggested in theory, help provide adequate, accurate information that allows 
people to make appropriate, efficient decisions (Serageldin & Grootaert 2000, p. 
48). In the view of Levi (1996) institutions have the potential to break the 
vicious cycles of discrimination (1996, p. 48), thus laying the basis for what 
Levi (1996) and Uslaner (1999) call generalized trust. According to Offe 
(1999) institutions could offer a 'deceptively simple and easy way out of the 











examines the convergence of these ideals with the reality as it unfolds in the 
water sector. 
(iv) Trust and social uncertainty 
The study examines the usefulness of trust as a measure of the social climate of 
reform. Within the context of South African citizens' experience of degradation, 
exclusion and heightened in-group/out-group dynamics, suggests that shame might 
be an inhibitor of trust. Shame sits well, the thesis argues, within the same analytic 
framework of trust and social capital. 
The reconstruction of the new and deconstruction of the old is a risky process, and 
one of the problems that seems to be emerging is that too many assumptions about 
how the process should unfold curtail innovation, inhibit exchanges and close 
networks instead of opening them. On the one hand there are fears that too much 
deliberation and insistence on old issues of exclusion and so forth are costly, time-
consuming and obstructive to the implementation of prescribed policies. On the other 
hand, as the study suggests, pressing ahead and 'getting a move on' without 
adequately examining the uncertainties, resulting in what Kramer (2001) calls 'uneasy 
trust,' is costly_ Ten years into the democracy, a symposium organised by DWAF to 
examine water management institutions is a sign that DW AF itself has recognised the 
need to re-examine the process that they have set in motion. Repetitive utterances by 
DW AF officials such as: 'there are no blueprints' or 'this is process' and 'we are all 
learning' and again 'we need to understand why ten years into the democracy it is so 
slow' suggest that failed attempts to control anticipated outcomes have had the 
positive, but costly, effect of reconsidering ways forward.! 
(v) Thematic schema 
One of the core challenges facing DWAF in the task of transformation is the trade-off 
between rapid initial delivery on the one hand and greater levels of investment in 
social development and capacity-building on the other (DWAF 2001a, p. 14). The 
thesis proposes that these unresolved tensions affect trust between water users. The 
I The Director-General's words during the opening speech at the Water Management Institutions 
Symposium, 15 16 April 2004, Willow Park Conference Centre, were that this is a 'world beating job 











study scrutinises the relationship between trust and transfonnation in the water sector 
deploying six analytic variables to organise this task: 1) style of government, 2) 
synergy between state and non-state actors, 3) bureaucrats and change, 4) knowledge, 
5) power, 6) agency. The rationale behind the research is to critically examine the 
relationship of these features and the development of trust. As trust is a core construct 
of social capital, the attitudinal as opposed to the structural component, social capital 
is considered as a critical theoretical construct and is a leitmotiv underpinning the 
analytic structure of this study. Although firmly lodged within the theoretical 
construct of trust and social capital, the deployment of six themes makes the inquiry, 
into the complex social processes, coherent. In this way the social pennutations that 
are part of the refonn in the water sector and that are nested within the debate on trust, 
are visited and revisited during the course of the investigation. 
(vi) Rationale for study 
Values put forward by social scientists sit more or less comfortably alongside actual 
data. As the study takes its course, there is no doubt that trust, as argued by the 
theorists, is a critical component of democracy, but the empirical data suggests that 
the complex arena in which transfonnation in the water sector unfolds is difficult to 
explain in tenns of trust theory alone. Trust is a product of a set of 'ideal' conditions 
and it is constantly reconstructed, renegotiated and reinstated. In order to better 
understand the politics of trust and social uncertainty, a wider set of analytic tools is 
necessary. Trust is both fickle and faithful, fluid and flexible and is a mellifluous but 
not sufficiently robust tool with which to consider the way in which the landscapes of 
water are reconfigured. Nonetheless, the variances between high trust and low trust 
serve as a useful barometer with which to test the climate of refonn and to evaluate 
the progress of the democratic project. 
The scaffolding for trust is constructed within the broad set of analytic themes that 
have been identified above and are reiterated here: (i) style of government which 
considers ways in which a top-down or interventionist style might affect the 
development of trust (and perpetuate feelings of shame), (ii) ways in which 
bureaucrats accept or resist change and why these might influence trust, (iii) ability of 
non-state and state actors to develop synergistic relationships and what factors 











agency are closely linked: (iv) equalising of power and the way in which power 
relationships are maintained or undermined, (v) meaningful transfer of knowledge and 
(vi) creation of an agency-enhancing and agency-enabling environment. 
The task of the study is to examine the substance or stuff with which the scaffolding is 
being secured. In so doing it 1) advances the theoretical framework of trust and 
secures trust as an important topic of concern in the reform process in the water sector 
and 2) explores another attitudinal construct that fits tightly alongside trust, the 
construct of shame. The discussion that is pursued examines the likelihood of the 
theoretical construct of shame resonating with social capital discourse, more 
specifically with its attitudinal component, trust. The relevance of the construct of 
shame in understanding non-participation, withdrawal, silence and symptoms of 
inequality and exclusion that persist is thus pursued. By bringing shame to the 
forecourt of academic discourse, within the well established and accepted social 
capital framework, understandings of shame are repositioned from a murky 
underworld of irrational emotion into the realm of cognitive and rational choice 
'modernity.' It seeks in so doing to bring together the realm of the emotional and 
rational because, as Gran (200 I) notes, modem society tries to establish 'the 
separation in social reality, at a cost' (2001, p. 7). 3) The study advances 
understanding of local development in general, but in particular the notion of 
development at the level of a catchment area, and 4) in the scrutiny of trust, the 
thesis brings together disparate disciplines and their incumbent theoretical constructs. 
2. Methods 
The methods section is divided into six phases that interlock with one another. 
Multiple methods is recognised as a common approach to secure in-depth 
understanding of a research topic. Because of the recognised difficulty of achieving 
objective reality, both in quantitative and qualitative research methods, the multiple 
methods focus attempts to 'secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in 
question' (Denzin & Lincoln 1998, p. 4). This approach is also referred to as 
triangulation, and can be considered as an alternative method of validation (Denzin 
1989; Fielding & Fielding 1986; Flick 1992 in Denzin & Lincoln 1998, p. 4). In this 
method, the investigation uses a number of qualitative research methods and reflects 











research. In other words, in adopting triangulation as a method of validation the 
qualitative research is subjected to a degree of rigour that is commonly accepted in 
quantitative research methods. 
Denzin & Lincoln (1998) use the term' bricoleur,' and although it can have a 
pejorative meaning, implying, for instance, an amateur, Denzin & Lincoln (1998) use 
it to describe the agility of the researcher who is able to 'perform a large number of 
diverse tasks' (1998, p. 4) in order to achieve rigour and breadth in the study, 
deploying a qualitative research methodology. The table below illustrates the phases 
and multi-methods approach. 
Table One: Multi-methods approach 
Time period Phase Type of activity Details 
November 2000 I Admin Africa project Desk-top: literature review on social capital, 5V '~'H''''~~, 
Februrary 2003 democracy, modernity: included intcractive dialogue, 
discussion groups, critical analysis (20 scholars) 
March 2002- !2 Theoretical pursuit on related Literature readings of books, journals, papers from colleagues: 
March 2004 topics: public policy, public analysis and theorizing of concepts. Complementary work 
administration, organisational where gaps in social capital literature and empirical data called 
theory, social identity, for further definition of an analytic frame 
participation, methods 
December 2000 3 Sector specific research, projects Legislation, Water Policy, Guidelines, Water Research 
March 2004 and water policy review Commission, Water Sector general. Relationship between neo-
I liberal macro-economic policy and service delivery, with 
I particular reference to the water seetor 
february - 4 Brcedc-Overberg stakeholders Semi-structured and unstructured interviews ( interviews): 12 
September 2001 face-la-face interviews* town engineers and public oillcials, 9 commercial farmers, 12 
January - February consullams, 15 DWAF and non-DW AF policy makers, 5 
2004 i councillors, 
-:-: .. 
November 2000 I 5 Fornla! events, interaction with Direct observation: I) catchment iora, 2) Breede Stakeholder November 2003 Breede-Overberg stakeholders Forum, 3) Overberg Stakeholder Forum, 4) Brccde-Overberg 
i 
i Stakeholder Forum, 5) Breede-Overberg Reference Group (10 
meetings) 
August 200! 6 International and national I) (ntenJational Water History Association: Bergen 
May 2004 workshops, conferences Conference: 2) Social CapitaV Community 
EmpowermentIParticipation workshop: World Bank 
Washington, 3) WISA Water Conference 
4) Water Management Institutions Symposium 












Phase One: Project Admin Africa: The administrative authority and trust relations 
between state and society in South Africa. Democratisation and Professionalisation of 
Administration within Agriculture, Education/Science and Health. 
The thesis is grounded in a broader explorative research project on trust and its role in 
public administration in the spheres oflocal and national government, housing, land, 
health services, tax collection, education and water. The Admin Africa project was a 
collaborative effort between the School of Government at the University of the 
Western Cape, South Africa, and the Department of Administration and Organisation 
Theory at the University of Bergen, Norway. The project was funded by the 
Norwegian Council for Higher Education's Programme for Development Research 
and Education (NUFU). 
The ability to acquire knowledge in both domains has been posited by Vroom (2002) 
as a feature of development. Scrutiny of the effect of opposing knowledge regimes 
became an actual research experience as researchers from the third world developing 
context (South Africa) and the first world context (Norway) collaborated and shared 
ideas and experience. Conflicts, insecurities and issues of power and knowledge 
played themselves out in the early months of the three-year Admin Africa project. But 
through the common project of acquiring knowledge across domains there was co-
operation and there were positive outcomes for the project. The project included six 
doctoral students who were supported and encouraged in their pursuit of excellence, 
fumbling, crawling and stumbling but gaining confidence with every step. Trust was 
the outcome of bridging differences and pursuing common interests. 
The primary gains were in advancing discourse on trust and bringing the international 
concerns about trust into the domain of public administration in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Secondary gains were in establishing a network of friends, scholars and 
researchers who are able today to interact and to share opportunities and knowledge. 
Admin Mrica demonstrated that the investment of energy, resources and time had 
positive gains. At the individual level, acquiring knowledge and learning the values 
of critique in the spirit of learning and for the achievement of academic excellence has 
proved invaluable. At the institutional level, linkages have been forged between the 











the University of the Western Cape, School of Govemment, and the University of 
Cape Town's Department of Political Studies with anticipated future exchanges of 
scholars and ideas between developed and developing countries. 
The first year of the project involved a critical review and synthesis of important 
social capital literature. In the initial phase of the project, some project members were 
concerned that the international discourse on trust could not contribute to decoding 
events unfolding within a developing country context. Some scholars in the Admin 
Africa project placed importance on distinguishing between modernity and pre-
modernity, with the assumption that trust fitted with values that were modem rather 
than pre-modem. Others contested that trust had any value at all in deciphering 
democratic values, within either developing or developed country contexts, and 
argued that the notion was too vague to be useful. 
The trust debates that emerged were vigorous and the dissent voracious. For many, 
particularly those from South Africa, social capital was a new and contested construct. 
Yet the trust literature spans disciplines, and each in tum settled into ways of 
grappling with the analytic framework that were personal yet collective, shackled yet 
unbounded, conflictual yet convergent. In the process, it became evident that trust was 
important and that the construct merited further critical analysis in order to determine 
whether and in what ways it could be rendered coherent and relevant to South Africa. 
The research project on water is strongly embedded in the Admin Africa project. The 
proposal submitted in its earliest phase aimed to use trust as a tool for better 
understanding the gap between policy and its practice in water resource management. 
Phase Two: Theoretical pursuit in related topics: 
Evolution of thematic schema 
The progressive uncovering of related literature constituted phase two. The key 
words trust and transformation are more or less explicit in literature in the field of 
organisational theory, for instance, Powell & Dimaggio (1991), Ostrom (1996), Levi 
(1996), Agrawal & Gibson (1999) Selznick (1949) and North (1990) consider 
institutional and systems change and the effects of these changes on actors. Kickert et 
al. 's (1999) insights into managing complex networks and his experience of strategies 











from the perspective of social identity, elaborating on social uncertainty and 'uneasy' 
trust. The development of the themes of Ostrom (1996), Levi (1996), Evans (1996) 
and also Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) around synergy and style of government are 
tightly locked, implicitly or explicitly, into social capital discourse. 
In scrutinising the notions of synergy and style of government, the work of Coning 
(2000) on the nature and role of public officials and Cameron (1999), who critically 
examines the effects of policy reform on local government, provided an important 
national context on these global themes. Lowndes (2003) and Carmichael & 
Midwinter (2003) were helpful, on the other hand, in locating the local government 
debate within a broad global context. It became apparent in examining this literature 
that the similarities between developing and developed countries are as important as 
the distinctions between them. Similarities were useful in ordering what would 
otherwise appear to be 'chaos' in local government. Balogun (1989) and Mutahaba 
(1989) were particularly helpful in locating transformation as an historical event and 
in so doing interpreting the problems of centralisation and state control in Africa as an 
imperialist project. The work of Balogun & Mutahaba (1989) resonates with Marais's 
(1999) interpretation of control and authority 'Within the South African context. 
Marais's (1999) caution about the intended limits of change that appease 'friend and 
foe' enlightens this research, offering insights into the paradoxes inherent in the water 
sector. 
Finally, the literature on participation that touches centrally on the themes of power, 
knowledge, agency and patterns of inclusion and exclusion reverberates with the 
analytic themes above. Unpacking problems that are of central concern to Newman et 
al. (2004), Williams (2004), Fergusson (2004) or Briggs and Sharp (2004) provides 
strong evidence of the way in which knowledge, power and agency intercept with the 
production of trust or the perpetuation of shame. 
Phase Three: Sector-specific research projects and policy review 
The historical review of the nation's water resources, a challenging task for the first 
AJ'JC government, was undertaken by the newly formed Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (DW AF) in 1996. The Water Law Review Process, chaired by Geoff 











Act no 36 of 1998. A large volume of guideline documents were commissioned by 
the Department. These included documents on catchment management fora, 
guidelines for the transformation of irrigation boards into water user associations, 
public participation processes and formulae for establishing committees, reference 
groups and other management· systems to take over the protection, use, development, 
conservation and management of the resource. These documents were made available 
for the research project2 and were a valuable part of the scoping that was necessary in 
the early stages of the thesis. 
The production and use of documents is, as Walsh (2004) contends, a valuable 
resource for ethnographic study (2004, p. 235). Consultants who were responsible for 
organising the catchment management processes that developed in the Breede-
Overberg Water Management Area, the selected site for the investigation, were asked 
by DW AF to advance notice of all meetings and relevant documentation in the 
interest of the research. However, despite the availability of these important 
guidelines and information, they are largely developed by consultants and researchers 
who have been commissioned by DW AF. In addition, the documents are designed for 
technically literate participants who are part of the water management systems. In 
these documents there are concise and accurate renderings on hard data, such as water 
flows, technical breakdown of water usage and so forth. The documents provide 
almost no critical analysis or reflection on process. Scholarly work, produced 
independently of the DW AF, was of critical importance in filling these gaps, in 
particular Wester et al. (2003), Mackay (2003) and Fayssee (2003). The Water 
Research Commission (WRC) is committed to inquiry into social processes, and 
notable in this field is the "Critical Review of Current Participatory Practice in 
Integrated Water Resource Management", WRC Project No K5/1434? The emerging 
patterns of participation or non-participation are confirmed by Wester et al. (2003), 
Mackay (2003) and Faysee (2003), and indicate the critical importance of further 
case-specific investigation and scrutiny of the reform process. 
2 Acknowledgements to Rashied Khan, Willie Enright of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
and to Louis Bruwer, consultant. 











Indications from discussions with knowledgeable researchers in the field of social 
science and development studies confIrm that the patterns emerging in the water 
sector are neither surprising nor anomalous with research evidence in other sectors. 
The accuracy and 'scientifIc' value of this work thus contributes to more general 
concerns that are currently being articulated by a wide range of scholars across a 
number of disciplines. Nonetheless, the study site is a single WMA comprised of a 
number of settings. This strength has also been identified as a weakness because there 
is a lack of generalizability (Maxwell in Bickman & Rogers 1998).4 The particular 
setting, the Breede-Overberg Water Management Area, may well be an extreme case 
or type for several reasons and is not, therefore, necessarily representative of the 
larger CMA population.s 
Walsh (in Seale 2004) proposes that other documents, of a literate society are also 
useful tools for the ethnographer (2004, p. 234). Novels such as Robert Harris's 
Pompeii, Diane Raines Ward's Water Wars, Drought, Flood, Folly and the Politics of 
Thirst, Morton's The Water's of Rome , Reisener's classic Cadillac Desert, Suzanne 
van Rensburg Soet Anysberg or Langenhoven's Die Kys abaut die Forro, are among 
some of the narratives that paint the world of water in words, poetry, descriptions, 
emotions and meaning. This literature provided inspiring and compelling visions into 
the world of water, 'invisible' beacons on the backstage. 
Phase Four: interactive formal events (DWAF and other) 
Four important conference and workshop settings offered the opportunity to consult, 
interrogate and exchange ideas, locating the research within a broad national and 
international setting 
1) 'The role of water in history and development' The Second International 
Water History Association Conference held in Bergen 10-12 August 2001 
4 In Survey Research Techniques: 54th Summer Institute, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Riley: Qualitative 
Methods: Semi-Structured Interviewing. 
5 The Western Cape, until the recent elections in 2004, was governed since 1994 by the Nationalist 











2) 'Conceptual and operational links between empowerment, social capital and 
community-driven development' Seminar held at the World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., in October 20036 
3) 'The Water Institute of South Africa (WISA) biennial conference' held at the 
Cape Town International Convention Centre, 2-6 May 2004 
4) 'Water Management Institutions Symposium' April 2004. Willow Park 
Conference Centre 
These events provided a platform for active involvement, dissemination of papers and 
uninterrupted immersion in water matters with fellow colleagues at a localised, 
national and international level. The International Water History Association hosted a 
three-day conference in Bergen that brought together a wide range of scholars 
exploring themes of water and development as lawyers, anthropologists, historians, 
artists, political scientists and technicians. Of special interest was the shared research 
experience of water management systems in developing contexts, in particular 
exposure to water scarcity in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and 
conceptions of water within an historical and developing context. The first event 
presented an opportunity to explore more deeply current thinking on the relationship 
between social capital, empowerment and community-driven development. The three 
events brought together scholars with common interests in water and confirmed that 
this study on water, lodged within discourse on trust and social capital, is important. 
The seminar at the World Bank in October 2003 provided international perspectives 
on core development themes and in debating the conceptual and operational links 
between empowerment, social capital and community-driven development a number 
of prominent scholars, in particular Grootaert and Krishna's 'think pieces,' were 
debated and elaborated on in some detail. The significance of the event, within the 
context of this thesis is that the scholarly reflections emphasised the critical role of the 
state in creating a climate where trust is nurtured and emphasised experiences of trust 
in developing contexts. The seminar confirmed the usefulness and limits of the 
concept of social capital, in particular its cognitive component, trust. Implicit in the 
6 Included think~pieces commissioned by the World Bank on conceptual defInitions, conceptual 
linkages, major points of agreement, major points of divergence and key operational points by Esman, 











debates, was also the notion of shame, because scholars spoke about the way in which 
knowledge was transferred and how people felt ridiculous or embarrassed when they 
could not understand what was being said. 
The WISA biennial conference in May 2004 came at a critical time in the preparation 
of the thesis. The data collection was complete but the opportunity to discuss water 
resource management and to contextualise this aspect of water reform in community 
driven projects, municipal projects and so forth was valuable. The themes that have 
been elaborated on in the thesis were latent in much of the work presented in the 
context of community-driven development or integrated water resource management, 
highlighting the relevance of this study and its contribution to research and inquiry 
into challenges that face DW AF in forwarding its project of reform. 
The Water Management Institutions Symposium was a two day intensive workshop. 
Discussion in small breakaway groups with key decision makers in the project of 
integrated water resource management highlighted some of the problems that have 
been identified and how DW AF perceived and managed these. The symposium was a 
planning symposium where the decision to restructure the Department and develop 
proto-CMAs within the Department, was confirmed. 
Phases Five and Six: Qualitative versus quantitative 
Introductory words 
The objective of gathering empirical data is to provide real data with which to evaluate the 
relevance of ideal theoretical assumptions that have been developed into theoretical 
constructs, or what Maxwell (in Bickman & Rogers 1998) refers to as a 'test' of the 
developing theories (1998, p. 94). The task of this research project is to evaluate the 
usefulness of the ideas, emanating from the selected theoretical schema, in analyzing the 
transformation that is taking place in the water sector in post-apartheid South Africa. The data 
provides an opportunity to deconstruct features of the trust discourse that are most useful for 
this project. 
The first challenge in data collection is to source primary and valid structures that 
provide coherence to the narrative and in so doing advance the inquisitive impUlses of 












and the words uttered by key infonnants. Both quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies offer the potential for both rigour and error, but this study is not tasked 
with examining, in too much detail, the comparative strengths and weaknesses of 
both. Adequate cautionary measures are required to mitigate for bias in both 
approaches. 
Research as a process of trust 
As a numerate anthropologist/ versed in qualitative research methodology, the 
temptation to produce a robust measuring instrument for trust was overwhelming. The 
constant self-undennining of the authority of the qualitative versus the quantitative 
needed curbing, as it was a symptom of the need for acceptance by technicians and 
'serious' researchers in the domain of water. The production of a scale would provide 
a 'safe' measure for trust. A quantitative study on trust in the water sector would have 
therefore provided easier points of entry and exit into the domain of water, as the 
method echoes the pragmatist 'technical' and 'objective' ethos that predominates. 
Another temptation was to reduce the need for face-to-face unstructured or semi-
structured interviews. In other words, it was an impulse by the researcher to check the 
emotional against the rational, the feeling against the cognitive and the 'soft' against 
the 'hard' science. 
The nagging desire to produce a robust measuring instrument was only fully placated 
during the final stages of the research project. Four events appeased the quest for 
quantitative research: 1) the complexity of the terrain and recognition of the limits of 
quantitative standardised instruments in measuring shifting and uncertain social 
phenomena, 2) external supervisory reassurance that the existing empirical evidence 
is more than adequate and that, furthennore, a scale to measure trust could be both 
distracting, costly and possibly unreliable,8 3) convergence of the cognitive and 
7 As an anthropologist in the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at 
the School of Economics (UeT) and part of a network of individuals pursuing common interests, 
knowledge and confidence about poverty research, both quantitative and qualitative, was gained. Later 
as a development practioner with a keen focus on informal networks and their role in economic 
production, entrepreneurship and capacity-bUilding, the focus was on creating accurate and valid 
measuring instruments and exploring mixed methodologies. Large- and small-scale surveys included 
questionnaire design, field supervision, validation and monitoring, data analysis and synthesis ofthese 
large- and small-scale surveys during the period 1990 to 2002. 
8 This project will be pursued as a discrete project post-doctoral thesis. The thesis is a contribution to 











emotional through bringing to fruition this project/thesis and thus gaining an internal 
authority (self) that is better able to resist the temptation to undermine the 'softer' 
aspects of social science, 4) trust in the research process and in the cohabitation of 
academic reasoning and excellence and emotional feelings. This cohabitation and 
ability to mingle the rational and emotional mitigated any tendency for reinforcing 
shame based feelings. The thesis provided an enabling environment for the 
development of agency (self) and permitted both the penetration of trustworthiness of 
others and of being trustworthy for others. 
The difficulty of measure for intangible assets 
Qualitative research has been criticised for not being 'scientific' although practioners 
of quantitative research are more frequently bringing qualitative components into their 
research design (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Seale 2002). Research into 
intangible assets, such as trust and social processes, the focus of this study, are prey to 
a range of problems that are common to both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. 
The concept of social capital is very popular in development discourse but it is 
relatively under-measured.9 There is insufficient attention paid to tool design which 
focuses on relevant factors in social capital. The nature of the concept, too, and its 
significance across almost all aspects of life, demands that a multi-disciplinary 
approach be used. But there are several other challenges associated with measuring 
the construct of social capital. 
A first challenge presented is for instrument design and the effort - in social capital 
measurement to measure 'invisible goods.' Differences in meaning exist for 
different people and a methodological challenge is evident in efforts to create 
measures that actually tap into what they are supposed to - or claim to - be 
measuring. Another challenge, associated in particular with the creation of a 
standardized measure of intangible or invisible assets, is the need to distinguish 
9 Narayan's Voices o/the Poor. Poverty and Social Capital in Tanzania produced by the World Bank 
in 1997 provides quantifiable evidence of social capital at the village level although its emphasis was 
on the structural rather than the attitudinal component of the construct. The attitudinal component is 
more prevalent in democracy measures such as the Afrobarometer, Latino or Eurobarometer and the 











between beliefs, attitudes and behaviour but to measure all three. One needs to 
ideally be tapping into all of these, but typically some surveys focus only on one of 
these important elements. In the task of measuring social capital it is essential that 
deep structure beliefs are used that inform behaviour as much the measure of the 
behaviour itself. 10 
A further challenge is to develop robust instruments which can measure across 
cohorts (i.e. income, education, race and age) and across location, a daunting feat in 
the domain of water management where cohorts are disaggregated into cultural, 
political and type of expertise. This is critically important in measuring social capital 
because these measurements can, if accurate, be used as predictors of, for example, 
trends in social wellbeing or social uncertainty, inclusion/exclusion, willingness to 
pay, to co-operate or to engage with the subject of integrated water resource 
management at all. But the challenge remains of how to interpret the causal linkages 
between trust (risk-taking, inclusion, engagement), shame-related behaviour 
(withdrawal, exclusion) and participation (inclusion, agency) and so forth. This is not 
an incidental task and requires considerable expertise in new paradigm research 
methodologies, whether these are quantitative or qualitative. 
In the domain of quantitative research, there are important debates around construct 
validity and reliability that inform trust measurements, in particular those put forward 
by Adcock & Collier (2001) who distinguish not only between validity and reliability 
but also between different types of validation processes. These authors provide a good 
illustrated model of conceptualisation and measuring: levels and tasks. The 
importance of this work is that it allows for different types of validation and makes 
use of an integrated overall process of assessment. The use of 'nomological 
validation' (Adcock & Collier 2001, p. 530) allows for the examination of the causal 
relationship between specific indicators of different concepts. But the usefulness of 
this research is also its reference to bridging differences, rather than stating 
distinctions, between qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. 












Onyx and Bullen (1997) in their analysis ofCACOM, the Centre for Australian 
Community Organisation and Management's social capital data project, point out that 
the social capital and cohesion scale they developed was simplistic and as such could 
not deal with the complexities and subtleties of human life (1997, p. 26). 
Other common errors in survey research, that are not specific only to the measure of 
intangible assets, include respondent and interviewer fatigue; 'recency and primacy'; 
hypothetical questions; 'memory recall' and 'satisficing' (Krosnick 2000; Sudman et 
al. 1996), many of which interfere with validity measures not only in quantitative but 
also qualitative research methods. Joseph Maxwell (in Bickman & Rog 1998), in his 
analysis of validity, identifies two broad types of threats to validity: researcher bias 
and reactivity, which is the researcher's effect on the setting or respondent, both of 
which are discussed in more depth in discussions that follow (1998, p.91). 
The advantage that quantitative research has over qualitative in this domain is the 
potential for larger numbers that produce data for statistical analysis. Quantitative 
research is also able to test whether the emerging trends in this study are changing 
over time, whether the measured trends are localised events and to identify new 
indicators and test others during the data analysis phase. But both quantitative and 
qualitative research are prey to a host of design problems and data errors, including 
the subjective design of the researcher and which questions are asked and which not. 
These remarks are critical when undertaking research about intangible assets and any 
assumption that qualitative research is less authoritative than quantitative in this 
respect must be rejected. 
Participant observation and interview process 
Introductory remarks 
Participant observation, unstructured and semi-structured face-to-face interviews were 
used in this research project for the purpose of gathering raw data. The study is 
exploratory in nature and the data is neither controlled nor manipulated (Tashakkor & 












This ethnographic component of the study was interactive and provided rich and 
important data to further the inquiry into trust and transformation in the water sector. 
Anthropologists have taken the view that society can be studied best from inside by 
the immersion of the researcher in the study. Walsh (in Seale 2004) presents an 
argument that ethno-methodology is part of a constructionist approach and it 
encourages the researcher to focus not so much on how people see things but what 
they are doing (2004, p. 227). A realist and 'scientific' view of the world is optimal, 
even if this is guided by feeling, perception and qualitative research methods. 
According to theories on reflexivity (Janet Holland and Caroline Ramazanoglu (in 
Seale 2004), the subject's own filter amplifies some events and mutes others. As the 
study field was remote from personal experience, highly technical, male and 
organised predominantly by engineers, the critical inquiry was made easier on the one 
hand, for it was necessary to act with suspended disbelief. In this instance the 
researcher's own ignorance of anticipated outcomes worked to the advantage of the 
critical inquiry. 
Geertz (1973) sees culture as a system of signs, and for him the task of the 
ethnographer is to produce 'thick description.' The ethnographer is then able to find a 
whole web of meaning, cultural structures and knowledge which is superimposed on 
what he calls the layers of a cultural script (in Seale 2004, p. 227). Walsh (2004) 
suggests that being a story-teller and conveying arguments and persuading readers 
that their accounts are 'plausible constructions of social actors and social scenes' 
(2004, p. 228) is a lesser science. Truer science does not need to persuade the reader 
that the accounts are 'plausible' for if the utterances of social actors are 'facts' and 
'real' then forms of realism have not been abandoned and the renderings are truly 
empirical and 'scientific' in their exactitude, despite the filtering effect of the 
researcher. 
The onus on the good researcher is to constantly re-evaluate the 'facts' and reconsider 
fairness, correcting for the effects of the filter where possible. Although the interview 
is, as Steinar Kvale (2003) writes, subjective, bias is reduced by the 'craftsmanship of 











that the knowledge that is generated remains as valid and reliable as possible (2003, p. 
290). This process was an iterative and essential ingredient in the study. 
As a participant observer (deploying direct observation techniques), Walsh (2004) 
recommends good relationships should be established with the people that are able to 
generate the data needed (2004, p. 228), but this is an ideal recommendation because 
in effect the gaps in knowledge, feelings of social uncertainty and 'uneasy trust' 
(2001) inhibit data-collection procedures. More than once during this study, for 
instance, conversations were redirected by either the respondent or interviewer. 
Instead of speaking about licensing or about the ethics of weighted votings in water-
users' associations, the conversation turned to non-threatening topics - for respondent 
and interviewer such as the food that was served at the venue or 'another cup of 
teaT Efforts to redirect the interview and to regain authority were sometimes 
unsuccessful. 
The data of a technical nature that was most needed in the early stages was most 
inaccessible inhibited by the knowledge regime of the researcher who did not have 
the key to enter into an unknown territory. Inexperience in the 'scientific' realm also 
inhibited information flows because once the door was unlocked and information 
flows were forthcoming, the information itself was often difficult to grasp. There was 
considerable cognitive dissonance between respondent and interviewer on many 
occasions. Thus the problem was not, as researchers sometimes experience, external 
gatekeepers who restricted access to information. The gates were open because the 
research was, at least formally, legitimate, emanating from a renowned learning 
institute and encouraged by DW AF within its own ethos of critical inquiry. Gate-
keeping was self-inflicted and stringently inhibiting. 
Dissonance between the formal acknowledgement of the research and the pressing 
need for results 'so what have you found?' was also inhibiting. Although the gates 
were opened there was, nonetheless, dissonance between the 'technical' and the 
'social.' The 'technical' found difficulty with a quest for 'truth' that was not positivist 
but doubtful, was reliable but ambivalent and was realistic yet incongruous. The 











repetitively reproduces perplexing verisimilitude and reflects back social uncertainties 
and ambivalences that go with deep change. 
Walsh's (in Seale 2004) reference to the funnel structure of ethnography matches well 
with the actual research experi'ence. The research did not have a distinct point of 
departure, other than the investigation of trust in the water sector, but as the ideas 
were more clearly formulated, the problem to be investigated gained focus. The 
original 'plan' mooted over time for the initial idea to scrutinise two institutional 
settings, 1) the catchment management agency and 2) a water-user association, was 
both erroneous and impracticaL The catchment management agency did not yet exist 
and the process of its establishment became the most important focus of the research. 
The process of gathering raw data as part of the investigation of trust and 
transformation in the water sector unfolded in a number of interviews, meetings, 
venues and institutional sites. 
The duration of meetings for this component of the study varied between four to six 
hours. The advantage of this component of the study was that there were well 
prepared formal documentsll provided by consultants both pre and post-meeting and 
these provided valuable information both during the data-gathering and analysis 
phases of the project. 
Face-to-face interviews 
Face-to-face interviews were both unstructured and semi-structured with the duration 
times between 90 and 120 minutes. 12 Verbal protocol between respondent and 
interviewer was sometimes complemented by maps of the geographical landscapes of 
the Breede-Overberg Water Management Area no 18, which was, as indicated in the 
preface, the chosen site of investigation for the thesis. The advantage of using maps as 
a tool to advance the inquiry was that the mapping of the geographical setting 
11 Note reservation on objectivity and range of topics highlighted in elaboration of phase three above. 
12 In writing, the intention is to provide a disguise and protect the identity of the informant, but this has 
not always been possible. Names and places have been changed to make it difficult for key informants 
to recognise themselves or to be recognised by the reader. For instance, an interview in Onrus might be 
listed as an interview in Hermanus, in this way maintaining the integrity of the geographical region but 
cloaking the respondent in a false identity. Unfortunately it is not necessary to adjust for gender as 











spatially identified boundaries of mountain, borders, estuaries, rivers and other 
physical landmarks. But there were disadvantages to this investigatory tool, for 
example the ease and speed - with which the respondent navigated through the 
maps reinforced feelings of separateness, ignorance and 'stupidity,' undermining the 
research confidence. 
Coherence 
The internal coherence of the findings suggests the emergence of a general 
experiential pattern ofthe events. The researcher's awareness of the need for 
coherence is itself an error bias in that selective utterances, during both the participant 
observation and the face-to-face semi-structured and unstructured interview phases, 
might be recorded over and above other utterances. Nonetheless, the experience of 
research and the need to retain integrity and internal validity is, as an anthropologist 
and development practioner, engrained. Thus the internal subjective analytic voice 
constantly corrects for bias by ensuring that words that 'don't fit' are not excluded. 
The words that 'don't fit' contribute to the puzzling distortions that are part of the 
transformation process and confirm the complexities and shambolic meanings that 
emerge on the ground at this particular point in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Face-to-face interviews provided raw data in the form of narrative texts. The data that 
was collected was transcribed within hours of the interview and a method of open 
coding was used where phrases or key words are coded using theoretical themes to 
organise the texts. This is adjusted from what is known as grounded methodology. 
Grounded methodology generates an indexing system through which segments of raw 
data can be accessed more readily (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 139).13 An example 
of open coding follows: 
Table Two: coding example one: Interview Onrus Steering Committee. February 2001 
--"'c:--:--------------,--=:---:---::---:-:---:----------, 
1-' :;:=K:=-ey'---'-'Wc..;:o.:..rd=--_________ +E;;:c, xample of manj:.;;.;:fe~st:.:;ac:.:ti..::con:;_____::__-:__--I 
I 
Distrust Farmers very distrustful and won't co-operate re 
, registration: also distrust re the pricing system 
I decisions ~
' Not real opportunity i People feel that locals don'( really get to make any 
Opportunities "'~------r-:=;N:.:.ew::::o:.:::)p=P(o-rt,-un-;i..,.tie-s-W-OU-;-Id-;-cb~e=w~'e;-I:.:cco~m~e~d======~~ 
, N aHonal versus local Not real local involvement in the bigger picture, it's , 
: Inclusion/exclusion also interventionist style 
I 
all them I 
DW AF going ahead with plan without input from " 
any of us 











Table Three: coding example two: Interview Central Breede River WUA: February 2001 
~KerWord Example of manifestation 
Trustworthiness He has been ele;:cted to rel:resent all WUA I 
Man of knowledge Knowledgeof as~ets of water consumption, etc 
Historical elite Connected to Brandvlei Dam building 
Key player At all meetings, leading part, part of the inner circle I 
."n<1I1"'", (my Impenetrable: makes decisions and leads I 
The surprising ease of verbal protocol of many of the respondents meant that unstructured 
interviews allowed for free flow of speech and the emergence of the invisible threads of trust 
and shame, At times the resonance of the theoretical constructs in the language of the 
respondent was thrilling in the exactness of match between thc ideal and the real. In indexing 
the narratives, patterns emerged: style of government matched experiences of inclusion and 
exclusion, trustworthiness and reflections of high or low trust and poverty, and water scarcity 
produced common themes in which the devastating effects of apartheid and the cleavages that 
exist currently were blatant 
Unintended consequences of coding 
The open coding method proved indispensable when shifting through large amounts 
of text at later stages. The text is, however, preserved in its original form, and as the 
theoretical frame itself expanded, new themes emerged. For example, after several 
interviews with town engineers local government issues were repeatedly reproducing 
resounding themes that did not readily match the social capital indexing or coding. 
New reading in public policy and public administration was helpful in providing the 
linkage between the theme of social capital, for example Sztompka's (1997) style of 
government and Mutahaba's et al. (1993) themes of centralisation in Africa. 
Some of the findings were fobbed off as incoherent by some' experts,' but they have 
been included as the fobbing off of certain realities can be perceived as censoring or 
gate-keeping and is in itself an indicator of the uncomfortable exactitude of the data, 
rather than the reverse. The fobbing off was important as it necessitated repositioning 
and cross-validation, both from 'objective outsider voices' or 'objective internal 
voices.' 
Sample and sample bias 
Gaining access to respondents was unproblematic and recruitment of respondents 











selected for suitability to 'test' the theory. The difficulty was not the recruitment 
phase but the face-to-face interviews themselves, because of exaggerated bias such as 
male respondent/female interviewer, water expert/water layperson, practical 
farmer/academic researcher, which were at times overwhelming. Some respondents 
perceived the researcher as lacking in practical skills because academics were 
considered to be 'out of touch and in the realm of ideas. ' In other instances the 
prejudice was that a layperson would 'never really understand' and a female 
interviewer reinforced the 'otherness' and 'differences' (Fine 1998, pp. 133-135). 
Over-J;eliance on 'experts' who were recommended in the early phases of the research 
had some negative repercussions as this reinforced the researcher's own feelings of 
inadequacy. Embarrassment or feelings of inadequacy meant that opportunities to 
gain knowledge were often lost. These opportunities were lost because the 
information overload was overwhelming and the inexperience of how to retrieve the 
events and organise them in memory reinforced feelings of exclusion and being 
'stupid' or'inadequate.' Much of this early data, retrieved two years later, served to 
inform the study. Its usefulness was not maximised at the important early stages ofthe 
study, and instead of providing stepping-stones to direct and focus the inquiry, these 
early meetings had a contrary negative effect for they were stored in memory as a 
reminder of the researcher's own ineptness and lacunae in 'scientific' knowledge in 
the domain of water. In certain cases, experts, sensing some confusion, offered 
additional interviews and elaborated on technical aspects, but persistence in the 
domain of the 'technical' aggravated the feelings of embarrassment and 'shame', at 
times so intense that the only way out was to make excuses and to express gratitude 
'thank you so much for your help, I will come back at a later stage.' 
Gender also reduced opportunities to gain knowledge in other ways. The opportunity 
to visit farmers in isolated rural settings was forfeited on several occasions as white 
agriculturists treated the interview in a demeaning manner and flirtatious undertones 
by respondents were unwelcome. The 'site tour' offer, for instance, was turned down 
despite the temptation to gain experience and knowledge on the workings of canals, 
farm dams or trans-boundary rivers between neigbours where water was heavily 
contested. Punch (in Denzin & Lincoln 1998) draws on the work of Martin (1980) 











room' (1998, p. 165) and Hunt (1984) who 'because of features of her identity-
white, female, educated outsider - found that there were impediments to developing 
rapport and trust with different categories within the police' (Punch 1998, p. 165). 
These observations, although in a different sector altogether, are relevant in the case 
of specialist research in the predominantly androcentric world of water resource 
management. 
Interviews with public officials in local municipal offices were 'safer' and the terrain 
was more familiar. It is possible that the direction the project took, in engaging with 
the concerns of public administration and local government in more depth, was due to 
the ease of verbal protocol and ease of setting and surroundings with town engineers 
that allowed for uninterrupted data collection. 14 But it is likely too that the emphasis 
on local government, as the primary site of intervention and service delivery, places 
importance on the problems and challenges experienced by local government and 
highlights the problem of trust at this level. 
The sampling rigours of quantitative data collection are inappropriate for qualitative 
data that demands other rigours, but, importantly, bias did occur and the following 
examples are pertinent: 1) data collected from key informants whose discourse 
matched more easily the researcher's discourse is superior to data collected from key 
informants whose dominant discourse is scientific and technical. This is evident from 
the field notes and the gaps that occur in the field transcripts, 2) the linear progression 
of time provided the opportunity to correct the skews both because of awareness of 
the 'unscientific' nature of certain inquiries but also because the dominant discourse 
became more familiar as more knowledge was acquired and the time lapse did not 
skew but rather reinforced emerging themes, 3) the filtering frame of reference of the 
researcher deciphered more easily certain recurring themes rather than others and 
resulted in easier indexing and more accurate memory recall, 4) the researcher's own 
bias, often implicit rather than explicit, produced hidden queues, and it is possible that 
they were less 'hidden' than intended, producing therefore counter-transference 
effects or reactivity (Maxwell 1998, p. 91) or what Krosnick (2000) names 
'satisficing' (2000, p. 6) providing pleasing rather than correct information, 5) the 
14 At least the interruptions were of quite a different nature, for instance phone calls, public officials 











researcher's own interests skewed the data in the opposite way, resulting in the desire 
of key informants to counter balance what they perceived to be research bias, thus 
underreporting incidences of thick trust, or in-group/out-group dynamics. As the 
respondent corrected for perceived research bias, the desire to mitigate or even 
undermine the research premise, largely but not only projected, 15 underreported 
certain events and over-reported others. 
Interaction between subject and object 
Janet Holland and Caroline Ramazanoglu (in Seale 2004) characterise interviews as 
'stylised social events' (2004, p. 184). Reflexivity is an important research attribute 
and refutes the idea that the researcher perceives the 'stylised social events' with 
neutrality or detachment (2004, p. 184). The research was affected by the 
researcher's own narrative that has influenced the research approach, the questions 
asked and the responses produced (Seale 2004, p. 184), and the research was hindered 
by a lack of shared assumptions in some cases and helped in others. The impact of the 
researcher's own journey played a significant role in the data collection process and 
influenced the way in which what Seale (2004) calls matching, did or did not, occur (2004, p. 
185). 
In general, personal research experiencesl6 also affected the inquisitive inquiry into 
trust and progressively introduced confidence that shame was an important but 
neglected feature in social capital discourse. In the exacting words of Wolf (1996), 
'one's position in the social hierarchy vis-a-vis other groups potentially "limits or 
broadens" one's understanding of other's (1996, p. 13).17 Because of personal and 
working research experience, there was dissonance with the cognitive discourse of scientists 
and pragmatic engineers or public servants which appears as Schaap & van Twist (1999) 
define as incomprehensible or unintelligible (1999, p. 72) while the discourse of the 
marginalized and the previously excluded, or those who suffered the effects of a top down 
style of government, was more coherent. 
15 The publication of an article by the author "Washing away the sins ofthe past' in the International 
Journal of Public Administration is a case in point. 
16 SALDRU 1990-2001 and 29 evaluations on behalf of Impumelelo Innovations Award Trust 2002-
2004. 
17 Also note the reminder by Wolf that 'why assume that the perspectives ofthose on the margin are 
less distorted rather than simply different from those not on the margin' (1998, p. 13) for common and 











Like a bridge over troubled water 
The 'meaningful rendition ofthe whole human experience' (Hilliard in Sefa Dei, 
1997, p. 210) promotes inclusivity and certainly, as Riggins (1997) warns, in the 
dominant discourse of science and technology, the repetitive nature of 'stereotypes' 
does not mean that they are the correct or the only depictions of reality (1997, p. 8). 
They are not 'the facts', as the dialogue on knowledge, agency and power in Chapter 
Five proclaims. Underpinning the discipline of academia and furthering the gains of 
excellence in the social sciences does not imply that the emotional or feeling context 
of the research project be denigrated in any way. Louise Vincent's (2004) article 
'What's love got to do with it? The effect of affect in the academy' is an indictment of 
the way in which academic excellence assumes the exclusion and repression of 
emotion. Vincent argues that the binary between reason and emotion is questionable 
and notes Freire's (1972) distinction between 'true words' and inauthenticity (in 
Vincent 2004, p. 107). 'Inauthentic words are unable to transform reality for they lack 
connectedness to the world and to the lived experiences within which they are 
spoken' (ibid). Academic critique is comfortably located in the theories of others and, 
although implicit, the passion for the topic lies all too often beneath the surface. 
Importantly, the dominant view, according to Vincent (2004), is that 'strong emotions 
are quite out of place in academy, belonging as they do to the realm of the intensely 
private' (Vincent 2004, p. 113). Vincent goes on to argue that this view has become 
so dominant that it has managed to cast itself as common sense and that, she asserts, 
speaks loudly of the prevailing power relations (ibid.). Vivian Bickford-Smith (1999) 
and Ross (1999) consider the way in which the public and private are organised in 
their work on the theme of 'respectability', where some actions are considered values 
(virtues) while others are denigrated as they are not considered to be respectable. 
Following on from this argument, trust itself, as a construct in development discourse, 
is far more acceptable than shame, but that does not mean that shame is less relevant 
as a determinant of social action. If the acquisition of knowledge is inhibited by 
shame-based feelings, rooted in a history of oppression or current experiences of 
poverty, whether these be water scarcity, scarcity of knowledge or scarcity of food, 
they are critical determinants of social action. The determinant defmes and shapes in-











development discourse. Puzzling distortions, so well described by Wicomb (1998), 
are less welcome in the ordered universe of 'science', and the emphasis on the 
software rather than hardware aspect of water (Turton 2002) continues to underplay 
the profound effects that deprivation of water has on people. 
This study brings shame to the fore. This is demonstrated using the rigorous codes of 
academic excellence. It is argued that this construct is no less important than the 
construct of trust. Suspension of trust, or healthy manifestations of distrust, has been 
identified as the paradox of democracy (Warren 1999; MisztaI1996). If an individual 
experiences shame it can be perceived as a signal that all is not right. Feelings of 
shame might be introduced due to style of government, discordant relationships 
between state and citizen, abuse of knowledge, power or inhibition of agency. Critical 
inquiry into shame can therefore provide opportunities for understanding barriers to 
the deepening of democracy and conditions that are obstructing change. 
Emotional versus cognitive as a hias for data gathering 
The ease of verbal protocol of expert informants is, as the discussion above has 
indicated, both an advantage and a disadvantage. Ease of verbal protocol results in 
texts that produce a wealth of experience and expertise and the verbal protocol 
enables the respondent to proceed unchecked. The researcher is thus supposedly given 
an opportunity to fit together the pieces of the puzzle and to unravel the way in which 
reform is taking place in the water management area. lbe disadvantage of ease of 
verbal protocol, as has been suggested above, is that the researcher is engulfed into 
the dominant knowledge regime, and lacking the skills - or confidence - is unable to 
redirect the interview and wade out of the morass of information. Repeatedly in these 
instances the feeling is one of entrapment, and the response of the researcher is, under 
these conditions, invariably silence or, particularly in the initial phases of the project, 
withdrawal. In most cases frustration at not standing one's ground was acute and 
confidence in the knowledge regime of anthropology and social research temporarily 
shaken. 
Furthermore, the research itself was affected by the distortions produced in the field 
and the inability of the researcher to decipher contradictory messages, signs and 











is subject to distortions and ambivalences as it finds difficulty in realising new 
democratic values. A new script in the domain of water is struggling to find 
expression, and the research process is affected by these struggles. 
The research experience accentuated strongly the divide between technical and social 
expertise. The social is uttered as a largely unintelligible discourse that falls between 
the cracks and is perceived by some technicians and public officials themselves as 
largely unhelpful in advancing the cause ofCMA. The incongruence of the two 
regimes is stark, despite the emphasis by policy and politicians on integrated 
catchment management. The research inquisition has articulated, rather than solved, 
the vagaries of the transition from the old to the new, the technical and the social. 
The inquiry has unlocked gateways in the process of gaining new knowledge, and in 
so doing, latent shame-based components of the internal authority of the researcher 
that might have been manifest have been appeased. The result is the production of 
trust in the research process itself. 
3. Structure of the thesis 
Chapter One has dealt with the rationale and approach to the study 
Chapter Two is tasked with the history of ideas of three concepts: trust (as a 
component of social capital), shame and participation and how the thematic constructs 
of trust and shame impacts on issues of inclusion and exclusion (participation). The 
chapter engages with several cross cutting themes and is densely located within 
theoretical notions of trust and shame although it introduces the case study, making 
way for the empirical data, in its discussion on the theme of participation in the latter 
part of the chapter. The idea in this chapter is to cover extensively a wide range of 
theorists in order to present the reader with a set of ideals. The theoretical discourse is 
arranged into three parts. 
Part One on 'Trust' is divided into the following ten subsections: 
1) Background to the ideas of social capital and how they matter to development 
discourse. 2) The distinctive properties of social capital are presented. The differences 











Modernity is the next subsection, and, as all social interactions are embedded, the 
usefulness of considering trust within modem, as opposed to 'traditional', country 
contexts is critically examined. 4) Transformation in the water sector requires a 
change from old systems to new systems and the reform or creation of water 
management institutions is of key interest. The idea of institutions as sites for the 
production of trust is considered, and 5) what the conditions are for the production of 
trust in institutional settings 6) The subsection on trust, inclusion and exclusion 
considers the meaning of democracy and how including people enhances the 
democratic project. 7) The problem of specificity versus universality follows on from 
this discussion. How to merge the specific with the universal and to build trust 
between strangers is largely dependant, the chapter argues, on the 8) style of 
government, and this subsection examines style of government within leitmotivs of 
trust, risk and power. 9) Subsection nine considers poverty and the linkages between 
poverty and scarcity of social capital, in particular trust. 10) This subsection is linked 
to the ideas of modernity, but here the purpose is to distinguish between good and bad 
social capital and the subsection is entitled 'Too much trust, too much of a good thing. 
The final two subsections lead into Part Two of the theoretical chapter which presents 
the analytic framework for Shame. 
Part Two is on 'Shame' and is divided into eight subsections: 1) The first subsection 
offers a brief introduction to the theme of shame and then considers 2) shame in the 
extreme and presents exaggerated examples of shame in order to illustrate how it 
becomes a determinant of social action. 3) Subsection three follows on from the 
background discussion and further develops the ideas of shame. 4) The theme that 
was considered in Part One of this chapter is e1aborated in the subsection entitled 
'Shame and modernity'. 4) 'Shame and agency' develops the argument that shame 
inhibits agency, 5) and contrasts gleichaltung (wellbeing) with embarrassment, 
criticism and insult. 6) 'Shame, identity and exclusion' and 7) 'Shame, honour and 
knowledge' complete the theoretical ideas on shame. 8) A summative discussion is 
presented that closes the formal discussion on shame by isolating distinctive 
properties of shame that fit tightly with distinctive properties of trust and considers 











Part Three of the theoretical chapter covers ideas on 'Participation' and begins with 
the 1) rationale for participation and 2) contextualizes participation within 
development discourse. 3) The problematic of trading outcomes with process is the 
next subject for debate, 4) but participation, like trust, is a vague term and the 
intended and unintended consequences of the vagueness are noted. 5) The final 
subsection of Part Three reflects on participation and different forms and meanings of 
participation. In so doing it makes explicit reference to the water sector and 
introduces the Breede River Basin Study in order to contextualise notions of 
participation and non-participation. 
A brief conclusion to the theoretical chapter considers whether and in what ways 
these ideals might be useful in better understanding the transformation process. 
The discussion in Chapter Three takes the reader through the: (1) background to 
water examining the background of water policy and current geographical and social 
landscapes that have been shaped by the historical legacy depicting how state practice 
around water in South Africa was organized in the past. The important theme of (2) 
water and poverty is developed. The chapter then reviews recent government Acts 
that are relevant to the delivery of water to consumers portraying the systems, and (3) 
legislative guidelines and policy documents with specific reference to the two key 
legislative frameworks, the (i) Water Services Act (no 108 of 1997) and the (ii) 
National Water Act (no 36 of 1998) with a discussion on the organisation ofthe water 
sector in South Africa and (iii) the National Water Resources Strategy. (4) This is 
followed by a subsection on policy aims and achievements. This part of the chapter is 
further divided into six subsections: (a) general, (b) knowledge regimes, (c) tariff and 
cost for water, (d) local government, (e) urban versus rural water supply and a brief 
paragraph on (f) water and trust. The chapter concludes with 5) summative remarks. 
Chapter Four reviews the changing state responsibility for the delivery of water to 
consumers and the changing role of the state in integrated water resource 
management, in particular the devolution of responsibility to local government. The 
chapter examines how the changing role of the state affects the production of trust and 











and other role players and how this interaction affects trust-building processes. Three 
themes have been identified and organise this discussion: 1) synergy between non-
state and state actors, 18 2) bureaucrats and change aversion and 3) style of 
government. These three themes are discussed within the following contexts: a) the 
establishment of a water user association, b) establishment of a local catchment 
management plan and c) implementation procedures at local government level. The 
chapter begins with a general discussion on the role of the state in producing trust 
using the themes as an organising tool. This general discussion is backed up by 
empirical evidence gathered within three selected contexts, 1) the Cogmanskloof 
Irrigation Board that is in the process of transforming into a water user association, 2) 
the Palmiet Catchment Management Plan, and 3) local government, where particular 
reference is made to the Greater Hermanus Water Conservation Programme. The 
chapter concludes with a general discussion section followed by summative remarks. 
Chapter Four produces data that reflects on synergistic relationships between state and 
local actors and examines the way in which state and non-state actors engage in the 
reform process. It is within this context that Stompka's (1997) focus on the style of 
government is particularly useful. Inequality and differences between people can 
hinder the flow of information and can be disastrous for sustainable development and 
democracy (Ostrom 1996; Farrington 1999). Chapter Four explores how these 
theoretical notions are relevant to the inquiry. 
Chapter Five continues to expand on the features that were covert in the trust 
discourse developed in Chapter Two and further develops the themes of democracy 
and participation that constituted the closing arguments of that chapter. Chapter Five 
furthers the debate on the themes of synergy between actors, style of government and 
bureaucrats' resistance to change and promotes these important topics by featuring in 
particular the following four facets: 1) participation, 2) knowledge, 3) power and 4) 
agency. The discussion makes explicit the interconnection between these four features 
and the constructs of trust and of shame. The empirical data proffers that 
participation, knowledge, power and agency are critical components of the attitudinal 
construct of social capital and trust - advancing too that shame belongs alongside 











trust - both being important detenninants of social action. Knowledge is critical to 
participation and poor people, suggests Desai (1994), cannot negotiate participation 
and secure control of decision-making processes without it. 'Capable agency' 
(Krishna 2002, p. 165) is necessary, and according to this author has a multiplier 
effect on the production of social capital. Krishna (2002) suggests that people learn 
what works and what does not work. 
The Conclusion to the study reconsiders the research approach and the way in which the 
themes were elaborated. The conclusion is tasked in particular with assessing to what extent 
the ideas match reality as perceived by the researcher. The chapter concludes in suggesting to 
the reader that the construct of trust is an important theoretical construct but that it is in the 
development of a more complex set of analytic tools to support the trust construct that it 
becomes most useful. The conclusion takes up the leitmotiv of shame and considers whether 
or not it would be a useful addition to the proposed trust toolkit. The chapter examines the 
tensions between the intended reforms and the realisation of these reforms in the Breede-











Chapter Two: trust, shame and social capital theoretical constructs 
The critical inquiry that concerns this work deploys the constructs of trust and shame 
and locates these themes within a broader set of analytic tools: style of government, 
bureaucracies and change, synergy between state and non state actors and the 
recurring themes of knowledge, agency and power. This chapter is tasked with 
locating the two core constructs of trust and shame within a theoretical framework. It 
presents ideas that will be critically applied to the empirical cases and provides a 
starting-point for the inquiries into the systems, peoples and institutions in the water 
sector. The discussion makes explicit notions that are implicit or explicit in diverse 
theoretical studies on social capital and that are at the core of contemporary 
development discourse, participation, inclusion/exclusion, power, agency and 
knowledge. The chapter examines in which ways trust and shame are determinants of 
social action, in particular, it reflects on the way in which shame is an inhibitor of 
trust and investigates how shame might curtail the establishment of new solidarities 
between water users, impeding the development of reform in the water sector. 
The chapter is presented in three parts, 1) trust, 2) shame and 3) participation. The 
chapter begins with a background to notions of social capital, locating the attitudinal 
or cognitive component of this construct within the social capital discourse. The 
discussion on trust is further divided into eight subsections: 1) notions of trust and 
modernity 2) institutions as sites for the production of trust 3) conditions for 
producing trust in institutional settings 4) trust, inclusion and exclusion 5) specificity 
versus universality 6) trust, risk and power: style of government 7) poverty as an 
impediment to trust and finally 8) too much trust, too much of a good thing? The 
second part of the chapter introduces the construct of Shame. This section is further 
divided into six subsections: 1) shame in the extreme 2) shame and modernity 3) 
Gleichaltung versus embarrassment, criticism and insult 4) shame, identity and 
exclusion 5) shame, honour and knowledge. The section on shame is completed with 
summative remarks on shame. 
The theoretical constructs of trust and shame include features of participation and as 











affected. The final section of the chapter makes the linkage between trust/shame and 
participation explicit and introduces empirical evidence into the theoretical 
arguments. It is further divided into the following five subsections: 1) the rationale for 
participation 2) contextualises participation 3) people to pipelines 4) trading outcomes 
for process 5) intended and unintended consequences of vagueness and finally 6)) 
reflections on participation. 
Background 
The ideas behind social capital are not new (Rose 2000, p. 147) and have been part of 
philosophical inquiry as early as Parsons (1949), Durkheim (1897) and Marx, who, 
amongst others, reflect on social interaction. Norbert Elias's (1978), The Civilizing 
Process or reflections of philosophers such as Wittengenstein (1953), who examines 
language and meaning and its inevitable ground in social meanings, Habermas's 
(1986) Communication and the Evolution of Society or, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Durkheim (1897), grappling with the social construction of 
individualism and Hegel (1952), on disconnectedness and anomie. In the discipline of 
anthropology, ritual (Geertz 1973; Malinowski 1922; Turner 1974) reciprocity (Mauss 
1950) and co-operation between neighbourhoods and communities have long been a 
central focus. Malinowski's Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), Geertz's 
(1973) descriptions of community ritual in Bali, Mead (1937) on social meanings, or 
Turner, (1974) on liminality, all contend with the positive and negative effects of 
social bonds and community life. 
From the late 1960s, with the growing concern about civil wars, revolutions and the 
rise of authoritarian regimes (Clark 2003; 1 Freire 1972; O'Donnell 19942), political 
notions of civil society - as the sphere where social movements become organized 
(Eade 1997, p. 5) 3 - were reinforced. Liberals called for greater political freedom, 
civil rights and the democratization of repressive regimes (Clark 2003, p.17). Links 
were made between economic growth and political freedom, for example by Ingelhart 
I Clark's (2003) chapter Concepts o/Development provides a useful overview of development 
trajectories. 
2 Democracy and horizontal accountability. 
3 Friedman (2002) is critical of the unquestioned admiration for civil society as an antidote to the 
discredited state. Many analysts of civil society have begun to call into question the durability of civic 
associations that played important roles in past democratic transitions, particularly in Latin America 











(1999), Fukuyama (1995), Ravaillon (2001), Hardin (1993), or Jones (2004) and this 
trend expanded in the 1980s to embrace a new conceptual framework for evaluating 
human wellbeing and development (Clark 2003, p. 19). Theorists like Amartya Sen 
(1999) moved away from a commodity and utility approach, arguing that human 
development is a process of enlarging people's choices (ibid.) and 'the very best 
theorists in mainstream economics worry about, and write about, social norms that 
determine and change preferences and behaviour' (Kanbur 2002, p. 478). Within the 
development context, as Seligman (1997) notes, the focus on civil society and 
citizenship is not on individual rights but is about shared solidarity, broadening the 
citizen's sense of self, conceived by Ellison (1997) as 'a position of defensive 
engagement of citizens' (1997, p.l). 
Seligman (1997) argues that the construct of social capital has replaced the focus in 
the sixties and seventies on civil society and that it comes in the 'wake of a 
disillusionment with the term civil society' (1997, pp. 5-7). Like civil society it tends 
to be 'loose and imprecise' (ibid.) and can mean different things to different people 
(Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002, p. 52). It risks becoming, according to Portes 
(2000), 'synonymous with each and all things that are positive or desirable in social 
life' (2000, p. 535), and trying to be, according to Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002), a 
catch-all concept but could end up catching nothing (2002, p. 5). It is, proposes 
Stiglitz (2000), a concept with a short and already confused history (2000, p. 59). 
Social capital 
Ostrom (2000) distinguishes four properties of social capital (2000, p. 173). 
1. It does not wear out with use but rather with disuse 
2. It is not easy to observe and measure 
3. It is hard to construct through external interventions 
4. National and regional governmental institutions strongly affect the level and 
type of social capital available to individuals to pursue long-term development 
efforts (Ostrom 2000, p. 173) 
The study examines whether and in what ways social capital might be constructed 











governmental institutions affect the production of trust. Chapter One examined the 
problematic of observing or measuring trust and constraints on research into 
intangible goods. 
Social capital refers to various social factors that contribute to wellbeing, although 
these factors are often elusive. Knack & Keefer (1997), Rose (2000), Grootaert & van 
Bastelaer (2002) and Putnam & Pharr (2000) propose that in the face of a complex set 
of social interactions, social capital, including its social structures and underlying 
norms and values, increases the efficiency of collective action. But, as the dialogue in 
the chapters of this thesis suggest, social capital has both positive and negative 
attributes and can inhibit collective action and thus hinder the project of reform. 
Understanding these structures, norms and values and how they impact on democracy 
and on improved wellbeing is at the core of increased interest of a wide range of not 
only social scientists but also economists. 4 
Social capital has also been broadly defined by Grootaert & van Bastelaar (2002) as 
'the institutions, relationships, attitudes and values that govern interactions among 
people and contribute to economic and social development' (2002, p. 2) or again by 
Putnam (1995) 'as features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social 
trust that facilitate coordination and co-operation for mutual benefit' (1995, p. 67), 
or as a 'stock of formal or informal social networks that individuals use to produce or 
allocate goods and services (Rose 2000, p.149). 
The construct of social capital can be broadly divided into structural social capital that 
relates to the networks, associations, organizations and the rules that they follow, and 
cognitive or attitudinal (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna 2002; Hooghe & 
Stolle 2003) social capitaL Attitudinal social capital refers to norms, values and 
attitudes that affect people's lives and is, as Krishna (2002) notes, less tangible and 
unobservable as people carry it inside their heads - and more difficult to measure as 
it refers to intangible notions such as shared values, reciprocity and trust (Dasgupta 
4 De Haan and Siermann (1996) present two conflicting hypotheses: 'some economists argue that 
freedom fosters economic performance and hence economic growth; others pose that high growth rates 
require economic controls and reduced freedom '. See also Ravaillon (2001), who, referring to non-
tangible assets, recognises that micro-empirical work on growth and distributional change is required to 











2000; Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna 2002; Warren 1999). Mistztal (1996) 
considers trust, the attitudinal or cognitive component of social capital, as a highly 
problematic but recurrent feature of social relationships (1996, p.13), and the 
empirical data will examine whether in the reality trust is as problematic as Mistztal 
(1996) suggests. 
The two components of social capital act together, for according to Krishna (2002) 
cognitive aspects predispose people to mutually beneficial collective action while 
structural elements facilitate such action (2002, p. 66). According to Grootaert & van 
Bastelaer (2002), Warren (2001) and Woolcock (1998) trust does not necessarily 
require embedded structural elements of social capital and similarly, according to 
these authors, the similarly structural elements of social capital are not necessarily 
conducive to the building of trust. The empirical evidence reflects on how networks 
and structural social capital affect the development of trust and, as both components 
are seemingly determinants of social action, they are considered for the purpose of 
this study to be critical analytic tools for the analysis of institutional transformation. 
Woolcock (1998), in his 'brief intellectual history of social capital' (1998, p. 159), 
does not fmd it surprising that the actual words 'social capital' were first discussed 
within an economic framework by Alfred Marshall (1890) and John Hicks (1942) and 
were used to distinguish between temporary and permanent stocks of physical capital 
(Woolcock 1998, p. 1 59). However, according to the same source the significance of 
social capital was first identified by Jane Jacobs (1961) and Bourdieu (1977). Jane 
Jacobs (in Woolcock 1998) notes: 
Networks are a cities irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is 
lost, from whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return 
until and unless new capital is slowly and chancily accumulated (1998, p. 
192). 
According to Woolcock (1998, p. 155) the construct was only fully developed by 
Coleman (1990), Putnam (1993) and Portes (1993). Today it has become accepted in 
mainstream development discourse, including economics, where the relationship 











2004;5 Knack & Keefer 1997;6 Ravaillon 2001;7 Sen 19998), although some theorists 
doubt that social capital has a positive effect on household income generation and 
poverty reduction (Mallucio et al. 2000).9 
Theorists argue that as advanced technology, global connections and the demise of 
autocratic and top-heavy states took man into the realm of the individual, rather than 
·the collective, social bonds were severed or threatened (Scheff 1990, p. 13), 
connections between people became more fluid and the denser networks of kin, 
friends or close neighbourhoods were replaced by new forms of social interaction 
(Seligman 1997; Mistzal 1996). The new forms of social interaction in the domain of 
water reflect puzzling convolutions that are not easy to decipher. 
Section One: Trust 
1.1 Trust and modernity 
De Hart & Dekker (2003) and others (Giddens 1990; Offe 1999; Hardin 1999; 
Halvorsen 2001; Seligman 1997, 2001) locate notions of social capital within 
discourse on modernity and modernization, suggesting that the more well to do in 
'modem societies' possess generalized trust, independent of locality, while others less 
well to do, don't. Fukuyama's (1995) core argument pivots on the notion that 
economically strong states (modem) have more social capital. These theorists argue 
that generalized trust in government, a product of a secure economic environment, 
manifests in social trust and social capital, which is an expression of modernity 
(Fukuyama 1995; Offe 1999; Seligman 1997, 2001). The arguments developed in 
Chapters Four and Five consider whether the notion of generalized trust is relevant in 
the WMA or whether there are merely pockets of trust within groups that signal 
5 Jones demonstrates that greater trust in wealthier members in new group situations might improve 
prospects of collective action (2004, p. 707). 
Knack & Keefer proposes that group memberships are not directly related to economic performance 
and are unrelated to trust (1997, p. 1284) but that trust and norms of civic cooperation are stronger in 
countries with formal institutions ... and are less polarised along lines of class or ethnicity (1977, p. 
1252). 
7 Ravaillon (2001) notes that human and physical capital have been emphasised but that intangible 
assets and risk, exclusion and so forth have received less attention. 
8 Sen's (1999) emphasis on capabilities, autonomy and freedom gave new insights into the relevance of 
these 'assets' for development. 
9 Mallucio et al. (2000) note that bridging social capital would help mitigate for shocks to vulnerable 
households but that in KwaZulu-Natal, the site of their research, networks were narrow and 










generalized low trust, both vertically and horizontally. Eisenstadt (1995) takes the 
position that people who do not belong to the 'narrow minimal scope of primordial 
units' (in Offe 1999, p. 55) need to construct trust amongst each other. This notion 
becomes an important one in the story of water that unfolds for it is difficult to 
unbundle the 'scope of primordial units' that Eisenstadt refers to, and it is likely that 
the reality on the ground might be far less tidy than is suggested. 
The anthropologist Harriss (2003) agrees that current thinking on trust suggests a 
movement from pre-modem contexts where trust is 'supposed not to be a problem 
since action is quite predictable' (2003 p.758) but it often is less unproblematic than 
'supposed.' The notion of networks and connectedness is at the centre of 
Granovetter's (1973, 1985) work. For him, actors 'do not behave or decide as atoms 
outside a social context' (1985, p. 487) and 'are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations' (ibid.). Granovetter's embeddedness is an 
emphasis on the concrete personal relations that are not only able to generate trust but 
also to discourage malfeasance (Granovetter 1985, p. 490), but which appear to be 
'soft and comforting,' ignoring the 'harsh and oppressive' dimension of power that 
can be present (Harriss 2003, p.764).1O 
The boundaries between familiarity and trust and modem and traditional- as well 
as the relationships between people are more blurred than would appear. Granovetter 
(1985) notes that in both modem and traditional contexts risk is the feature that 
distinguishes the modem from the old and that it is risk, therefore, that distinguishes 
trust from familiarity.ll The feature of risk becomes important in the analysis of the 
empirical data, and is discussed under the subsection risk, power and style of 
government below. 
A useful way of considering the differences between what Woolcock (1998) notes as 
enmeshed social relations of one type or another (1998, p. 162) is the distinction 
between network capital and social capital. People with network capital, for instance, 
10 Harriss (2003) quoting Sayer (200t). However, Harriss's research on business in Indian fmns 
confirms Fukuyama's hypothesis that the businesses are run by family and kin or caste but, unlike 
Fukuyama, Harriss's emphasis is on the dimension of power. 
II WH Auden is cited in Turner (1974) as referring to a passage from 'needless risk' to 'endless safety' 











remain dependent on locality and neighbourhood, in other words tied by blood and 
10cality,12 and are, as the anthropologists Geertz (1993) and Malinowski (1926) 
suggest, bound by pre-modem or traditional social bonds. Implicit in this argument is 
that modem autonomous people are able to form bonds with others that are not solely 
based on family ties or neighbourhood networks and that members of pre-modem or 
traditional societies are not. The core argument is important but the distinction 
between the modern and the traditional does not sit comfortably, and post-modernists 
(Lyotard 1979; Esteva & Prakesh 1998; Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Rahnema 1997) 
contest the usefulness of the notion of modernity and argue that the premise on which 
these arguments is founded is questionable. 13 A similar concern has already been 
expressed, about assumptions made about western notions of knowledge and 
objective science and this concern will be further explored in Chapter Five. 
1.2 Institutions as sites for the production of trust 
Seligman (1997) identifies trust as threefold: trust in persons, trust in institutions and 
trust in abstract systems (1997, p.18).14 Transformation and trust can be produced 
within organisations, there can be trust in the organisation itself and there can be trust 
in systems that have been established by government, all of which affects ordinary 
water consumers. The focus in analysis of trust and transformation in the water sector 
engages with these three levels of trust, although the intersection of trust between 
institutions, people and systems is not always dear. 
A culture of trust or distrust is not produced by democratic institutions - although 
institutions are, as Ingelhart (1999) suggests, one of many factors that contribute to 
the emergence of trust or distrust. In the reform of the water management institutions, 
the way in which the management systems are developed is considered as a necessary, 
but not sufficient, ingredient for trust. North (1990) argues that the main function of 
12 See Victor Turner's discussion on communi/as and gemeinschaft (1974, p. 202). 
13 The idea that there is a path whereby traditional people move through to modernity and acquire 
technology and goods that make them more 'modern' is contestable. It implies that traditional 
communities lack complexity and diversity and makes over-simplistic allusions to homogeneity. A 
similar argument is followed in Chapter Five's, section on knowledge that suggests too that dominant 
discourse defmes the parameters of what is superior and desirable knowledge. 
14 The overwhelming vote in favour of the African National Congress in the elections of April 2004 is 
dear proof that trust in systems is high and that it overrides any distrust in people who administer them. 
The ANC is trusted, as a legitimate governing system, confmning what Warren (1999) has claimed, to 












institutions is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure for human 
interaction (1990, p. 25), but institutions, particularly during periods of transition 
from an autocratic regime to a democratic one, struggle to achieve this. Powell & 
Dimaggio (1991) consider institutions to be 'rife with conflict, contradiction and 
ambiguity' (1991, p. 28) and, according to Offe (1999), they are incomplete and 
ambiguous places where patterns of precarious and potentially contested cooperation 
are debated (1999, pp. 66-67). 'Trust is important for the material practices and 
organizing principles that are established and for the symbolic constructions that are 
part of institutions' (ibid.). 
The new management systems that are being built as water management moves away 
from being a centralized state function to becoming a function of institutions at the 
watershed level would be, because of the radical nature of the proposed changes, 
contested or precarious sites (Offe 1999). Yet the way in which the ideas match the 
actual is not always neat and the analysis developed, particularly in Chapter Four, 
considers a number of premises put forward by the theorists. Powell & Dimaggio's 
(1991) premise that institutions secure the privileges and interests of some rather than 
all groups is particularly relevant as empirical evidence suggests that some water 
users are favoured over and above others (1991, pp.lO-l1). 15 Institutions, committees 
and forums are expected to have both positive and negative effects on water users and 
on furthering the project of democracy in the water sector. They can, as Serageldin & 
Serageldin & Grootaert (2000) proposes, under favourable conditions help provide 
adequate, accurate information that allows people to make appropriate, efficient 
decisions (2000, p. 48) and, if there is credible commitment by governments to the 
principles of democracy, they are able, according to Levi (1996), to break the vicious 
cycles of discrimination (1996, p. 48), thus laying the basis for what Levi (1996) calls 
'generalized trust' (1996, p. 50). Are conditions in the CMA process favourable and 
is there adequate, accurate information for water users to make appropriate and 
efficient decisions? 
15 Powell & dimaggio (1991) represent the 'new institutionalism' but are in accord with the theory of 
Selmick's (1949) 'old institutionalism' in that both accept the dynamic and contested terrain of 
institutions although Selznick, to mention just some of the many differences, is "straightforwardly 
political' and also 'embedded in local communities' (Dimaggio and Powell 1991, pp. 12-13) in his 
analysis. Selznick's work on integrated watershed management is relevant for discussions in this thesis 
and it is remarkable that the many insights that are noted by theorists in recent decades were already 










Ibe chapters that unfold are tasked with examining how well the theoretical claims of 
authors match with the reality that emerges from field examples. The claim that 
Powell & Dimaggio (1991) and Agrawal & Gibson (1999) make, for instance, that 
change, power and efficiency are fundamental features of institutions and that, 
because they are sites of contradiction and ambiguity, relationships of power are 
unevenly distributed across them, will be examined. Agrawal & Gibson (1999) asserts 
that once they are in place institutions are 'independent of the forces that constituted 
them. Institutions can change because of constant challenges to their form by the 
actions of individuals whose behaviour they are supposed to influence' (1999, p. 637). 
Agrawal & Gibson's (1999) assertion is explored more fully as it might be possible 
that unequalised power distribution in institutional settings restricts the opportunities 
to challenge the form of the institutions. The dialogue that is pursued in the study 
critically examines how and under what conditions constant challenges to the form of 
the new management systems are possible, if at all. Although institutions for water 
management have been put in place as drivers of change and transformation, not all 
institutional forms result in tangible gains for their members or lead to practical action 
or change. Stiglitz (2000) suggests that one of the reasons for the restraint in 
opportunities or tangible gains for all members is that at certain stages in the evolution 
of social institutions there might be an undersupply of social capital (2000 p. 60) 
when the resource is most needed. This is a critical concern to both DW AF and to 
researchers who are considering obstacles that are standing in the way of the 
development of the new management institutions. The empirical data gathered 
suggests that the concern of Stiglitz (2000) is highly relevant for there appears to be 
an imbalance of social capital and trust, with an oversupply in one domain and an 
undersupply in another - where it is most needed. The urgency for a supply of social 
capital is to equalize the balance of power and produce new networks and new 
institutional forms. The nature of trust is that it is constructed on shared norms and 
reciprocity but during periods of transformation patterns of cooperation are 
renegotiated (Ruiters 1996; Offe 1999), and until new patterns of cooperation are seen 
to work and trustworthiness across segments is felt, it is likely that there will be an 











Levi's (1996) emphasis on the quality of the institutions is critical, for as the author 
contends, institutions can 'promote trust of those you know and distrust of those you 
do not, those not in the neighbourhood, outside the networks' (1996, p. 49). Offe 
(1999) notes that institutions can nurture trust between people who have never before 
had contact with one another and for whom there is no relevant communal allegiance 
(1999, p. 70), and they can provide social solidarity (Luhmann 1995). Ruiters (1996) 
notes that in communal allegiance: ' ... new networks of trust and partnerships between 
former enemies ... between civics and local authorities, between capital and labour ... 
form part of a pervasive official national building project' (1996, p.119). 
One of the concerns that emerges in an analysis of the empirical data is that shared 
norms and reciprocity are locked into networks that have been shaped under the 
apartheid regime. The opportunity for institutions in post-apartheid South Africa to be 
production sites for new trust building is therefore limited. 
It is in the institutional settings, stakeholder forums, committees, water users' 
associations and reference groups that, as Offe (1999) hopes, individuals and groups 
of people who were in different pockets of social capital are provided with 
opportunities to test the trustworthiness of others (1999, p. 55). According to Offe 
(1999), institutions, because they represent norms and values, could offer a 
'deceptively simple and easy way out of the structural scarcity of trust in all its 
dimensions' (Offe 1999, p. 65). In the ideal, certainly Offe (1999) presents an 
attractive solution although one that is 'too good to be true' in particular under the 
present institutional settings where there is the level of uncertainty and profound 
change as a result of the transformation process in the water sector in South Africa. 
Offe (1997), expanding on his premise, proposes that people who are not connected to 
primordial units need to build trust (1997, p. 10) and that institutions are sites where 
this can take place. 
The relationship between this set of values and the reality is a problematic one and 
calls for a complex set of variables with which to analyse in which ways institutions 
are able to develop shared norms and values and how the development of these would 
further the project of transformation in the water sector. To artificially construct a 











produce trust because, as Luhmann (1995) contends, it must be given freely (1995, p. 
128). But developing the climate in which trust is able to be brokered is important. In 
other words, the artificial construction of a system might be necessary, at least in the 
early stages of transformation, to ensure that the conditions for the development of 
trust are offered. The risk· of constructing artificial institutional settings that 
undermine rather than produce trust is also high. 
Offe (1997) sees institutional settings as mediators or generalisors of trust (1997, p. 
18). Like Ostrom (1996) and Levi (1996), Offe (1997) places emphasis on 
institutional rules and proposes that if the institutional rules are adhered to, 
institutions have the ability to generate trust and to build bridges of trust between 
strangers (1999, p. 70). Offe (1997) warns that in cases where the institutions lack 
plausibility and are not seen to embody the accepted democratic norms and values, 
they would be unable to produce trust and the outcomes would be considered dubious 
(ibid.). Trust is built on confirmations and 'it reacts to critical information not because 
of the facts they report, but because they function as indicators of trustworthiness' 
(Luhmann 1995, p. 128). What types of critical information would facilitate the 
production of generalised trust and would serve as indicators of trustworthiness? And, 
on the other hand, what critical information is being generated if there is a 
manifestation of low trust amongst water users? 
1.3 Conditions for producing trust in institutional settings 
Sztompka (1997) goes more deeply into conditions that are necessary for the 
production of trust, and for Sztompka (1997) style of government is one of the 
important determinants of a culture of trust. Sztompka (1997) considers that a style 
that is nurturing and inclusive will foster a culture of trust. For Sztompka (1997) it is 
this feature of style of government that provides an answer to Offe's question: what 
does it take for an institution to build bridges and to nurture trust between strangers? 
The 'spirit' of the law is expected to be transmitted to members and if the style of 
government is aligned with a specific set of values, according to Sztompka (1997) it 
will generate trust. 
Under these conditions, in other words where the style of government enables the 











can be a source of trust (1996, p. 50). Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Ostrom (1996, 
2000), Levi (1996), North (1990) and Tarrow (1993) proclaim the importance of the 
state in the project of democracy. The state has the ability to reduce what Schaap & 
van Twist (1999) call 'network closedness' (1999, p. 65) and can counterbalance what 
Levi (1996) calls 'narrow dependencies' (1996, p. 51) that are risky. Chapter Four is 
tasked with examining more closely the role of the state and whether the state is 
contributing to the production of trust or whether, in fact, it is responsible for the 
perpetuation of shame, a feature that is discussed in considerable depth in the second 
part of this theoretical chapter. It is possible that if low trust emerges between water 
users, this could be linked to an interventionist style of government and if, on the 
other hand, there is high trust emerging between water users and government, this 
might be the result of a nurturing style of government in the way that Sztompka 
(1997) has suggested. 
North (1990) considers trust as an important factor in institutional settings as it 
smoothes relationships, gains time and minimizes necessities for contractors and 
excessive legality but the generalisation of trust can also be enhanced through 
institutions that generate practices of fairness and neutrality. Offe (1997) clarifies this 
by saying that equal political participation by the regime that strangers are jointly 
subject to must be seen as neutral and colour blind, without built-in preferences, 
biases and selectivity or restrictions of access (Offe 1997, p. 26). There are conditions 
that would not be considered 'fair' for instance: 1) top- down decision-making that 
bypasses local water users could be considered unfair because the needs of some are 
likely to be amplified disproportionately to the needs of others, while 2) deployment 
of a dominant frame of reference and knowledge regime to the exclusion of 
alternative knowledge regimes could be considered unfair and exclusionary because 
the needs of some water users could be considered less intelligible or comprehensible 
than the needs of others. 
Theoretically, institutions have the potential to generate conditions for the experience 
of trustworthiness of strangers, and between strangers and they can promote a sense of 
self, or what Offe (1997) refers to as a property to be agency-shaping and agency-
enabling (1997, p. 27). Are water management systems providing opportunities for 










Under what conditions would institutions have positive effects for democracy 
(Warren 1999) and could they embody the spirit of the law and succeed in furthering 
the objectives of integrated water resource management (IWRM)? The discussions 
that are pursued in the following chapters scrutinise the way in which theory matches 
reality and discern which theoretical constructs are most useful in understanding 
transformation in developing country contexts in general and in the water sector in 
particular. The discussion continues by unpacking the linkages between trust and 
democracy and examining how inclusion furthers the project of trust and how 
exclusion, on the contrary, might hinder its production. 
1.4 Trust, inclusion and exclusion 
Dryzek (1996) defines democratisation as the progressive inclusion of various groups 
and categories III political life (1996, p. 475), and it IS accepted 
that sustainability of development is more likely to be achieved 'if the commitment 
and energies of all sectors of society can be harnessed' (Minogue 1998, p.l6).16 The 
National Water Act (no 36 of 1998) provides the necessary conditions for the 
democratisation of the water sector by including water users who were 
disenfranchised and excluded from decision-making processes in the past. But are 
these conditions sufficient to drive the deep changes that are required to move from 
old to new? Notions of agency are so intimately connected to features of power, 
knowledge and participation (Giddens 1990; Desai 1994; Offe 1997) that these 
features become essential ingredients and inform the analytic framework that is 
developed in the thesis and that is discussed below. 
Desai (1994) elaborates on the right of people to participate in the planning, execution 
maintenance and control of projects and decisions that affect their own lives, a 
process, he suggests, that is increasingly accepted as a good government agenda 
(Desai 1994, pp. 217-218). Krishna (2002) also proposes a bottom-up dynamic of 
development to replace failed top-down efforts to deliver economic and social 
benefits (2002, p. 3)Y For Desai (1994) good government is not enough because the 
16 Coetzee et al. remind us it is only one of the ingredients necessary to promote sustained development 
and 'it is not to suggest that participation equals sustained development' (200 I, p. 469). 
17 The absence of women in the institutional settings in the water sector is notable and there is a 
consistent exclusion of women. Their work as caregivers is carried out in private (Ellison, p. 1997) and 











involvement of the disenfranchised in decision making is, he suggests, a complex 
process that requires 'new mechanisms and structures' that are pro-poor (1994, p. 
218). Knowledge is critical to participation because poor people are unlikely to be 
able to secure control and participate in decisions that affect their own lives without it. 
(Desai 1994, p. 221). Krishna (2002) refers to this as 'capable agency' (2002, p. 165) 
which has a multiplier effect on social capital (2002, p. 168) as people learn what 
works and what does not and also because, as Ostrom (1996) states, they are better 
able to monitor the accountability of their own members (1996, p. 229).18 The way 
that knowledge is both produced, used and understood has a political dimension 
(ibid). 
Creating artificial settings for inclusion is problematic. Selznick's (1949) discussion 
on cooptation mechanisms, distinguishing between formal and informal cooptation 
described as the 'process of absorbing new elements into leadership or policy-
determining structures of an organisation as a means of averting any threats to its 
stability of existence (1949, p. 13), is relevant. For if there is to be cooptation, then 
suitable mechanisms are required to ensure that those brought into the structures are 
not excluded from the inside, a concern that is well expressed by Newman et al. 
(2004) and Williams (2004). Selznick (1949) acknowledges the fact that formal 
cooptation does not envision the transfer of actual power (1949, p. 14). 
As the study is concerned about transformation in the water sector and the role of trust 
and shame in this process, the dimensions of participation, inclusion and knowledge 
are pivotal. We share Ellison's (1997) concern with social inclusion and citizenship 
and agree that in a climate where social actors are increasingly 'confronted with the 
erosion, or transformation, of established patterns of belonging, they ... readjust 
existing notions of rights and membership to new conceptions of identity, solidarity 
and the institutional foci of redress' (1997, p. 711). 
This confrrms again the importance of the 'new mechanisms' and that a 'good' government is in itself 
not enough. 
1& Selznick (1949) describes the minimum essentials for this process, and of relevance to this discussion 
is the principle 'that there must be active participation by the people themselves in the programs of 










For the progressive transformation of water management systems it is critical that 
there be a process in which, as Ellison (1997) proclaims, 'differences and highly 
differentiated needs' (1997, p. 706) are acknowledged in their specificity. Ellison 
(1997) claims, however, that the particular can be as misleading as the universal. The 
universal claims in the CMA process are concerns and preoccupations with ideals of 
integrated water resource management, a big idea rather than a reality for many. 
Varughese & Ostrom's (2001) paper on heterogeneity recognises that everyone does 
not want the same thing and to be fair and impartial to the needs of all sectors of water 
user groups, the need for specificity rather than universality - emerges as critical for 
the production of trust. 
1.5 Specificity versus universality 
Building trust between strangers and fostering an environment of belonging is an 
important function of democracy and it can come about, as Desai 1994, Eade 1997, 
Farrington 1999, Krishna 2002, Selener 1997 and Selznick 1949 hope, by drawing 
people into decision-making processes. These authors propose that by drawing 
people into decision-making processes local needs would be better represented and 
that in so doing the intended overall long-term outcome of reducing, or eradicating, 
poverty and inequality would be redressed. In the context of the water sector, drawing 
people into decision-making processes is a means to ensure sustainability and to 
realize the goals of integrated water resource management. Agrawal & Gibson (1999) 
and Ostrom (1996) agree that communities19 playa key role in bringing about 
decentralization, meaningful participation, cultural autonomy and conservation. The 
principle driver for integrated water resource management is the recognition that 
social formations closest to the resources are best placed to manage the resources in 
the long run (Agrawal & Gibson 1999, p. 634). 
But drawing communities in to decision-making processes is not proposed as a 
replacement for state involvement. Synergistic relationships between the state and 
local actors are championed by Evans (1996), Foley & Edwards (1996), Ostrom 
19 Agrawal & Gibson note that most studies that refer to communities in the field of conservation refer 
to a 'bundle of concepts related to space, size, composition, interactions, interests and objectives' 
(1999, p. 633). Note also the debate about heterogeneity and homogeneity, Krishna (2002), examining 
community peace efforts and Varughese and Ostrom (200 I) who scrutinise the diversity of groups in 











(1996), Levi (1996) and Tarrow (1993) as the answer. Ostrom and others (Evans 
1996; Foley & Edwards 1996; Levi 1996; Tarrow 1993) examine ways in which 
government agents strongly affect the level and type of social capital that is available 
to sustainable development efforts (Ostrom 2000, p. 173), and the point that these 
theorists stress is the synergistic relationships between state and local actors. Synergy 
between state and non-state actors requires a two-way engagement, one which is 
participation from the bottom up and the other which is engagement from the top 
down. The achievement of this engagement would be its ability to attend to the 
specific goals of local water users while furthering the universal goal of IWRM. 
Sztompka's (1997) focus, on the style of government as a key determinant for trust 
building, is a preoccupation with intervention from the top-down,20 while for Rose 
(1994) trust is built from the bottom up. But both these interventions, whether they be 
top-down or bottom-up, require a flow of knowledge between the various parties in 
order to equalise the basis of power and control (Selener 1997). Ismail Serageldin & 
Grootaert (2000), whose expertise in development is located firmly within 
international agricultural research and global development discourse,2! goes as far as 
to use information as a measure for the level of equity that exists (Serageldin & 
Grootaert 2000, p. 49). Scheff (1990) approaches the problem of knowledge and 
power as a sociologist with a concern for emotion and the way in which emotion 
guides and informs social interaction. For this author, unequal access to knowledge is 
the source of in-group and out-group dynamics and the reason is that 'in modem 
societies, experts usually see laypersons in their own society, that is non-experts, as an 
out group whose common sense is tantamount to ignorance' (1990, p. 142)?2 The 
point that is being driven in these theoretical discussions is that inequality and 
differences between people can hinder the flow of information and they can be 
disastrous not only for sustainable development (Ostrom 1996; Farrington 1999) but 
for the overall democratic project (przewoski et al 1996). 
20 Sztompka (1997) differentiates between interventionist and nurturing styles of government. 
Nonetheless his focus is on style of government rather than community and as such it is from the 
outside in, or top-down. 
21 Serageldin is vice-president for special programs at the World Bank and chairman of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research and the World Commission on Water. 
22 'What Thomas Scheff seeks to develop is essentially a quite novel account of the nature of social 












1.6 Trust, risk and power: style of government 
For Seligman (1997) and others (Warren 1999; Levi 1996; Luhmann 1979; Offe 
1999) risk-taking is central to the building of trust, where if something goes wrong 
some 'undesirable event' caused by the trusted can result (Offe 1999, p. 47). If there 
is certainty of an outcome then there is no need to trust. Hardin (1993) disagrees that 
trust is something one risks or makes a rational choice about (Hardin 1999, p. 25) and 
he develops an argument for 'encapsulated interest for both the trustor and the trustee' 
(Hardin 1999, p. 26) where the focus is on trustworthiness rather than trust. 
Granovetter (1985) is also reluctant to adopt the 'rational actor' approach, but unlike 
Hardin he accepts that it is a 'good working hypothesis that should not be easily 
abandoned' (1985, p. 506) and opts for a 'selective rationality' ( 1985, p. 505). 
But for Luhmann (1979) and Offe (1999) taking a risk is a rational choice that an 
individual makes. Trust is essentially risky and anyone who gives his trust 
supposedly, according to Luhmann (1979), 'considerably widens his potential for 
action' (1995, p. 128). Offe (1997) expands on the eventuality of an 'undesirable 
event' because 'my present action is premised upon the expectation of a future 
favourable response ... and in the absence of which I suffer a loss or damage' (Offe 
1997, p. 14). 
The relationship between trust and risk is particularly relevant in the context of water 
management which is overridden by complex technological discourse - where the 
outcomes for the layperson are not always evident - and which is also, currently, 
dominated by uncertainty and changes. When people are unwilling to take a risk, it is 
unlikely that new social capital will be produced because closedness or social fixation 
(Schaap & van Twist 1999) intrudes in the way in which people connect. Network 
c10sedness blocks innovation (Levi 1996) and impacts on the way in which social 
capital is built. But the attraction of network c1osedness, according to Molenaers 
(2003, p.122), is that it creates trustworthiness of the social structure, allowing the 
shared obligations and expectations that form part of that network to proliferate. Open 
networks, on the other hand, lack enforcement mechanisms (ibid.). Resistance to open 
up is also resistance to 'lose' the trustworthiness that has been consolidated between 











networks symmetry is fundamental between the different actors - for 'if one or both 
parties would start to nibble on the obligations inherent in the relations, both trust and 
reciprocity might in the end cripple' (Molenaers 2003, p.123). There are direct 
consequences of not living up to expectations. 
Patterson's (1999) research on trust showed that 'anxiety and insecurity are clearly the 
most powerful forces driving distrust (Patterson 1999, p. 190). Thus, unsurprisingly, 
within the current climate of transformation and deep changes in the water sector, 
trust levels are not high. Patterson (1999) and Luhmann (1979) approach risk and 
uncertainty from different angles and both cases are true. Risk and uncertainty inhibit 
the formation of trust but risk and uncertainty are also drivers of it. In stable 
democracies, for instance in Scandinavia, everyone trusts everyone else (Ingelhart 
1999; Stolle 2003), but there is an argument also that everyone can afford to trust 
everyone else because they are 'adequately secured against losses' (Luhmann 1995, p. 
128). In high-trust societies, such as these, generalised trust has been established over 
time and through periods of interactions between individuals. Trust in government, in 
these instances, is also high as state capacity is able to make provision for and 
determine the quality and inclusiveness of service delivery and fairness (Stolle 2003, 
p.34). The extent to which state capacity is fully utilised to further inclusiveness and 
fairness is questionable in the case of the Breede-Overberg WMA. 
Change is risky and public servants are adverse to risk-taking (Andrews & Shah 
200 I). But change in style of government is particularly important in the South 
African context where the old regime was characterised by an authoritative and 
deliberately exclusive government and where distrust remains imprinted in the 
memory of the majority of South Africans (Ruiters 1996; Marais 2001). The regime 
was dominated by a style of government that was oppressive and restrictive, 
discouraging spontaneous group activity and trust (Stolle 2003, p. 31). Despite the 
regime changes and the democratisation of the country, many government officials 
maintain the same style - centralised top-down decision-making that permeated the 
former regime, with the consequence that the deep change that has been expected and 
prescribed is not taking place. Unsurprisingly, therefore, reform in the water sector is 
slow and, according to Stolle (2003), mistrust slows down the process of reform 











of a culture of trust (Rothstein & Stolle 2003, p. 192). The questions are under what 
conditions will these rules and resource divisions that were part of the old 
bureaucratic system change (Klijn 1999, p.33) and under what conditions will new 
social capital be created (Krishna 2002)? Kickert & Koppenjan (1999) suggest that 
know-how is a key 'tactical and strategic' aspect and that bureaucrats need to know 
about the actors involved and their idiosyncrasies (1999, p. 58). The know-how is part 
of the knowledge transfers that are required in both domain, a discussion pursued in 
depth in Chapter Five. 
1.7 Poverty as an impediment to trust 
The World Values Survey data demonstrates 'unequivocally' that people of rich 
countries show higher levels of interpersonal trust than those in poorer countries 
(Ingelhart 1999, p. 89). One proposed reason, as suggested above, is that the rich -
and secure, knowledgeable and powerful - can afford to trust and have alternative 
resources - power, money and information (Offe 1999, p. 53). The argument goes 
then, that the rich are able to use their power, money and information if something 
goes wrong with the trust agreement. There is also disposable time, not only income, 
and more well-to-do people have the leisure time to join clubs, churches and 
associations. In the process, individuals get to know each other. 
Barberton (1998) and Ribot & Peluso (2001) are clear about the correlation between 
scarcity of resources and tangible goods. In the water sector, the correlation between 
water deprivation and deprivation in intangible social assets and goods is evident. In 
other words, those most in need of trust can least afford the transaction costs of 
engaging in trust-based relationships (Offe 1999; Barbeton 1998). However, as the 
empirical data unfolds, it considers too the possibility that the well-to-do also have 
much more to lose as water reforms are undertaken. Analysis of the empirical 
evidence explores the reality that the costs of non-participation are higher and that it is 
in the interests of those who are better endowed with water, to activate their social 
capital if they wish to retain their endowments. 
Another cause for paucity in investment in collective action in the water sector could 
be that the wealth of social capital of the poor has been dissipated as the previously 











One of the most persuasive arguments put forward by analysts of social capital is that 
thriving economic productivity is characterised by modem industrial relations where 
strangers cooperate with one another and form networks based on a culture of 
interpersonal trust (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Knack & Keefer 1997) but they do 
not only cooperate for economic gains but also for sociability, approval, status and 
power (Granovetter 1985, p. 506). 'Enforceable trust' is, according to Portes (2000, p. 
539), generated and sustained by the networks, for instance in the case where 
unregulated market transactions take place as community members imbue an 
entrepreneur among them with status and power in recognition of his/her income-
generating activities (ibid.). Studies on respectability (Bickford-Smith 1999; Ross 
1999) by historians examine conforming and sociability in terms of the need to be 
accepted in a system informed by Victorian values or virtues - what they refer to as 
'respectability.' The silence of some water users who do not have the know-how, is 
understandable within this context where not knowing means losing respectability of 
the values or virtues that predominate in the domain of water. The values and virtues 
are also drivers of enforceable trust, as it is the right thing for beneficiaries to 
reciprocate and to honour payments (Portes 2000) and also it is the right thing for 
beneficiaries to conform to social values and to maintain respectability (Bickford-
Smith 1999; Ross 1999). 
Undoubtedly, from preliminary evidence so far in this study, and from the theoretical 
assumptions reflected above, there is a link between tangible and intangible assets. 
Granovetter (1985) does not refute the fact that intangible assets (social) have tangible 
(economic) gains, but he too argues that business relations are mixed up with social 
ones (Granovetter 1985, p. 495) and that there are networks of personal relations at all 
levels where transactions take place (Granovetter 1985, p. 496), or what Jones (2004) 
sees as webs of interpersonal relationship that consider individual behaviour but 
within a social context (2004, p. 700). As embeddedness is an important aspect of 
sociability, and linked closely to intangible gains such as belonging, status or honour, 
loss of intangible assets can be a devastating consequence of mobility. The movement 
from a known place also means the movement from social relationships and family 
with the incumbent erosion of norms of reciprocity and sharing that follows 











and relations were frequently the framework within which women placed their 
experiences of loneliness, sadness and depression (ibid.). Scheff (1990) refers to 
severed social bonds, the most extreme cases of which were slaves who were 
'wrenched not only from their families but also from their cultures' (Scheff 1990, p. 
13). These concerns are pertinent for the reform in the water sector takes place within 
an uncertain social environment where political activists who were leaders of civil 
society are now in government and ordinary water users find themselves betwixt and 
between. 1bis is true for white agriculturists and it is true for school teachers and 
community leaders who remain disempowered today and are unable to assist their 
local residents in improving sanitation or water. 
Whether or not impulses to respectability, as featured in the theories of Ross (1999) or 
Bickford-Smith (1999), are helpful in understanding behaviour of water users is a task 
that forms part of the analysis. How does failure to trust affect opportunities in the 
water sector? Are the costs of failed opportunities to gain access to scarce resources 
an incentive for taking risks and engaging in trust-based relationships? Does failure 
produce what Kramer (2001) calls uneasy trust or feelings of shame that make it 
difficult for the development of conditions of high trust between water users? Is the 
fear of losing respectability, for others, a motivator to participate in the decision-
making process? 
Serageldin & Grootaert's (2000, p. 41) interest in social capital is more tightly 
intertwined with their research in the sector of natural resource development, and 
these authors consider ways in which social capital mayor may not contribute to 
sustainable development. Serageldin & Grootaert (2000) reflect on the ways in which 
closed networks, or what Schaap & van Twist (1999) call 'network fixation,' might 
undermine cooperation in this sphere. The task of the study is to examine whether and 
in what ways network closedness might be unproductive for watershed development 
and obstruct the progressive advancement of new water management systems. 
Woolcock's (1998) discussion on the costs of embeddeness exposes the problematic 
nature of closed or what he calls 'embedded' social relations and he notes, as did 
Desai (1994), that the transition from these forms of social relations requires new 
institutional forms and requires the development of a new set of tools, on how to 











Another differentiation that is worth considering is Granovetter's (1973) argument, 
developed in his earlier and complex article the 'Strength of Weak Ties,' that assumes 
weak ties to be more likely to link members of different small groups than strong 
ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups (Grano vetter 1973, 
p.1376). In other words, he believes that dense networks are not as useful as having 
more 'local bridges' (ibid). The way in which theorists approach the topic of social 
capital emphasises that it is a complex area and that there are different types of 
belonging. Warren (1999) and Grootaert & van Bastelaer's (2002) view is that 
belonging alone does not have a positive effect on democracy but that it is the scope 
and nature of the affiliations that matter?3 
1.8 Too much trust, too much of a good thing 
Conflating trust and familiarity can have consequences for the coherence of the 
analytic framework. The theoretical assumptions are that too much trust produces 
network closedness and that this, some theorists suggest, is negative social capital, the 
exclusion of some and inclusion of others (Woolcock 1998; Portes 1998; Portes & 
Landolt 2000; Granovetter 1982; Molenaers 2003; Ruiters 1996; Mishler 1997). It is 
not always clear when theorists discuss dense networks whether they refer to what 
Eisenstadt (in Offe 1999) calls 'primordial units' (1999, p 55) or a social context that 
is one of modernity. Notwithstanding the noted concern for lack of tightness in the 
social capital discourse that does raise concerns about its coherence, undoubtedly high 
degrees of discrimination close alternative avenues for economic gains and social 
honour (Woolcock 1998, p. 165). The following chapter expands on the relationship 
between water and poverty and traces linkages between water poverty and the effects 
of scarcity of this resource on feelings of exclusion, lack of respectability or lack of 
status. Poor people lack the opportunities to be actively involved in decision-making 
that could improve the quality of their everyday living. Farmer (1999) examines 
HIV / AIDS and stigma- related behaviour in Haiti and in his empirical setting, 
23 See also The typography o/voice (Goldin 2004) for an analysis of belonging and the relationship 











personal agency and freedom and broader social and economic restraints are 
interlocked (1999, p. 84)?4 
The key features of the discussion on trust are that participation, inclusion/exclusion, 
knowledge and power are important features of social capital and that more or less of 
these features is a detenninant of how and in what ways trust is produced and 
maintained. Chapter One argued the inclusion of shame in social capital discourse, 
and ways in which shame might detennine social action are examined in the course of 
the empirical analysis. The theoretical discussion on shame that follows develops an 
argument for why it should be considered as a cognitive or attitudinal component in 
the construct of social capital. The theoretical discussion suggests that shame both 
inhibits - and therefore perpetuates - network closedness and that network 
closedness, exclusion and non-participation produce and perpetuate shame. If the 
water management systems are not producing high trust, could one of the reasons be 
that there is some degree of shame amongst certain segments of water users? 
Section Two: Shame 
Literature on shame/5 not as prolific as the literature on trust, dates mainly prior to the 
nineties. The links between the trust issues which have taken such high profile in the 
'90' s have not been made explicit, but readings on shame (Heller 1996; Lynd 1958; 
Nussbaum 2001; Peristiany 1974; Scheff 1990; Taylor 1985; Tisseron 1992; 
Seligman 2000) confinn that like trust, shame plays a key role in detennining the 
engagement of individuals within the social context and shaping social interaction. 
Lynd (1958) suggests that the experience of shame seriously jeopardises or destroys 
trust (1958, p. 43) and that in shame there is a questioning of trust (1958, p. 207). 
24 Fanner (1999) makes the point quite clear in his book Infections and Inequalities that economic 
inequality favours epidemics and that these are closely linked to homelessness, racism and so forth. He 
makes the historical links too between political violence and long-sustained structural violence with 
increased rates of certain stigma-related diseases, for instance tuberculosis (1999: 259). Vulnerability 
to waterborne disease that is the result of poor access to adequate clean drinking water is not different. 
This is highly relevant to the discussion on shame that follows. 
25 Shame is used as a generic for a whole family of emotions including embarrassment and humiliation 
(Scheff 1990, p.74). Feeling words, like 'insecure, awkward and uncomfortable, can also describe 











Shattering of trust in the dependability of one's immediate world means 
loss of trust in other persons, who are the transmitters and interpreters of 
that world ... We have turned for response in what we thought was a 
relation of mutuality and have found our expectation misinterpreted or 
distorted. (1958, p. 47) 
As the discussion below unfolds, it becomes clear, that shame themes, as explored by 
social science theorists, belong to 'social capital' discourse, and it is a highly relevant 
cognitive or attitudinal construct. In the same way that trust has been widely accepted 
as a core element of social capital (Krishna 2002; Putnam 1993; Putnam 1995; 
Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Offe 1999; Seligman 2000; Sztompka 1997; 
Woolcock 1998) so too shame has its place in contemporary social capital discourse. 
The concerns that are part of development discourse are also relevant to shame in 
particular: segmentation (Ruiters 1998), autonomy and embeddedness (Granovetter 
1973; Woolcock 1998) and participation, power, knowledge, good government, 
democracy and citizenship (Blomkvist 1995; Desai 1994; Ellison 1997; Ostrom 1996; 
Rose 2000), risk (Offe 1997; Luhmann 1979; Levi 1996; Giddens 1990), Seligman'S 
(2000) notions of self and modernity and Kramer's (2001) concerns with identity and 
trust in institutional settings or Ross (1999) and Bickford-Smith's (1999) discourse on 
respectability. The theoretical analysis that follows makes the links between trust, 
networks and shame apparent and leaves the space for the reader to determine 
whether or not a valid case has been made for the inclusion of shame alongside trust 
discourse. 
2.1 Shame26 in the extreme 
In the early years of this century, Durkheim (1906 in Scheff 1990, p. 72) noted that 
'social influence constituted an independent system in its own right' which is different 
from the political, psychological or economic systems (ibid.)?7 His hypothesis was 
26 The divide between shame and stigma is sometimes unclear. Contemporary work on HIV/AIDS for 
instance (Farmer 1999), Levine and Ross (2002) describe stigma and AIDS where infected persons feel 
that it is their fault and they have brought something on themselves. For the purpose of this thesis, 
stigma is different to shame in that there is an outward sign, a blight or disease, such as leprosy or 
AIDS. The borderline between stigma and shame is often fluid though, for instance, prisoners on 
Robben Island felt that they were being stigmatised and also felt shame (Naidoo 2000). Nussbaum's 
(2001) paper' Upheavals of thought, the intelligence of emotions' was, in its draft form, entitled 
Inscribing the face, shame, stigma and punishment. 
27 Durkheim's social solidarity was determined by divisions oflabour rather than by likemindedness (in 











formulated after his examination of human behaviour where he noticed the 
importance of emotions for social solidarity (Durkheim in Scheff 1990, p.ll) and 
recognised the relationship between shame and conformity. Durkheim (1906 in Scheff 
1990) analysed the occurrence of suicide and reached the conclusion that in societies 
where individualistic tendencies were suppressed there were less suicides. In Catholic 
countries there were lower suicide rates than in Protestant countries where there is 
less conformity and less outer deference (Scheff 1990, p.72). 
These concepts are familiar to urban historians who consider respectability and the 
gains that are achieved when individuals conform to socially acceptable virtues (Ross 
1999; Bickford-Smith 1999), avoid being ostracised and fit in to the values and norms 
that surround them. Scheff (1990) criticises Durkheim's theory, that insists on social 
influence and organic solidarity - as an independent system in its own right (Scheff 
1990, pp. 72-74) as well as his methodology. In his critique, Scheff (1990) deploys a 
more intensive empirical research method to argue that the constraining factor for 
social interaction is not at a cognitive level and is not exterior, but rather that the 
compelling drive to conform to society is an emotional response (ibid.). For, he 
argues, social experience, particularly when there is conflict, is constrained by 
emotions (ibid.). The two determinants of social action that are selected as key 
analytic constructs, trust and shame, are considered in this research as both cognitive 
- they are determined by external factors but also emotional - determined by 
internal factors. What compels the individual to conform is not the perception of 
recognition of beliefs (cognitive process) and external sanctions and constraints, for 
we conform even when we do not wish to do so, but rather the emotional self or more 
precisely the internal constraining mechanisms, a deference-emotion system (Scheff 
1990, p. 71). It is the internal, almost invisible, emotional system that compels us to 
conform with external sanctions as the price of non-conforming is high (ibid.). It is 
significant, according to Scheff (1990), that formal sanctions, rewards and 
punishments are infrequent while the deference-emotion system functions virtually 
continuously (1990, p. 75). 
Shame is a painful emotion and, according to the theologian Phillips (1986), anything 
is better than the pain of experiencing shame. People 6dt (Leilde & Bekker 2003), are 











shame. Phillips (1986) interprets the biblical story of Ruth in terms of shame and 
deception where the biblical figure of Boaz, faced with a situation of shame, reverses 
it and ends up being 'honoured by all' (1986, p.IO). But the pressure to conform 
obliges Boaz to deceive his closest relative in order to save face. Phillips's (1986) 
point is that the fear and Boaz's refusal to be shamed puts the citizen of Israel in a 
situation where there is no alternative at all but to deceive in order to retrieve honour. 
The anthropological interest in shame has been in the main with its function as an 
instrument of social control (Epstein 1983, pp. 27-28) where the redressive aspect 
with its public expression of disapproval maintains the social order. But it is possible, 
and the observations put forward in Chapter Four and Five suggest that might be the 
case, that authorities use shame as a sanction for social control and that knowing that 
water u..<;ers seek respectability and want to conform and feel that they fit in, they are 
less likely to challenge the dominant regime in the domain of water management and 
interfere with the way in which change does or does not take place. 
2.2 Shame within an analytic framework 
Although, as Scheff (1990) suggests, shame is an emotional and not a cognitive 
construct, he makes explicit the linkages between emotion and motivation to act, for, 
like trust, there is a relationship between shame, agency and power. Like trust, it has 
everything to do with inclusion, knowledge, acceptance and equality which are 
positive effects of democratisation. Like trust, it is usually invisible, 'hidden from 
view' and difficult to study (Scheff 1990, p. 84). 
Nussbaum (2001) points out that shame is an inherited condition of our birth.28 Social 
conditions that reinforce our inadequacy, incompetence or isolation will bring to the 
fore this inherited shame, and can paralyse and obstruct action or engagement: 
'Aristophanes portrays shame as a painful emotion grounded in the 
recognition of our own non-omnipotence ... a kind of primitive shame at 
the very fact of being human and incomplete underlies the more specific 
types of shame that we later feel about handicaps and 
inadequacies' (Nussbaum 2001a, p. 7). 
28 Nussbaum's psychoanalytic understanding of shame as a result of an infant's striving for perfection 
- and omnipotence - and that the experience of shame at one's lack of omnipotence gives way 











Although, Durkheim argues that 'social influence constituted an independent system 
in its own right' (Durkheim in Scheff 1990, p. 72 ) and that confonnity has some 
positive effects, the suppression of individualism does not have a positive effect on 
democracy. The positive effects of democracy are being able to dissent, argue, 
disagree and debate, enhance human freedom and encourage interpersonal trust. Risk-
taking and shame do not sit comfortably alongside one another for someone who feels 
shame will be unwilling to debate, argue or act as a free agent. 
Scheff (1990) makes the important observation that these intact social bonds are the 
result of a positive relation of self and he links the intact social bond, or feeling good 
about oneself, with the emotion of pride (Scheff 1990, p. 82). For him, social bonds 
assume not only a cognitive but an emotional connectedness between people. For 
Scheff (1990), the antithesis of an intact social bond is a threatened one, and the 
personal emotion connected with this threatened state is shame (Scheff 1990, p. 95). 
Shame is according to Scheff the reverse of pride. Lynd (1958) sees the juxtaposition 
of pride and shame as 'fruitless and misleading' and juxtaposes shame with honour,29 
deploying the Greek word, 'philotimo' which is honour, the inviolability of freedom 
in oneself through selective identifications with aspects of one's own wider culture' 
(Lynd 1958, p. 252). Pride, according to her, corresponds with' hubris' or arrogance. 
This resonates with Vivian Bickford-Smith (1999) and Ross (1999) on respectability 
where adopting Victorian virtues and values cloaked feelings of poverty or racial 
segregation. 
Knowledge about the actors involved (Kickert & Koppenjan 1999, p. 58), a nurturing 
style of government (Sztompka 1997), and recognition of local knowledge regimes 
(Farrington 1999; Ostrom 1996; Levi 1996; Miller 1993) are some ways that 
individuals can feel less inadequate, incompetent and isolated, reducing inherited 
shame or marginalised. According to Scheff (1990), the experience of shame varies in 
intensity but it always results in an inability to engage manifesting either as silence, 
29 The work ofPeristiany examines Mediterranean values of honour and shame, where dishonour and 
shame are clearly the opposite of honour. If shame is a lack of self-esteem, honour has many meanings 
but is connected with the Latin 'respect, esteem, prestige'. Like shame, the individual sees himself 











exit or even, in extreme cases, where the pain of shame is so intense, as suicide 
(Epstein 1984; Scheff 1990). 
2.3 Shame and modernity 
Heller, in her book entitled The Power of Shame (Heller 1985), offers a general theory 
of shame. Heller goes back to the work of Freud on guilt and emphasises that guilt 
and shame have different routes as guilt is the consciousness of a debt that has to be 
repaid (Heller 1985, p. 2) and the less it can or will be repaid, 'the more tormenting 
the guilt feeling comes' (ibid). A cautionary note on modernity has been given 
above, but it is pertinent to note that guilt is perceived by Williams (1993) as a 
symptom of modern consciousness. Williams (1993) considered the Greek culture to 
be governed by notions that are nearer to shame than to guilt with the implications of 
freedom and autonomy that are associated with guilt and not with shame. 
In the case of shame, the authority is also referred to as the communal referent 
(Seligman 2000, p. 38) or by Bickford-Smith (1999) or Ross (1999) as adhering to 
Elizabethan virtues and values. Seligman (2000) considers shame as an internal 
occurrence but what is critical to this understanding is that the members of the 
community who are experiencing the shame need to agree that certain actions and 
modes of behaviour would be 'shameful'. In other words, it is the acceptance of the 
external authority that gives rise to shame. For Heller (1985), the laws, rules and 
regulations with which a system organises itself and legitimises its actions (external 
authority) need to be reconciled with the internal authority, The internal has a voice 
and is somebody rather than nobody (Williams 1993, p. 84). When the two 
authorities are in harmony with one another then an individual has a sense of self and 
is able to experience feelings of power and autonomy. When the tension between the 
two is so great that the two authorities cannot be reconciled the individual enters into 
a state of negation of self and meaningful constructs with the outside world are then 
extremely difficult (Heller 1985). The shame response is a primary regulator of 
behaviour (Heller 1985, p. 7). 'Being different remains shameful given that success as 
the measure of everything is imposed on individuals as the external authority' (Heller 
1985, p. 19). As the study argues that the dominant organisational culture in the 











in a different way results in feelings of not fitting in and not matching the external 
authority. 
Seligman's (2000) approach is slightly different as he argues that the idea of self as 
one constituted only by an external authority what he calls obligations and 
allegiances, - is not in accord with modem liberalism (Seligman 2000, p. 40). Modem 
liberalism, according to Seligman (2000), argues for a participatory engagement 
which is dialogical in nature and which is in contrast to the Durkheimian notion of 
individual, voluntary compliance to moral dictates (Seligman, 2000, p. 40). The core 
of Seligman's argument is that the modem selfhas full agency and is able to 
participate. As a result exchange - either symbolic or material- is possible and part 
of the symbolic exchange is the 'trust' produced as a credit (Seligman 2000, p. 44). 
Clearly, for Seligman, this exchange is based on what he refers to as a rational actor 
model of self (Seligman 2000, p. 80). According to Seligman shame 'admits not 
recompense or restitution' (Seligman 2000, p. 81) 
With shame, there is an inevitable derogation in one's status as a person; 
with guilt one's status is intact but ones' relationship to others is affected. 
The shameful is not worthy of association; the guilty is still worthy, but a 
price must be paid (Morris, G quoted in Seligman 2000, p. 80) 
The only way that shame can be expedited is to reconstitute one's self and not a 
relationship, for it is 'shame that we feel when we violate our own constituted sense 
of self (Seligman 2000, p. 81). Shame never fails to remind us how 'mediated our 
autonomy really is' and 'we see in its manifestation the 'eyes of the other' as an 
authority external to self (Seligman, 2000, p. 82). Like Scheff (1990), Seligman 
(2000) acknowledges the extreme effects of shame are overwhelming, bringing 
feelings of chaos and what Seligman (2000) calls an experience of cosmic disruption 
(2000, p. 83), for what is at stake is a violation of meaning to one's sense of self. 
2.4 Shame and agency 
Tisseron (1992) approaches shame as a psychoanalyst, but for him too the emotional 
aspect of self is a determinant of social action - or inaction - and shame as a powerful 
emotion impedes entry into discourse with the outer world. If there is discourse, it is 











consequences for social action and should be valued as a check mechanism because it 
guards the integrity of an individual immersed in a system with which it cannot 
identifY (Tisseron 1992). An alternative type of coherence is produced and trust is 
generated between in-groups who constitute a different kind of external authority for 
one another, or what Bickford-Smith (1999) calls moral virtue. Naidoo (2000), 
speaking about prisoners or people with infectious diseases such as leprosy, 
understands well the way in which in-group/out-group configurations are consolidated 
around shared differences (Naidoo 2000). 
2.5 Gleichaltung versus embarrassment, criticism and insult 
Positive social action enhances autonomy and freedom and introduces what has been 
referred to by Scheff (1990) as gleichaltung (1990, p. 76). This describes a state of 
being where cogs fit well into each other for the experience of mutual 
acknowledgement produces positive feelings, or gleichaltung. However, when social 
interaction results in embarrassment, criticism and insult, it produces shame, feelings 
that are counterproductive for social and economic wellbeing. 
Citizens fighting the apartheid regime attempted to forge honourable identities and 
overcome feelings of shame, but they were systematically undennined and 'shame' 
was perpetuated. Shame was an advantage to the apartheid authorities for opposite 
attributes, such as honour (Lynd 1958) or pride (Scheff 1990), cemented relations and 
. made people feel good about themselves. Network c10sedness or fixation was thus 
cemented during the struggle years and it was conflict rather than cooperation that 
brought people together (Rideaus 1998; Ruiters 1996; Marais 2001) as 'in general you 
trust people of your own kind and are suspicious against others' (Rideaus 1998). 
The honour or pride of activist leaders, and what Woolcock (1998) has referred to as 
'bounded solidarity' (1998, p. 161) was constantly interrogated and threatened by 
apartheid authorities, and mistrust, shame and guilt were perpetuated through gossip 
and constant undennining of feelings of virtue and value. These tactics were 
construed to disseminate distrust and create confusion and fear. 
The dimension of power is fundamental to our understanding of shame. As Pattison 
(2000) notes, 'the creation of strong authority is understandable but dysfunctional and 











inferiority produced by a sense of dependence on one's employers or superiors ... .' 
(ibid). According to Hardin (1993), it is experience that determines the 'psychology 
of trust '(Hardin 1993, p. 508) and, unsurprisingly, distrust is deeply embedded in the 
historical memory of the majority of citizens. It is the way in which distrust emerges 
amongst water users that matters to this study, and empirical data will illustrate the 
way in which transformation in the water sector is producing distrust and for some, 
shame. 
What is important to studies on institutional change and transformation is that, 
according to Heller (1985) and Scheff (1990), the negative chain reaction is not 
transitory and it does not only impact on personal interactions in the social sphere. 
Because this attitudinal component of social capital has repercussions on larger 
systems and institutions (Heller 1985; Scheff 1990), it becomes an important analytic 
construct with which to consider transformation of systems and water management 
insti tuti ons. 
2.6 Shame, identity and exclusion 
The tensions between the cognitive and emotional aspects of self and its consequences 
for social action, described by Scheff (1990) and Heller (1986) above, are evocatively 
depicted by Zoe Wicomb (1998) in her article 'Shame and Identity: the case of the 
coloured in South Africa'. Saartjie Baartman was taken from her own country over 
two hundred years ago and displayed as a living - and later dead - exhibit in London 
and Paris. Her remains were returned from the Musee de Paris in May 2002, to her 
country of origin. This powerful icon of the Khoi 'Venus' serves as a reminder of 
what happens, in the extreme, when social capital is deliberately smashed and 
scattered. 
If Coleman (1987), Warren (1999) and Mishler (2001) are correct that 
institutionalised distrust is a healthy manifestation in a democracy, then it is alarming 
how little disagreement, dissonance or debate takes place in the stakeholder forums 
and reference group committees that are part of the process of building the water 
management institutions in the Breede-Overberg WMA. What appears instead is a 
uniformity of trust on the formal level. Scheff (1990) notes that pride and shame are 











shame to stifle its own discourse'(1998, p. 92). Wi comb (1998) describes a condition 
which is contrary to trust, a condition where shared values are not openly brokered 
and people are in 'the ambiguous space between inside and outside' (1998, p. 104).30 
Although Turner (1974) constructs notions of liminality to describe ritual and 
meanings and metaphors of ritual, the notion of what he calls liminality or being 
'betwixt and between' (1974, p. 232) is a useful way to understand space and social 
interaction that takes place outside the formal organisational structure. 
The following evocative description by Wicomb (1998) describes shame as 'cross-
eyed and shy, stalks the post-colonial world broken mirror in hand, reproducing itself 
in puzzling distortions' (1998, p. 92). The description is not only evocative but helpful 
for it gives insight into some of the 'puzzling distortions' that are apparent as the 
empirical data emerges. Dissonances become apparent in the in between spaces, 
suggesting that the formal space provided is unable to foster debate, questioning and 
dissent and that some individuals might be overwhelmed with shame. Fear of 
embarrassment, insult or criticism in water management forums could result in zero 
exchange and feelings of separateness from the 'mainstream.' Isolation or insecurity 
reinforces anomie.3l This is a condition described by Leilde & Bekker (2003) in their 
article on local government and the way in which poor and rich alike experience local 
development: 'Their social exclusion however individualises and marginalizes them. 
Their voice is faint and of little influence ..... their strategy, typically chosen on an 
individual basis, is one of opting out of civil society ... ' (2003, p. 159 i2 
There are reasons for withdrawal and exit that have nothing to do with shame. 
For instance, a breach of trust can lead to exit, lack of interest in the cause of 
water reform and so forth, but the empirical evidence, particularly in Chapter 
Five presents a case for including shame in the reasons for non-participation. 
Within the analytic framework of Leilde & Bekker (2003), shame encourages 
30 Wicomb refers to the stoep or veranda that is outside the house. 
31 For a deeper discussion on anomie and atomic see Galtung (1996) who provides a macro-historical 
perspective of structural and cultural transformations and describes the process of destructuration and 
deculturation (1996: 379) and atomie and anomie in domestic society (Galtung 1996, pp. 379-413). 
32 Another reason for choosing to exit, argues Bekker, particularly relevant for those who have some 












exit rather than loyalty as a person disengages from the discussions, silently or 
invisibly. 
2.7 Shame, honour and knowledge 
Vigilance and institutionalised distrust have been considered as an integral part of 
democracy and scepticism of authority a valuable democratic resource (Coleman 
1987; Mishler 2001; Scott 1985; Offe 1997; Warren 2001). But disengagement and 
experience of shame reinforce social exclusion of some and inclusion of others and 
have a negative effect on democracy. The argument that is pursued in the interest of 
shame is that exclusion, from the dominant knowledge regime, reinforces a negative 
sense of self, entrenches feelings of shame and makes positive social action and 
participation difficult. As knowledge is crucial to secure control and meaningful 
participation, its political dimension cannot be underestimated. The observations 
presented in this study shows that the old water-user networks are not easily unstuck 
and new intra-group negotiations between water users are difficult. 
2.8 Summative remarks on shame 
Both Heller (1985) and Scheff (1990) recognise that a negative chain reaction occurs 
when the system is maligned and that it does not only impact on the personal - neither 
is it transitory, for it can, as already emphasised, have an impact on the larger systems 
and social institutions. Tisseron (1992) recognises that shame is brought about in a 
situation with others and it is not chosen but is inflicted (1992, p.15), and shame is 
accompanied by a feeling of emptiness and the negative perception that others have of 
self (ibid.). Power, present as the 'eye of the other,' and whether intentionally or not, 
triggers off feelings of shame that emerge when a member feels excluded (Tisseron 
1992, p. 178). 
Bearing in mind that shame is a 'puzzling emotion' and is somewhat 'recalcitrant to 
attempts at precise definition' (Epstein 1983, p. 1) it is nonetheless useful to present 
four distinct features that emerge from the discussion on shame: 
1. External (cognitive) and internal (emotional) must be reconciled in order for 











2. Without a sense of self an individual cannot establish meaningful social bonds 
with others 
3. Shame results in silence, retreat, exit, withdrawal or disengagement with the 
social realm 
4. Shame is invisible but a critical determinant of social action 
Four distinctive properties of trust were identified by Ostrom (2000) and were part of 
the trust discussion in the first part of this chapter. In these surnrnative remarks on 
shame it is useful to link the four distinctive properties and in so doing to make the 
argument stronger for the inclusion of shame in trust discourse. The similarities 
between the two constructs, with the possible exception of the third property, are 
remarkable. 
1. Like trust, shame does not wear out with use but rather with disuse 
2. Like trust, shame is difficult to observe and measure 
3. Shame is hard to destruct through external interventions 
4. National and regional governmental institutions strongly affect the level and 
type of social capital available to individuals to pursue long-term development 
efforts (Ostrom 2000, p. 173) 
The section on poverty as an impediment to trust produced evidence from theorists to 
support Woolcock's assumption (1998) that all forms of exchange are inherently 
embedded in social relationships (1998, p. 163), for instance that various forms of 
embeddeness influence opportunities and constraints that face individuals in their 
pursuit of economic advancement (Granovetter 1973; Woolcock 1998; Warren, 1999; 
Ingelhart 1999). Embeddedness, it was argued, carries both benefits and costs 
(Ruitt;rs, 1996; Ridaeus 1998). The empirical data reflects on the costs of shame, and 
considers whether experiences of isolation and insecurity encourage people to seek 
comfort with the like-minded. The study considers whether and in what ways localism 
entrenches in-group/out-group dynamics. It is possible that feelings of shame 
ensconce isolation and insecurity that, in turn, perpetuate segmentation and network 
fixation and reinforce the 'dark' side of social capitaL In order to avoid shame, Scheff 
(1990) proposes that individuals root themselves in social networks where they are 











If this is the case in reality, what conditions would be optimal for water users to 'feel 
good about themselves?' The theoretical arguments suggest that it would be very 
difficult for new social capital to be built and trust in strangers would be near 
impossible under conditions where water users feel heightened isolation and 
insecurity. The involvement and capacity-building of local stakeholders is a core 
component of reform in the water sector and is, as Gorgens et al. (1998) note, of 
paramount importance to the process. 
Section Three: Participation 
3.1 The rationale for participation 
One advantage of decentralisation and localisation of decision-making is that this 
process, in the ideal, provides an opportunity to obtain knowledge of local resources. 
This suggests too that as Selznick (1949) proposed, localised systems can be more 
easily flexible to adjust to these conditions (1949, p. 27). The reluctance of some 
water users to attend or participate meaningfully in decisions around water might be 
helpfully understood within the context of shame, bearing in mind that if individuals 
are too embarrassed to speak, they will not participate. Non-participation would have 
an effect on the way in which the larger systems and institutions are constructed. 
In an evaluation of participatory development, Glyn Williams (2004) identifies the 
publication of the World Bank's World Development Report 2000/1 entitled 
'Attacking Poverty' as a marker that participatory discourse had moved from the 
'margins to the mainstream' (2004, p. 557). However, Williams (2004) guards against 
enthusiasm in considering this an achievement for the cause of participation. For 
Williams (2004), unless the outcomes of participation are clear, although it has the 
potential to provide an opportunity to give a voice to the poor, it can also become a 
new form of subjection (2004, p. 559). In the context of the shame discussion above, 
water users who do not feel comfortable enough to contribute and who feel 
inadequate will not feel 'gleichaltung' but could well feel shame. 
Does participation produce or inhibit the development of trust and does it, and if so in 











arguments put forward in the preceding sections and introduces empirical evidence 
that integrates the previous arguments coherently 
3.2 Contextualising participation 
The devolution of decision-making to the local level is not unique to South Africa.33 
Over the past decades developing countries have focussed on the bottom-up dynamic 
of development, proposed as a replacement for failed top-down efforts that were 
supposed to but did not benefit the poor (Krishna 2002, p. 3). These concepts are not 
only unique to IWRM but are fundamental to democracy, a process that seeks to work 
closely with local citizens and communities to find ways of meeting their needs and 
improving the quality of their lives. Developmental local government, as per Chapter 
Seven of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, requires that local 
democracy be developed and promoted (Mogale 2001, p. 12). Warren (2001) 
Woolcock (1998) and Minogue (1998) confirm that the engagement of civil society is 
one of the key principles of good governance. Tapscott (1999) offers insights into 
ways in which South Africa has opted for deepening democracy at all levels of society 
and at the three tiers of government and feels, that by bringing government closer to 
the people the project of democracy would be easier (1999, p. 13). 
3.4 People to pipelines 
In the domain of water management, farmers are encouraged to manage their own 
irrigation schemes (Shah et al. in Faysee 2003).34 DWAF (1994, p. 8) itself notes that 
the continent of Africa and the rest of the developing world littered with failed good 
intentions implemented by specialists (1994, p. 8). This participatory approach, that 
supposedly involves water users at all levels but specifically focuses on ordinary 
water users, is commonly accepted in developing and developed contexts (Ostrom 
1996; Briscoe 1997; Farrington 1999) and developing countries have come to realise 
33 Decentralisation is a 'blanket term encompassing a number of subcategories: devolution (or 
democratic decentralisation), deconcentration and delegation' (Cameron 2003, p. 114).lt is not within 
the scope of this work to discuss these differences and they are used fairly loosely. Decentralisation is 
therefore accepted as the 'blanket term' taking care to distinguish between the nuances that Cameron 
(2003) alerts us to. Oluwu & Wunsch (2004) define decentralisation reforms as 'legal acts and 
administrative measures that initiate a transfer of responsibility (authority), resources (human and 
fmanciaI), accountability and rules (institutions) from central government to local entities (2004, pp. 4-
5). 
34 Principle One and Principle Two ofthe Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, 











that water is a multi-stakeholder issue. Agrawal & Gibson (1999), Ostrom (1996) and 
Serageldin & Grootaert (2000) contend that bringing communities who are closest to 
the resource into decision-making is essential for achieving sustainable solutions for 
natural resource management. This is because interested and affected parties are a 
viable mechanism to address the needs of people and the environment, and in this way 
to translate IWRM.35 It is therefore a logical progression that has evolved from 
lessons learnt that the ideological phasing out of top-down strategies and the growing 
popularity of bottom-up processes encourages greater cooperation from local users 
(Cloete 2000; WRC 2003). 
But in order for this process to be effective, not only must local level institutions 
have representatives from a wide spectrum of water user groups that are 
affected (Agrawal & Gibson 1999, p. 638) but, importantly, the representatives 
should be able to make choices and to voice these choices. Simply mimicking a 
process of localisation or integrated water resource management, as Lant 
Pritchett & Michael Woolcock (2003, p. 193) state in their article 'Solutions 
when the solution is the problem' is not the way to go. The domain of water has 
been dominated by a top-down supply-driven paradigm and this paradigm will 
not shift by simply adding people to pipelines. A radical appraisal of the 
paradigm itself is critical and is one of the tasks with which this thesis has been 
charged. This means that principles, such as those classified as an outcome of 
the Water Law Review Process and consequently enshrined in the National 
Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997), are 
not in themselves enough to secure transformation. More precisely, as Pritchett 
& Woolcock (2003) caution, it is not a matter of simply adopting the recognized 
notions of empowerment, participation, accountability, good governance and 
transparency but it is how this process is implemented that matters (Pritchett & 
Woolcock 2003). 
35 The Millennium Summit, New York (2000), the Second World Water Forum, The Hague (2000), the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Rio (2002), the UN Conference on the Environment and 
Development in 1992 that produced Agenda 21, Monterrey Conference: March 20002, the Third 
World Water Forum, Kyoto (2003) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg (2003) placed water high on the development agenda and advocated localised decision 











... any discussion about 'empowennent' or 'participation' or 
'accountability' in general is bound for incoherence ... there is tremendous 
controversy as to exactly how to bring about such institutions and 
organizations. Can 'participation' really improve outcomes? Will 
'decentralisations' really bring government 'closer to the people? 
(Pritchett & Woolcock 2003, p. 204) 
3.5 Trading outcomes for process 
One of the core challenges facing DW AF in the task oftransfonnation is the trade-off 
between rapid initial delivery on the one hand and greater levels of investment in 
social development and capacity-building on the other (DWAF 2001a, p. 14). It can 
be expected, because there is what Pritchett & Woolcock (2003) note as 'terrible 
disarray in the field' (2003, p. 193) that every catchment will have its own set of 
problems and solutions. The danger of simply fixing a problem of failed development 
without scrutinising the essential flaws in the failed system has already been noted 
(Pritchett & Woolcock 2003). But as the pages of this research unfold, it becomes 
evident that DWAF is struggling to replace the old paradigm and despite their own 
acknowledgement in the 1994 Water Supply and Sanitation White Paper (DWAF 
1994) that increased sustainability more than outweighs the gains made from rapid 
early delivery (DWAF 1997), the fast-tracking of the CMA process appeared, until 
very recently, to be a priority.36 
As the ideals proclaimed in the National Water Act (1998) become reality, DWAF is 
grappling to decipher what Desai (1994) has stressed as the essential new mechanisms 
that are pro-poor.37 A brief detour to revisit the problematics in the trust construct 
that were outlined earlier is useful. Portes (2000), for instance, cautioned that trust 
36 This must be seen in context of the discussion presented in the concluding chapter. As Wester et al. 
(2003) state DW AF is placing greater emphasis on social mobilisation (2003, p. 805) that is leading to 
a slower implementation process. The work of these authors in the Olifants Basin, as well as the work 
ofthe non-governmental organisation, ACCORD in the Sand River Catchment of the Inkomati may 
well be different from that in the Breede-Overberg. The Inkomati and Olifants Basin have, for instance, 
mining and industrial sectors amongst others that dominate. Preliminary comparative work undertaken 
by the Water Research Commission (2002) suggests nonetheless that the Sand Catchment, where the 
NGO Accord has been responsible for public participation, is making concerted efforts to transfer 
knowledge and render more equal the playing fields - the exception rather than the rule. 
37 Poor includes poor in the resources to manage water and not only income flows. Oluwu & Wunsch 
(2004) describe the participatory budgeting process, originally developed in some Latin American 
cities such as Porto Allegre, that is now promoted by two World Bank initiated municipal development 
programs in Africa. A substantial part ofthe budget is subject to discussion and debate with members 
of the public organised by neighbourhoods or civic groups. (2004, p. 74). Importantly, according to 
Oluwu & Wunsch (2004) the decisions that are made in these groups are binding on local governments 











risks becoming 'synonymous with each and all things that are positive or desirable in 
social life' (2000, p. 535), and Grootaert & van Bastelaer (2002) apprised that it is 
trying to be a catch-all concept but could end up catching nothing (2002, p. 5). A 
reminder too that Stiglitz (2000) advised that trust is a concept with a short and 
already confused history (2000, p. 59). Participation as a feature suffers much the 
same problem but it has enjoyed less theoretical rigour than the notion of trust. Yet 
participation is implicit in much of the social capital theory that has been presented 
here, for knowledge, power and inclusion/exclusion, that have everything to do with 
participation, are identified as critical components for better deciphering social 
configurations (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Blornkvist 1995; Powell & Dimaggio 1991; 
Ellison 1997; Desai 1994; Offe 1999; Pattison 2000; Rose 2000; Selznick 1949; 
Selener 1997; Tisseron 1992). These themes are critical to the understanding of how 
social configurations constrict or construct new water management systems. 
During the Water Law Review process both the Australian and the British models 
were considered to provide the best basis for implementing Integrated Catchment 
Management in South Africa (WRC 1996, p. 49). But government opted for the 
Australian approach which 'relies heavily on active community and stakeholder 
participation in natural resources management and decision making' (WRC 1996, p. 
49). The Water Law Review identified a 'long-term process, where implementation is 
a gradual and slow process of learning, negotiation, planning and action' (WRC 1996 
pp. 49-50) to be a disadvantage in the Australian modeL Despite the adoption of the 
Australian model and DWAF's acknowledgement that development in the water 
sector should be demand driven and community-based CD WAF 1994), DWAF's 
emphasis has continued to be on delivery and on fast-tracking the transformation 
process, trying to get to 'Pretoria,38 too fast. This decidedness has propelled the 
implementation of both the Water Services Act (delivery of water services) and the 
National Water Act (water resource management).39 
A current research project, commissioned by the Water Research Commission (2003) 
and confirmed by theorists (Barbeton 1998; Kickert & Koppenjan 2001; Pritchett & 
38 Pritchett & Woolcock (2003) develop the analogy ofa phantom state of Denmark, a desired 
destination. 











Woolcock 2003) stresses that participation is a process and it requires extra resources, 
special meetings, special efforts, time and energy and transport. The Development 
and Facilitation Act (Act 67 of 1995) and the White Paper on Local Government ( 
1998) both insist that municipalities 'develop mechanisms to ensure citizen 
participation' (Hart 2002, p. 261). There are thus, as Hart (2002) stresses, mandated 
efforts to enforce participation (ibid.) and it this enforcement of participation that 
Newman et al. (2004) see as a shift towards more collaborative forms of governance 
(2004, pp 203-204). According to Newman et af. (2004) this emphasis is a result of 
the transformation of the modern state, shifting from that of governing through direct 
controls to that of governance (ibid). Newman et al. (2004) clarifY that participation is 
more about questions of identity in a multi-cultural world than about representative 
democracy (2004, p 204). 
3.6 Intended and unintended consequences of vagueness 
Barbeton (1998) cautions about the vagueness of the terms 'participation' and 
'empowerment' that have, according to Kotze (1998), been popularised in 
development discourse to the extent that they no longer have any particular meaning 
(1998, p. 85). Vagueness is worth scrutiny and vagueness of policy is, for instance, 
described by Selznick (1949) in his much-cited Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
study. According to Selznick (1949) vague legislation is vulnerable to 
misinterpretation but also to manipulation by elites. It is worth examining a typical 
extract from the National Water Act (Act 38 of 1998) which betrays well the 
vagueness in the language, particularly disquieting around something as 
fundamentally important to the transformation process as citizen participation. 
Achieve representation of disadvantaged persons or communities which 
have been prejudiced by past racial and gender discrimination in relation 
to access to water ... the development of a catchment management strategy 
and the promotion of community participation in water resource 
management within its water management area and agreement on water-
related matters from the various stakeholders and interested persons (Act 
36 of 1998, Chapter 7 Part Two & Three) 
Marais (2001) posits that the vagueness of the Act is not only incidental but a 
factor that he describes in 'Limits to Change' that deliberately allows for 











The settlement and the launch of the transition depended on an activated 
awareness of 'common interests' between the old order and the popular 
movement - on an acknowledgement that friend and foe have to pass 
through a gateway of concessions and compromises in order to avert 
disasters for the respective agendas (Marais 2001, P 95). 
The vagueness in the Act creates enough space for interpretation where the common 
interests of both DW AF and an elite new order are resolved. Pegram (2001) asserts 
that the NW A was 'intentionally written as a framework act which allows 
considerable flexibility in its implementation (2001, p. 2). In line with GEAR policy, 
DW AF's vested interest is to reduce expenditure, but the stringent limits being placed 
on social spending following the shift from the RDP to GEAR focus puts a restraint 
on the involvement of communities and community organisations. The outsourcing of 
management functions and the creation of statutory body corporates such as the CMA 
or WUA are practical solutions that are in line with South Africa's current macro-
economic policy. In 1994, with the decision to revise the Water Act (No 54 of 1956), 
government's purpose would understandably be to meet with least resistance from old 
order elites averse to change. Vagueness in policy is a solution that is sufficiently 
pleasing to 'friend and foe' (Marais 2001, p. 95). 
Despite both rhetoric and legal reform that suggest that the democratization has 
seriously begun (Oluwu & Wunsch 2004, p. 3), ten years into the new regime 
transformation and democratisation in the water sector are by no means a given. 
Peters's (2002) examination of power and meaning in governance of common 
resources proclaims that there is an 'impoverished toolkit for examining social 
dynamics surrounding resource use' (2002, p.15). These insights are confirmed by 
other theorists who critically examine gaps between ideals of participation and the 
way that participatory processes are implemented in reality (Newman et al. 2004; 
Williams 2004; Parfitt 2004; Fergusson 2004). The empirical evidence is closely 
scrutinised to decipher whether it not it concurs with Peters's (2002) and others 
(Newman et al. 2004; Williams 2004; Parfitt 2004; Fergusson 2004) claims. As the 
social component is recognised as critical to the success of transformation in the water 











The DW AF (200Ic) position paper on the 'Establishment of Catchment Management 
Fora', cites 'mutual respect, compassion, comprehension and appreciation of fellow 
members' as crucial ingredients for achieving the 'common vision shared by all' 
(2001, p. 5). Not forgetting the propensity for dissent, debate and discussion (Warren 
2001) the ingredients deciphered by DW AF (2001) are the axis on which trust 
amongst water users pivots. Certainly, they are ingredients that would be able to 
reverse feelings of social inhibition or what Kramer (2001) described as being in 'no 
man's land' (2001, p. 176) that marginalised water users might feel. Chapter Five is 
tasked with unpacking texts that reflect levels of social uncertainty and inhibition. It 
considers whether water users feel embarrassed and not appreciated for if so, there 
could be vicious cycles of exclusion that are reproduced. 
3. 7 Reflections on participation 
The main aim of participation in the water sector is to transfer power, or at least to 
equalise power, between marginalised and elite groups. The stated purpose of these 
transfers is to offer sustainable solutions in the domestic realm, for instance to ensure 
clean drinking water for all and in the resource domain to ensure the 'protection, use, 
development, conservation, management and control of water resources' (Act 36 of 
1998, Chapter Two, Part One). 
The purpose of establishing a CMA is to 'delegate water resource management to the 
regional or catchment level and to involve local communities ... ' (Act 36 of 1998, Ch 
7 Schedule 45). Schedules 2 and 3 of chapter 7 of the Act deal with the functions and 
operation of catchment management agencies and include the promotion of 
community participation. Chapter 8 of the National Water Act deals with water user 
associations and schedule 30 of that same chapter, ordains that WUAs 'operate at a 
restricted localised level and are in effect cooperative associations of individual water 
users who wish to undertake water related activities for their mutual benefit' (Act 36 











Many catchment fora have been established to promote the public participation 
envisaged in the National Water Act (Hart 2000, P 2).40 Hart (2000) warns that the 
dominance of special interest groups in the current water policy landscape undermines 
the 'spirit and intent' of the fora (2000, p. 3) which have been conceived as 
'interactive, multi-stakeholder bodies (2000, p. v). 
The Breede River Basin Study, commissioned by DWAF (1999) as a precursor to the 
establishment ofthe CMA, describes public involvement as a golden thread that runs 
through the study. But public involvement is a vague term and DWAF's conflation of 
public participation processes with participation ignores the critical differences 
between different modes of participation. Farrington et al. (1999) in describing 
different types of participation make the following differentiations: 1) passive 
participation where people participate by being told what is going to happen or what 
has already happened, or 2) where people participate by giving answers to questions, 
and 3) interactive participation where people participate in joint analysis and are able 
to make decisions collectively and form new groups or strengthen old ones 
(Farrington 1999, p. 5). 
The difference between 1) and 2) in Farrington's model of participation and 3) is vast. 
The third option is in line with Chambers's (1994) participatory rural appraisal (PRA) 
and participatory development methodologies that were seen as 'cementing' the place 
of 'participation' within the development pantheon (Wi1liams 2004, p. 557). Ribot 
and Peluso (2001), in their theory of access, go further in their scrutiny of 
participation, for they examine not only the means but the outcomes and benefits in 
their theory of access. Ribot and Peluso's (2001) contribution is to locate the 
participation discourse within the broader social contexts of what they call 'non-
place-based networks of social ties' (2001, p. 2) and to insist on access as a dynamic 
process which depends on an individual's place and power within the nexus of social 
interactions. Ribot and Peluso (2001) disaggregate access into ten relevant categories 
among which are access to authority, which shapes an individual's ability to benefit 
from resources, access to technology, which determines how easily a person can get 
from one place to another on roads, in cars etc; access to property, where ownership 
40 Position paper on 'roles and functional models for catchment fora' in a series of commissioned 











ofland becomes critical; and extra-legal access, which describes criminality for 
instance as a matter of perspective for government might 'legally' invoke forceful 
means to protect its own axis of authority (Ribot & Peluso (2001, p. 6). The benefits 
that an individual is able to accrue are directly connected to their access in these 
selected domains. 
It becomes apparent when examining official DW AF policy documents that there is a 
tendency to conflate representation, public participation and participatory practice. 
This tendency is a symptom of what Williams (2004) sees as being increasingly 
written in to 'Southern Government (social) development projects' because 
developing countries are forced to follow suit with global international development 
trends (2004, p. 558). 
As early as 1997, Rahnema (in Williams 2004) considered the concept of 
participation to have been politically 'tamed' (2004, p. 558). The rubber-stamping of 
water user associations that have seemingly, but not meaningfully, included outsiders 
is a good example of the legitimating functions that vague notions of participation 
have for mainstream visions of development (2004, p. 558). Yet, as Williams (2004) 
cautions, the feature should not be rendered impotent for it 'can provide its subjects 
with new opportunities for voice and its consequences are far from pre-determined 
(2004, p.559). Water users, such as those involved in the Duivenshoks and Ruensveld 
rural water schemes that is described in Chapter Five, gained benefits from their 
cooperative and reciprocal trust relationships - both within the farmer segment but 
also vertically between themselves and government thirty years after they began to 
speak to one another as a result ofthe Soil Conservation Act of 1946. In other words, 
repeated interactions, cooperation, risks and uncertainties resulted in economic and 
social wellbeing. The advantage that the farmers have is an understanding of how 
government works, and the state had a vested interest in their wellbeing. 
Although the right of people to participate in the planning, execution, maintenance 
and control of project (Desai 1994, p. 217) and decisions that affect their own lives is 
increasingly accepted as a good government agency or good governance (Desai 1994, 
p. 218), the achievement of this project is not easy. There are several problems with 











participation tend to focus on the tools rather than the principles underlying their 
utility (Parfitt 2004, p. 551) to the fact that the tools are unrefined and undefined. The 
constitutional right of citizens to water, that underpins government policy in the water 
sector, is amputated for in itself it is insufficient to ensure meaningful participation. 
1be remaining chapters reflect on the empirical evidence that was gathered in the 
Breede-Overberg and consider that policy, although a necessary ingredient, is sn 
insufficient driver of change. Chapter Five continues the discussion on knowledge, 
agency and power, three critical features of participatory processes and in so doing, 
allows for a better understanding of why this should be the case. 
Summative remarks 
This chapter has scrutinised the construct of social capital and in so doing has 
encompassed a wide range of themes that are relevant to the broader realm of 
development discourse. The themes of participation, inclusion, cooperation, 
reciprocity and agency are made more or less explicit by all the theorists discussed 
above and are at the core of the trust/shame debate. The absence of shame in the 
social capital debate is surprising, and the chapter has further developed the argument 
put forward in Chapter One, for its relevance to discussions of the cognitive or 
attitudinal component of social capital, trust. The following chapters of this thesis 
provide empirical evidence to suggest that the shame construct might provide helpful 
new insights into the process of reform in the water sector. In concluding this 
chapter, we remind the reader that the realm of ideas and concepts belongs to what 
Weber caBs ideal types, and the distinctions are not as clear when 'seen' on the 
ground because of the tensions between between facts and values. Despite the 
disjunction between facts and values the study explores the appropriateness of a 
particular value or ideal to the facts. Both shame and trust are fluid and invisible 
constructs (Krishna 2002; Scheff 1990) and these constructs are examined through the 
eyes of the researcher whose impartiality is impossible. Nonetheless the theoretical 
constructs of social capital, embedded as they are in discourse concerning social 
interaction, are considered to be cardinal tools with which to unpack the 











Chapter Three: background, history and policy 
Wafer has many forms and many voices. Unhonoured, keeping its seasons 
and rags, its rhythms and trickles, water is there in the nursery bedroom; 
water is there in the apricot tree shading the backyard, water is in the 
smell of grapes on an autumn plate, water is there in the small white 
intimacy of washing underwear. Water - gathered and stored since the 
beginning of time in layers of granite and rock, in the embrace of dams, 
the ribbons of rivers - will one day, unheralded, modestly, easily, simply 
flow out to every South African who turns a tap. That is my dream. 
Antjie Krol 
1. Introduction 
The historical patterns of access to water and other areas of public service delivery 
were markedly skewed (Abrams 1996; Gorgens et al. 1998; MacKay 2003; DWAF 
1994; Eberhard & Pegram 2000; eloete & Wissink 2000). The role of the state, post 
1994, is: 1) to examine allocation of water to the various sectors, urban and domestic, 
mining and industrial, irrigation and afforestation and environmental (Eberhard & 
Pegram 2000, p 4),2) to ensure access to clean drinking water within 200 metres of 
the dwelling and 3) to build network reticulation systems as well as institutions to 
ensure delivery in order to redress the unequal distribution of water. These tasks are 
essentially of a technical nature and, although necessary, are not sufficient to redress 
the unequal distribution of water. In trying to redress the backlogs and meet the 
required standards DWAF's strategy has been first and foremost one of delivery. 2 
There are two core legislative frameworks for transformation in this sector, the 
National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act, 1997 (Act 108 of 
1997). The implementation of these and other policies contained in supporting 
documents are the responsibility of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF). The National Water Act governs the water resource; that is the rivers, 
streams, dams and ground water, while the second legislative framework, the Water 
Services Act, 1997, prescribes the distribution of water for domestic, business and 
industrial usage. Both Acts together provide for the establishment of institutions that 
are given responsibility for management and distribution of these services. The 
J Source: http://www.thewaterpage.comlwp3.htm. 
2 The consequences of this approach are discussed in this and following chapters, but this approach is 
strictly contrary to both global and local rhetoric where the supply approach of the previous decades. 











National Water Act and the Water Services Act, together with supporting legislation,3 
create an opportunity for water users who were not involved in decision-making 
processes prior to 1994 to interact with one another and define the institutional spaces 
for these interactions to take place. The objective of these acts is to attain equity, 
efficiency and equality in water matters as an 'iterative process' (DW AF 2002, p.l2). 
The discussion that follows in this chapter is organised under the following four 
headings: 1) the background to water which is further divided into three subsections: 
i) historical legacy, (ii) current geographical and social landscapes, and (iii) water and 
poverty; 2) policy context: legislative guidelines and policy documents. This second 
section of the chapter is further divided into four subsections (i) policy background 
including the two key legislative frameworks, (ii) the Water Services Act, (iii) the 
National Water Act with a discussion on the organisation of the water sector in South 
Africa and (iv) the National Water Resources Strategy; 3) policy aims and 
achievements. This part of chapter three is further divided into six subsections: 
(i) general, (ii) knowledge regimes, (iii) tariff and cost for water, (iv) local 
government, (v) urban versus rural water supply and a brief paragraph on 
(vi) water and trust. The chapter concludes with 4) summative remarks. 
2. Background to water 
Historical legacy 
The various transmutations of apartheid, from its inception to the tricameral 
parliamentary and 'own affairs' administrations, eleven homeland territories, 
four independent TBVC states and six 'self-governing' areas (DWAF 1994, pp. 
2-5), served to reinforce and maintain power and prolonged the delivery of 
water along clearly demarcated racial lines (ibid.). Investment in pipes, 
reticulation systems, dams, inter basin transfers and any provision of water 
3 Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework, 1997, National Environmental Management Act, 
1998 (Act 107 of 1998) and the National Environmental Second Amendment Bill, August 2003 
(Government Gazette No 25289), Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997 (Act 62 of 1997), Local 
Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act 209 of 1993), Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 
1998 (Act 117 of 1998), Western Cape Planning and Development Act, 1999 (Act 7 of 1999), White 
Paper on Local Government, 1998, Municipal Systems Bill, Local Government Demarcation Act (Act 
27 of 1998). Also relevant: White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management for South 












supplies predominantly served the white population of South Africa.4 The 
underlying premise of water access, allocation and delivery was to support 
economic growth and foster the trust of a white electorate. 
Water supplies and water-borne sewage services were provided to wealthy 
municipalities and towns along clearly designated racial white lines (ibid.). Water 
supply schemes were created to distribute water to industrial and agricultural sectors 
of the economy.5 Black local authorities, with authority over the black townships 
within 'white RSA' , suffered from inefficient management and lack of funding. 
Mutahaba et al. (1993) in their analysis of public administration in Africa, note that 
not much investment had gone into developing sophisticated administrative systems, 
leaving these structures as 'skeletal organisations' (1993, p. 6). Despite the 
allocation, access and delivery of water to whites, even white local authorities were 
considered inefficient (Cameron cited in Carmichael & Midwinter 2003, p. 119) and 
were largely controlled by central government (Carmichael & Midwinter 2003, p. 
119). The principle of self sufficiency required that white local authorities kept 
separate native revenue accounts for black townships that were under their control 
(Carmichael & Midwinter 2003, pp. 116-117) and the townships and rural areas were 
largely left to fend for themselves (DWAF 1994, p. 5). The result of these political 
and administrative realities was an inequitable distribution of water. 
4 It is misleading to believe that apartheid constructed these divisions, as Marais (2001, p. 16) in his 
chapter 'Origins ofa Divided Society' notes: the 'NP's policy did not rupture the country's historical 
continuum' and although it intensified the levels of oppression these had been built on foundations 
already present. 
5 In the Breede-Overberg area, water use is dominated by agriculture although the amount transferred 
to the Metro is also significant (Proposal Second Draft: October 2001, pp. 15-18) and not without 
contention. The tensions between the metro and the 'rural' area are discussed within the context of the 
state/citizen debate in Chapter Four. Two hundred and twenty four million m3/a is transferred primarily 
for use by the Cape Town metro and irrigators along the Berg River and around Stellenbosch. Water is 
transferred to the Cape Metropolitan Area from the Palmiet River and to the CMA and the Berg River 
from the Theewaterskloof Dam. The main point here is that water allocation is determined by its 
financial value. More money is gained by selling water to Cape Town - at a higher cost than 
consuming it in the Breede - and, it is argued, the additional money goes towards funding the CMA 
costs. 
5 Agriculture represents close to 60% ofthe total water requirements in the country, followed by 
domestic consumption, 25%. Agriculture is seen to be an inefficient user of water in other words the 
economic impact of water use in irrigation is substantially less than in other sectors (Conradie et at. 
2001, MacKay 2003, DW AF 2002). However, as MacKay (2003) and DW AF (2002) note, agriculture 
provides employment (11 % oftotal national employment. (OW AF 2002, p. 17). The NWRS (ibid.) 
notes that only 10-15% of the total agricultural employment is in irrigated agriculture. The impact of 
alien invasive vegetation in the Overberg area is severe. It consumed approximately 93% of all the 
water used in the Eastern Overberg and approximately 35% of all the water used in the Western 
Overberg where it used almost as much water as the irrigation sector. (Breede-Overberg CMA 










From the perspective of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, institutions to 
administer water supplies proliferated over the years, including parliament, provincial 
administrations, regional bodies, parastatals, sixteen water boards, many non-
governmental organisations, both foreign and local, irrigation boards, metropolitan 
authorities and local authorities (DWAF 1994, p. 5). In addition, each of the ten 
homelands had their own departments of water affairs, public works, local 
government and agriculture. Together, hundreds of authorities and homeland 
structures had responsibility for water but failed to make resources available where 
they were most needed (ibid.). This view is corroborated by others (WRC 1998; 
Eberhard 1999; Eberhard & Pegram 2000) and although there were urban blacks, 
coloureds and Indians who believe that their needs were better catered to under the 
previous regime, there is little research in the water sector to support this view.6 
Although much of the data that is presented below is the view of the Department of 
Water Affairs or researchers working in tandem with DWAF, for the purpose of this 
thesis this general view is accepted, for what matters is that there are skews in water 
delivery and that these skews affect trust between water users today. 
Current geographical and social landscapes 
South Africa is a water-scarce country.7 Water resources are unevenly distributed 
across the country and the country suffers from hydrological extremes (Abrams 1996; 
Eberhard 1999; DWAF 1997, 1986,2000; Comadie, B et al. 2001). Approximately 
12 million South Africans lacked adequate water supply at the time of pUblication of 
the DW AF 1994 White Paper and nearly 21 million lacked basic sanitation (DW AF 
1994; Eberhard 1999).8 Despite the reversal of the regime, as a middle- income 
country there are a significant number of people who are water-poor. Water supplies 
for these consumers fall short of the World Health Organisation basic requirements of 
6 Research in the water sector is largely commissioned by OWAF or the Water Research Commission 
and it is possible that failures to deliver are underreported. There have been critical evaluations on the 
failed delivery, for instance by Hemson (2003), but only anecdotal evidence has been presented that 
confirms the statement that delivery was better to coloureds and AsianlIndians under the old regime. 
1 The average rainfall for the country is approximately 450 mm per year which is well below the world 
average of about 860 mm per year (OW AF 2002, p.9). 
8 Conradie et af. (2001) provide an estimate of a little less, noting that 25% of the population are 
without adequate basic water services and that 50% of water service institutions are in financial 











25 litres of water per person per day, or, as stipulated by the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, 6000 litres per household within 200 metres of the abode. 
Despite the complexity of the situation and the organisational reform required in the 
department, the policy of the DWAF, as stated in the 1994 White Paper, was "to 
ensure that all South Africans (could) have access to basic water supply and sanitation 
services within seven years or less" (DWAF 1994). By June 2003, DWAF's Minister 
Kasrils announced achievements by reporting that there were between five and six 
million households without adequate water supplies (DWAF media release June 
2003).9 
Residency overwhelmingly determines access to water today and although the social 
and geographical landscapes of apartheid are still apparent, they are most starkly 
represented in the urban/rural skews. Approximately 76% of those lacking adequate 
water or sanitation live in rural areas. Within urban areas in South Africa, water 
consumption is as high as in developed countries, but unsurprisingly, within the cities, 
there is uneven distribution (Eberhard 1999). Of the poor, 29 million, DWAF has 
served 12 million or 42%.10 Another report states that by July 2002 a total of 7.2 
million rural people have been provided access to potable water (at a cost ofR5.5 
billion) and that South Africa is on target to reverse the water backlog by 2008.11 The 
report also cites a remaining water backlog of approximately 8 million people. In 
addition, an estimated 15% of clinics and 12% of schools lack water and sanitation 
(DW AF 2002).12 Without water-borne sewerage the majority of the dwellings which 
lack adequate water supply use the bucket system, traditional unimproved pit toilets 
9 http:www,dwafgov.zacomrnuications/Press Re!eases;2003' and South African Race Relations 
Survey 2002. 
10 v\\\\\.dwafgov.za~PrQiects! Official GCIS statistics that say 80% of all households had access to 
water in 1996 and 85% in 2001. The source of water is not stated: some are community taps, others 
taps on site and so forth. Issues of quality and access are not separated. Reportedly by the end of July 
2000, DWAF had provided water for 5.8 million people at a cost ofR3.74 billion rand. There are 
contradictions in the statistics and this has been noted by Hemson (2003) and by Eberhard (1999) who 
are concerned about the lack of coherent statistics. Within government, the GCIS and DW AF statistics 
contradict each other but so too do different sources within DWAF. As these figures do not necessarily 
reconcile with one another, they demonstrate the contentious and political dimensions of water. 
Ostrom (1996, p. 213) also notes the negative effect of unreliable data and the difficulty of obtaining 
'accurate information about local conditions, whether on physical variables or local institutions.' 
II Ibid 
12 RJO million has now been allocated to DWAF for clinic sanitation programmes and R150 million for 











or the veld 13 (DW AF 2001) for sanitary purposes, none of which meets the basic 
functional, health and environmental requirements for an adequate water supply 
system. According to DW AF (2003) the target date for the eradication in 430 000 
households of the 'despised bucket system' is 2006 (DW AF media release June 
2003).14 
Many factors have contributed to this landscape of deprivation; 15 primarily an 
absence of facilities and infrastructure resulting from South Africa's divided political 
past, a scarcity of water and the geographical mismatch of demand and supply for 
water (DW AF 1994, p. 4). But the scope of the water problem is enormous and the 
problem also includes budget shortfalls, insufficient care regarding knowledge 
transfers, poor management and ignorance of the consequences of this in time and 
money, together with a lack of sustainability of completed projects. The solution to 
these problems involves the resource management and construction of appropriate 
institutions to ensure the governance and distribution of the available water (Turton 
2003).16 In 1999, DW AF aimed to reach two million people per year for the next six 
years at a cost ofR500 million per year, with total projected spending between 2000 
and 2005 of R3 billion. The Integrated Rural Development Strategy (IRDS), launched 
by the President's office in November 2002, estimated that one billion rand was 
needed to bring one million people clean water. 17 
13 Open defecation. 
14 
15 Although the Breede WMA, the focus of this study, is located in the Western Cape, the wealthiest of 
all the nine provinces, the situation is no different in this province. For example, according to the 
preliminary phase of the Breede River Basin in 1999, over 10 000 people have sub-standard water 
supplies mainly in the following towns: Ashbury, Rawsonville, Rolihlahla. 
16 DW AF organised a two day symposium to brainstorm the problem of water management institutions 
at Willow Park conference centre in Johannesburg (April 2004) with the purpose of addressing the 
problem of institutions and management of water. 
17 Finance Week September 23-29 in 1993 estimated R I 3 billion in capital and almost R600 million in 
recurrent expenditure. According to this source, this would provide water to 3.2 million urban homes 
and 1.6 million rural households and sanitation to 3.4 million urban units and 1.9 million rural homes. 
The MIIF five-year estimates for total investment requirements were R35 billion to R50 billion for all 
water and sanitation services and R23 billion to R33 billion for water services only. In order to achieve 
this goal, the DWAF indicated that the annual budget of the newly created department must be 
increased from Rl,6 billion per annum (1,28% of the total operating budget) to R2,8 billion (2,24%). 
This 1 % increase in the national budget over seven years, together with housing subsidies, should allow 
the Department to provide universal basic water supply and sanitation services to all citizens (DW AF 
White Paper 1994). Minister Kasrils in his budget vote address (June 2003) proclaims that DW AF has 
provided for RI.2 billion for new water supply and sanitation infrastructure and RJ 16 million for 
refurbishment with another R21 0 million in the next two years. R93 million has been set aside for 
capacity-building and R25 million for strengthening DW AF's oversight role. 











Water and poverty 
The economic and social effects of water delivery are interconnected l8 and there is 
not only a strong link between 'water poverty' and 'income poverty' (Sullivan 2002, 
p. 1) but also between social resources and water scarcity. According to Turton et al. 
(2003), as water is ultimately basic to all human existence, cooperation in this domain 
can achieve political gains, and these authors note that waterschappen (loosely 
translated as 'water cooperatives') became the very foundation on which democracy 
grew in the Netherlands' (2003, p. 14). Insufficient or inadequate water supply can 
mean inefficient economic impact where water is of poor quality, unreliable or too 
costly. 
In the 1997 White Paper, DW AF notes that sufficient affordable clean water for 
hygiene purposes should be seen as part of the primary health-care service (DW AF 
1997). The potential health, social and economic benefits of improved water delivery 
are clear, given an estimated 1.5 million cases of diarrhoea reported in children under 
the age of five every year in this country (DWAF 2001a). Inadequate sanitation is a 
health problem (DWAF 2001a)19 and it also has serious socio-psychological problems 
that impact, particularly but not exclusively, on the elderly, on women and children 
and on household members who are in poor health already. 
Empirical evidence reflects the relationship between shame, inadequate water and/or 
inadequate sanitation, for the inability to maintain bodily hygiene, for instance, has 
been known to bring shame to households, and in some instances feelings of shame 
are so intense that households have been known to 'drop' out of social activities 
altogether.2o Water scarcity also reinforces skews and discrimination, particularly 
Basic Sanitation states that households in fonnal townships have access to a one-time housing subsidy 
ofR16 000, now increased to R20 300. This subsidy allows the recipient to buy land, build a house and 
provide essential services such as potable water, sanitation and electricity. Individuals who have 
infomlal land rights to the property they occupy may also qualify for this subsidy (DW AF 200 la). 
This is accommodated in tenns of the National Housing Programme referred to as Rural Subsidies: 
Infonnal Land Rights. However, in the case of rural homes, this subsidy does not include water and the 
cost of delivery to rural towns remains high and often unatfordable. 
18 Numerous available household survey datasets link socio-economic wellbeing to access to water: For 
example: Langeberg Survey: SALDRU 1999, Project for Statistics for Living Standards and 
Development: SALDRU 1994. Clark and Qizilbash (200 I) rank water as the fourth most important 
value for wellbeing. 
19 http://www.unesco.orglwater/~. 
20 The White Paper (DW AF 200 I) acknowledges that inadequate sanitation has negative social and 











against women and children (UNICEF 2001).21 Extending adequate access to safe 
water supplies is the most important contribution to equity that a government can 
make and should be prioritised (World Bank in Eberhard & Pegram 2000, p.lO). The 
full health benefits of DW AF's programme of water delivery can only be maximised 
when all three services, namely sanitation, waste removal and hygiene promotion, are 
provided (SA Waterbulletin: MarchiApri12001). 
The lack of available water has increased the vulnerability of poor households. 
Despite significant advances in the modification of the Municipal Infrastructure 
lnvestment Framework (MIIF), the inefficiencies of the apartheid spatial form have 
slowed down economic development. This has happened because those households 
that have been poorly serviced have suffered reduced business opportunities and 
stifled productivity both in terms of reduced nutrition and income flows (Eberhard & 
Pegram 2000, p. 21).22 
As economic production is stifled by poor access to clean water, electricity, 
sanitation, etc. so too poor access to knowledge and information entrenches poverty 
and has been shown to exacerbate feelings of exclusion, mistrust and shame. 
Linkages and social networks and the relationship of these to economic production are 
highly relevant in the context of this thesis, for access to knowledge is an important 
collected during the evaluation of sanitation projects on behalf of the ImpumeJelo Innovations Award 
Trust, during the period June 2003 September 2003, has shown that some household members' 
withdrawal from religious activities is directly related to inadequate water and sanitation. Members 
report being ashamed to bring congregation members home 'when it is their turn to do so' 
(Collaboration between the International Food Policy Research Institute, the University of Natal and 
the University of Wisconsin drawing on the 1998 KIDZ 2 survey). Feeling dirty and 'not to wash 
yourself because there is no water near the dwelling' enhances feelings of unworthiness and 
unsociability and has been found by these studies to exacerbate feelings of social exclusion. 
21 In 1997, consultants working in the water sector in a communal area outside Johannesburg reported 
that a child was physically abused by his parent because the child had used water to wash his hands 
after his mother had walked for two hours to fetch water (Unicef 200 I). The basic need for water is not 
met, and hygiene and health practices are curtailed. The child was not using water for recreational 
purposes. 
22 Urban renewal plans include incorporation of water services as an essential component of job 
creation and economic upliftment. Abalimi Bezekhaya, 'The People's Garden Centre,' in Khayelitsha 
serving 2000 gardens, is an example of an NGO focussed on economic production within constraints: 
no water, poor soil conditions but high quality vegetables and nutrition for families. Water scarcity - as 
well as poor soils - is an impediment to gardening and production of home-grown nutrients, thus 











factor, shaping who can benefit from which resources (Ribot & Peluso 2001).23 As the 
empirical data in this thesis demonstrates, trust in government is closely linked to 
delivery of safe and adequate water - and sanitation at affordable costs to 
households. 
Positive democratic effects cannot be maximised unless there is adequate information 
and knowledge so that people are able to make informed decisions about issues that 
affect their lives (Warren 1999; Goldin 2003; Miller 1993) and change the patterns of 
who has and who does not have water.24 
3. Policy context: legislative guidelines and policy documents 
Policy background 
The first policies to make a break with the past were contained in the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme that was published as a key pillar of the ANC election 
manifesto in 1993 and became the official policy of government in May 1994 
(Eberhard 1999; White Paper 1994). The 1994 Water Supply and Sanitation White 
Paper (DW AF 1994), entitled 'Water, an indivisible national asset,' identified the 
need for government to create a sustainable policy on water supply and sanitation, and 
although a water and sanitation paper, the bulk of the paper dealt primarily with the 
provision of water. In the 1994 White Paper, D WAF's recognition of unequal access 
to basic water supply resulted in a formulation of preliminary guidelines which were 
drawn up in accordance with the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(MacKay 2003; DW AF 1994).25 
The paper did not introduce a strategy per se; instead, it outlined the areas where 
policy would be formulated in the future and national guidelines would be drawn up, 
entailing a 'major review of the Water Act No 54 of 1956' (DWAF 1994, p.2). The 
1994 White Paper discussed the legacy of the apartheid years, notably the absence of 
23 Ribot and Peluso (200 I) point out that the term access is frequently used when referring to property 
and natural resource analysts or by other social scientists, without adequate definition. Their paper' A 
theory of access, taking property out of place', seeks to 'map' relationships of access. 
24 Miller (1994) in particular proposes a 'prolonged phase of education and consultancy.' He speaks of 
the community as clients who should be satisfied by the agency. In other words, until the transfer of 
knowledge has been completed, the negotiation between client and agency remains deficient. 
25 The International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade of the 19805 also influenced the way in 











a clear, coherent policy prior to 1994, institutional fragmentation within governing 
bodies, and a lack of political will to address the water problem.26 It aimed at 
remedying the inequalities in water allocation of the past and in particular aimed to 
resolve issues of property rights to water, later resolved in the National Water Act 
(Act 36 of 1998) where all ownership rights were vested in the state (Conradie et al. 
2001). It was followed by the White Paper on a National Water Policy for South 
Africa (DW AF 1997) and the White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation (DWAF 
2001). 
The policy principles underlying the 1994 White Paper are as follows (DW AF 1994): 
1. Development should be demand-driven and community-based 
2. Integrated planning and development 
3. Basic water is a human right 
4. 'Some for All' rather than 'All for Some' 
5. Equitable regional allocation of development resources 
6. Water has an economic value 
7. User-pays principle 
8. Environmental integrity 
The foundations for a sound institutional structure to support the transfonnation must 
be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and with the eight principles that 
have been outlined (DWAF 1994, p. 9). As the role of government changed, the 
Department stressed that all communities in the country should have access to basic 
services but were eager to point out that although they would support provincial, local 
government and 'other' agencies (such as, for example, water boards), this did not 
imply that the supply of basic services was the direct responsibility of the Department 
(ibid.). The key to sustainable water and sanitation development, emphasised in tenns 
of Section 126 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa Act 1993, is the existence of 
functional and competent local government (DWAF 1994, p. 11). Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution of the RSA (Act 108 of 1996) vests the responsibility for water, limited 
to potable water supply systems and domestic waste water and sewage disposal 
26 Note also Evans (1997) who refers to the 'native administration' and makes the point that apartheid 











systems, in local government.27 Section 146 of the Constitution makes the role of the 
state explicit and provides scope for national government to develop national norms 
and standards for functions that fall under Schedule F of the Constitution.28 
The Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution proclaims the following basic rights 
that are important to the water sector in general and fundamental to the new 
democracy: the right to equality, the right to dignity and life, the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to health or wellbeing and, importantly, the right of 
access to sufficient water and food and to primary healthcare services (Eberhard 1999, 
p.27). The National Water Advisory Council was established in November 1994 and 
the Water Laws Rationalisation and Amendment Bill were passed which provided for 
localised statutory water committees. Based on the changing role of the State and the 
rights ordained in the Bill of Rights, in order to redress the water problem, a national 
panel began the water law review process in 1994 with the aim of drafting a new 
Water Act (WRC 1996, p. 11).29 The panel drew up a set of 28 principles, approved 
by Cabinet in November 1996, which formed the basis of the new water legislation 
(MacKay 2003, p. 52; Gorgens30 et al. 1998, p. 7).31 An important step was to create 
a new department that would reverse the legacy of apartheid, specifically the 
institutional fragmentation, inherent confusion and resulting political inertia of the 
paqt. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry was created on 1 July 1994 with 
27 A brief note on water use has not yet been provided and is useful for the reader. MacKay's (2003) 
discussion adopts the II different kinds of water users that require authorisation according to Section 
21 of the National Water Act. These are: storage and abstraction of water; impeding or diverting the 
flow of water in a watercourse; discharge of waste or heated effluent either directly to a water resource 
or in a manner which may impact on a water resource; alteration of the bed, banks, course or 
characteristics of a watercourse; removal and disposal of underground water (primarily related to mine 
dewatering); recreational use of water resources; stream flow reduction activities; and controlled 
activities. (MacKay 2003, p. 54). Discussion Document 2 (Bruwer 2000) divides water users broadly 
into three sub-divisions. l) Consumptive and non-consumptive users, 2) users whose actions 'degrade 
water quality and those who do not' 3) purpose for which water is used. 
28 In order to link the fmancing, funding and implementation of water programmes, the 2001 White 
Paper suggested that the Integrated Development Planning (lDP) process, introduced by the new local 
government statutes as the appropriate mechanism to aid municipalities, set priorities and coordinate 
service delivery. Within the IDP, the Water Services Development Plan (WSDP) should provide the 
basis for water and sanitation provision and operation (DW AF 200 I a). Municipalities are now 
required to prepare Infrastructure Investment Plans (lIPs) regarding existing and proposed levels of 
service to households, health and hygiene education to be provided and estimated capital and recurring 
costs. However, the IDP process requires local government to budget and source funding in order to 
implement water programmes. 
29 Chaired by GeoffBudlender, the Water Law Review Panel met 13 times over a three-month period. 
30 Part one. The guidelines for catchment management are divided into three parts. Part one discusses 
the conceptual and institutional context of catchment management. 











responsibility for consolidating all water and forestry-related departments, budgets, 
personnel and functions previously in existence (DW AF 1994). Given the immensity 
of the task, the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader Asmal, anticipated that 
it would take 18 months to two years to form the new department (DW AF 1994, p.l). 
The objective of the Department is to develop 'not only a new organisational structure 
but also a new ethos and vision' (DW AF 1994, p.2). 
The Water Law Principles were approved by Cabinet in 1996 (ibid.) and were to 
become enshrined in the National Water Act two years later. The five most 
significant principles are summed up in the following table (MacKay 2003, p. 52) 
Table Four' Five Water Law Principles 
Principle Principle 
no 
·3&4 The abolition of riparian water rights 
~~~--~~--------~~ 





Establishment of 'environmentally su stainable social and economic benefit' as a key 
ment and allocation decisions. criterion for water resources manage 
Provision of the use of economic inst ruments in the management and control of pollution. 
ent system should contribute to the cost of its Beneficiaries of the water managem 
establishment and maintenance. 
The two key policy and implementation mechanisms, the National Water Act (Act 36 
of 1998) and the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997), were based on these 
principles (MacKay 2003, p. 52). Other key processes that informed these two core 
legislative frameworks are presented in the flow chart below:32 



















South Africa (Act 
108 of 1996) 
Water Laws 
Rationalisation and 
--....,.... Amendment Bill 
(Nov 1994) 
Appointment of 
---..-.. Water Law Review 
Panel (April 1995) 
Growth, 
---..... Employment and 
Redistribution 
Strategy (1996) 
Water Services Act 
(Act 108 of 1997) 
Figure One: Relevant legislation 
Water Supply and 
Sanitation Policy 
----'..... White Paper (Nov 
1994) 
Launch of National ---'1.... Water Conservation 
Campaign (Sept 
1995) 
White Paper on a 
--....,.... National Water 
Poliey (April 1997) 
The National Water 
Act (Act 36 of 
1998) 
The 1997 White Paper on a National Water Policy (DW AF 1997) notes that sufficient 
affordable clean water for hygiene purposes should be seen as part of the primary 
healthcare service (D W AF 1998). Concerns about water services cannot be isolated 
from related areas of health, hygiene, housing, education and the environment. 
According to MacKay (2003): 
The 1997 White Paper on National Water Policy (DW AF 1997) 
represented a key milestone in the process of refonn of the water sector as 
a whole, and it will have far-reaching effects on social, economic and 
environmental issues in South Africa as it is implemented over the next 20 
years (MacKay 2003, p. 49). 
The reason for this is that it was the first policy document to integrate the principles 
and objectives of the new water law, in line with the Constitution of South Africa and 











introduced in 1996. The National Water Act and the Water Services Act are the 
primary implementation mechanisms for this policy (MacKay 2003, p. 52). 
Water Services Act 
The Water Services Act of 1997 states that local government would be the 
implementers and the authorities for the provision of water services.33 Local 
government has a duty: 
To all consumers or potential consumers in its area of jurisdiction to 
progressively ensure efficient, affordable, economical and sustainable 
access to water services (Act 108 of 1997 Chapter Three 11 (1) )?4 
Local municipalities are responsible for the provision of water services and for 
implementing water improvement programmes at the localleve1.35 Provincial and 
central government institutions, the private sector and NGOs are also considered vital 
stakeholders, and should facilitate water development through financing, consulting, 
technical assistance, construction, training, capacity-building and education on health 
and hygiene matters. 
The policy principles underlying the Water Services Act are: 
1. The rights of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation to ensure 
sufficient water. 
2. The rights of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation to ensure an 
environment not harmful to health or wellbeing. 
3. All spheres of government to ensure that water supply services are provided in 
a manner that is efficient, equitable and sustainable. 
4. All spheres of government must strive to provide water supply services and 
sanitation services sufficient for subsistence and sustainable economic activity. 
33 Amongst others, relevant supporting policy: Water Services Act, 1997, Local Government Municipal 
Systems Act, Act 32 of2000 and the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, No 117 of 1998 
34 Schedule 4 (Part B) Section 151-156 of the Constitution of South Africa allocates the responsibility 
and function for the provision of water supply and sanitation services to municipalities. 
35 Some of the important reasons are to maintain efficient pricing structures and minimise leakages. For 
instance, the power of consumers to influence water pricing has been demonstrated in Los Angeles and 











5. All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles of co-
operative government. 
6. That the delivery of water services must be undertaken in a manner consistent 
with the broader goals of water resource management. 
7. The interests of consumers and broader goals of public policy must be 
promoted. 
8. National government is custodian of the nation's resources. 
The Water Services Act, 1997 (Act 108) deals with the distribution of water for 
domestic, business and industrial use and with the institutions that are given 
responsibility for managing and distributing services. It legislates the municipal 
function of providing water supply and sanitation services. 
The Water Service Act provides for the rights of access to basic water supply and 
basic sanitation. It sets norms, tariffs and national standards that provide the 
framework for water services development plans (WSDPs), thus providing a 
regulatory structure for water services institutions and water services intermediaries. 
This Act provides that every water service authority must prepare a water services 
development plan (WSDP) for its area of jurisdiction as part of the Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) process. 
The Water Services Act gets its mandate from Section 27 of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution which says that 'everyone has the right to have sufficient food and 
water'. This Act does not deal with the allocation of water. It does, however, give 
local or district authorities the ability and authority to manage their own water 
supply. Municipalities can act as Water Service Authorities (WSAs) and as Water 
Service Providers (WSPs) or they can subcontract this function to water boards or 
another service provider to ensure the provision of water to their consumers 
(DW AF 1997). Although the Water Services Act includes measures to promote 
water conservation and demand management its primary function is to deal with 











The Water Service Act also redefmes the roles of water boards whose main task is to 
'provide water services to other water service institutions within its service area' 
through selling bulk water. 
Sections 9 and 10 of the Act regulate the volume of water that has been set as the 
target for 'basic' level services of households - currently 6000 litres per month per 
household. Section 4 (3) ensures that poor households will not be deprived of water 
services because they are poor, for when proven that 'he or she is unable to pay for 
basic services' they should not be denied water (DW AF 1997).36 
National Water Act 
The 1998 National Water Act further emphasises the policies that were laid out in the 
1997 White Paper on a National Water Policy. It is more explicit in its design of a 
full-scale national water programme, indicating that the future programme would 
attempt to develop the necessary implementation strategies to meet the basic need of 
all citizens within ten years, according to the policy principles presented in the 1997 
White Paper. The Act stipulates that the 'water resources ofthe Republic must be 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled' in an equitable and 
sustainable manner.37 
The vision of the National Water Act is declared in the Department's slogan 'some for 
all for ever'. The primary principle identified in the Water Law Review process is that 
development should be demand-driven (DWAF 1994), and instead of developing new 
resources water conservation and management of existing resources takes priority 
(DWAF 2002, p. 6; MacKay 2003). It is this principle that has been used to determine 
how priorities will be set and decisions made to maximise the benefits of the water 
programme. According to MacKay (2003), at the time of its release, the National 
36 Further discussion on the issue of rights and payments to water follows under the subsection on costs 
and tariffs in this chapter. 
37 Chapter 2, Part 1, Section 5 (3). These six themes are recurrent in government rhetoric. See for 
example the Introduction to the National Water Resource Strategy by the Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, August 2002, and the opening speech by Director-General Muller at the Water Management 











Water Act was considered one of the most progressive models for water reform in the 
world (2003, p. 53).38 
Organisation of the water sector in South Africa 
By incorporating principles three and four of the Water Law Review, the National 
Water Act separated land and water rights, and this was unprecedented in the history 
of South Africa.39 Water has been declared a national asset and private water rights no 
longer exist 40 It was recognised that naturally occurring water usually can be 
effectively and efficiently managed only within a river basin or catchment area, because 
of the need to manage, or at least account for, all aspects of the hydrological cycle 
(BRBS 1999; MacKay 2003; WRC 1996).41 The country has been divided into 19 
water management areas (WMAs). The establishment of WMAs and their boundaries 
is a component of the National Water Resources Strategy in terms of Chapter Two, 
Section 5 (1) of the National Water Act42 The institutional arrangements laid out in 
the plan for the management of these nineteen water management catchments have 
been specified in great detail by the DW AF in the National Water Act, Chapters 7 and 
8. 
The WMA is a large-scale area defined by macro-hydrological boundaries and 
provides the geophysical framework for national water planning as defmed by the 
National Water Resources Strategy (BRBS). Catchment Management (CM) as 
prescribed by the National Water Policy: 
38 According to MacKay (2003), 'one of the first pieces of legislation in the world to provide for this 
water as a right rather than as an allocation' (2003, p. 60). 
39 Roman Law adopted the concept of dominus j/uminis which made the distinction between private 
water and public water but determined that the right to the use of public water was vested in the state. 
The British introduced the principle of riparian rights which gave riparian land owners the right of use 
of public water and replaced the dominus j/uminis principle (DW AF 1994). As MacKay (2003) points 
out, the riparian laws were suitable to a country where water flows are regular but they are not suitable 
to the semi-arid South African climate (2003, p. 57). Water law was first codified in a number of 
Irrigation and Conservation Acts between 1906 and 1912. The 1956 Water Act (Act 54 of 1956) 
retained the riparian principle (DWAF J 994). Government Notice No. 1352, 12 November 1999, 
National Water Act, 1998 (No. 36 of 1998): Regulations require that a water use be registered and 
make it impossible for water to be privately owned. 
40 Chapter 4, Part 8, of Act 36, 1998 establishes a procedure for compulsory licences for all water use. 
41 The WRC (1996) defines the catchment area as 'the drainage basin of a river, and its boundaries are 
demarcated by the points of highest altitude in the surrounding landscape. It is adjoined by other 
catchments and its geographical area covers all of the land which drains into one river system, from its 
source to its estuary' (1996, p.19). 
42 See Sections 5 (2)-(5) in Government Gazette No 19182, but also relevant are the Catchment 










'" is simultaneously a philosophy, a process and an implementation 
strategy to achieve equitable access to and sustainable use of water 
resources by all stakeholders at catchment, regional, national and 
international levels while maintaining the characteristics and integrity 
of water resources at the catchment scale within agreed limits (WRC 
1998, p. 5). 
The guiding principles of the National Water Act are designed to promote social and 
economic development through the use of water and recognise the need to establish 
suitable water management institutions in order to achieve this purpose. These WMAs 
will therefore be governed by a Catchment Management Agency (CMA),43 a self-
governing body corporate. DWAF's role in pioneering and promoting the 
establishment of CMAs and water user associations (WUAs) that inform them, is 
pivotal.44 
As the National Water Act recognises the need for consensual participation by 
relevant stakeholders, both in government and civil society, and that the previous 
delivery systems produced low trust (Gorgens 1998, p. 4) it reinforces notions that 
water provision should not be viewed as 'top-down'. Section 79 in Chapter 7 
prescribes that the catchment management agency, while performing its duties, must 
'be mindful of the constitutional imperative to redress the results of past racial and 
gender discrimination and to achieve equitable access for all ..... (Act 36 of 1998, 
Chapter 7 Section 4 (a)) and it includes vital stakeholders who can and should 
contribute to the effective delivery of water and the management of the national asset. 
It must 'strive towards achieving co-operation and consensus in managing the water 
resources under its control' (Act 36 of 1998, Chapter 7, Section 4 (b)).45 
DW AF's role is central to the success of the transformation.46 Of the key 
institutional transformation requirements, as stipulated in terms of Section 98 (4) 
of the National Water Act, the transformation of irrigation boards into water user 
43 Sections 72, 73 and 151 (1) (1) of Schedule 3 in Chapter 17 of Act No 36, 1998, set outthe powers 
which may be exercised and duties to be performed by CMA on assignment of delegation. This 
discussion is followed through in Chapter Four of this study. 
44 Chapter 8 of the National Water Act, Act 36 of 1998, establishes the procedures and powers of Water 
User Associations. 
45 Chapter Five offers a critique of this - suggesting that the protection of civil society is inadequate 
and 'vague'. 











associations is also paramount.47 Clearly, as the chapters that follow elaborate, 
this process has not yet been finalised. 
DWAF's intention in the National Water Resource Strategy is to layout the practices 
of various government departments by designating the roles and responsibilities of all 
stakeholders and providing a means of coordinating these efforts.48 Importantly, the 
intention is to ensure that those who have been excluded from decision-making 
processes would be drawn into the forums responsible for water management. The 
National Water Policy rests on the concept of integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) on a catchment basis and the National Water Resource Strategy must 
promote the management 0/ catchments within a water management area in a holistic 
and integrated manner (Schedule 6 (1) (1) Act No. 36 of 1998). 
National Water Resource Strategy (NWRSt9 
The National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) is the implementation strategy for the 
National Water Act but it is a "dynamic document, which will continue to grow and 
change as the needs, capacity and understanding of our people change' (DW AF 2002 
(a».50 The development of the National Water Resources Strategy is the 
responsibility ofDW AF. This large-scale strategy must ensure that plans are in place 
to prevent any region suffering water shortages or poor water quality. It must also 
ensure ecological water requirements and protect the interests of international 
neighbours. The four main objectives of the strategy are: 
• To establish the national framework for managing water resources 
• To establish the framework for the preparation of the catchment management 
strategies 
• To provide information 
• To identify development opportunities and constraints 
47 ••• the period for transformation into a Water User Association by Irrigation Boards in terms of 
section 98(4) of the National Water Act, 1998 has been extended to 31 August 1999. (BRBS 2001) 
48 Chapter Five engages in more depth in the problematic notions of participation, community and 
stakeholder that are seemingly 'uncritically' applied in the policy rhetoric. For this discussion see also 
Agrawal & Gibson 1999, Benjaminsen et al. 2002, Peters 2002, Eade 1997, Ribot & Peluso 2001 and 
Selener 1997. 
49 The NWRS is scheduled to be released in April 2004. 











Subject to Section 5 (4) (a) of the National Water Act the NWRS must: 
Set out strategies, objectives, plans, guidelines and procedures of the 
Minister and institutional arrangement relating to the protection, use, 
development, conservation, management and control of water resources 
.... ' (Act No 36 of 1998, Schedule 6 (1) (a)). 
The NWRS provides data on natural mean annual runoff and the ecological reserve 
and on the available yield for each WMA as well as the water requirements for each 
WMA (DW AF 2002, pp. 15-18). It provides strategies to balance supply with 
demand - 'a reconciliation of the available water and total requirements for the year 
2000' (DWAF 2002, p. 19). 
4. Policy aims and achievements51 
General 
Water policy in South Africa is undergoing a process of 'rapid and significant 
evolution' (Eberhard & Pegram 2000, p. 28). In an attempt to redress the apartheid 
skews, water policy is directed at improving conditions amongst the poor, mainly 
those living in rural communities of the former homeland areas and in informal 
settlements. Although the concern for scarcity of water as well as access and rights to 
water is appropriate, inadequate attention has been given to equal access and control 
over water (Wester et at. 2003). Many water users are more restrained by a lack of 
means to take water from its source rather than lack of rights of access to water 
(ibid.). 
Following global trends in watershed and catchment management (Agrawal & Gibson 
1999; Farrington 1999; Fayssee 2003; MacKay 2003; Wester et aL 2003), and in 
accordance with the principles of the South African Constitution, the water policies 
that have been introduced are aimed particularly at the provision of opportunities for 
participation of all South Africans where government takes up the responsibility for 
'leadership and guidance rather than control' (WRC 1996, p. 7). The objective of the 
water policies is to redress the inequalities of the past and ensure that all South 











Africans have access to clean drinking water. At the same time, these policies ensure 
the Reserve for the environment, not considered before as a consumer in its own right, 
has the first claim on the resource (Eberhard & Pegram 2000, p. 33).52 The ecological 
Reserve represents the minimum quantity and quality of water that must remain in the 
system to ensure that at all times it is able to recover to, or maintain, an 'acceptable 
level of ecosystem health' (Beuster 2001, p. 24). 
Gorgens et al. (1998) provide detailed guidelines for participation in the catchment 
management process and state: 
... This includes changing people's behaviour, tapping into their energy 
and resources, empowering them to take control of their neighbourhood 
environment, and owning the catchment management process and its 
implications. Together with involvement, capacity-building of the 
stakeholder representative is of paramount important to the process, 
because informed participation will lead to understanding and informed 
decision-making, which will facilitate effective implementation and 
administration (Gorgens et al. 1998, pp. 6_7).53 
The Water Act, and its accompanying policy documents, provide the legislative 
framework required for authorities to clear the water backlog, ensuring that all 
citizens have a basic level of water service by 2010. DWAF states that it may be 
possible to achieve this target by 2008, but in practice the timetable has been shifted 
out to provide an additional two-year window. 54 
The National Water Act, evaluated within the context of the other policy documents, 
provides a clear direction for water delivery in the intervening years. It is difficult to 
ascertain numerically what has been accomplished in the nine years since the first 
White Paper was introduced. 55 Although there is a policy focus on the poor, the 
52 The environment should not be considered a competitor for use as it is the base from which 
consumers are able to draw water. 
53 Part 11: Guidelines for the catchment management process (Gorgens et al. 1998). 
54 Discussion DWAF Provincial Office: February 2004. 
55 Indicator SA: Volume 17, No 4. This review is critical of government figures and the contradictions 











dissonances between the policy rhetoric of the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry and policy implementation are apparent. The hard-won democratic rights that 
are embedded in the South African Constitution are not easily translated in the 
domain of water management. Wester et al. (2003) and MacKay (2004) are right in 
saying that the core vision encapsulated in the Constitution becomes more 'fuzzy' as 
the level of implementation is moved outwards from principles through policy 
' ... making co-operation and alignment across sectors at the lower (local) levels that 
much more difficult' (MacKay 2004, p.3).56 Gorgens et al. (1998) also identify the 
fragmented resource management initiatives as problematic, for instance the land-care 
movement, driven by the Department of Agriculture, and the establishment of 
conservation and conservancies, driven by the Department of Environment Affairs 
and Tourism and the Parks Board (1998, p. 8). The new Draft White Paper on Water 
Services attempts to tackle head-on some of these problems and like the National 
Water Resources Strategy makes more explicit the linkages between water resource 
management and water services and between civil society and government. 
According to Farrington (1999), Miller (1993), Ostrom (1996), Levi (1996) and the 
World Bank Development Report (2003) international best practice has demonstrated 
that communities who are involved in the decision-making process are willing to 
commit to the maintenance and operations involved with water management, 
including responsibility for financial aspects of the service. Institutional reform that 
embraces the notions of political-administrative capacity and democracy at the local 
level is considered critical to the delivery process (ibid). But although international 
lessons in development are persistent that successful development, particularly in 
rural areas, requires participatory mechanisms and that local needs should be 
considered a central part of planning (ibid),57 this is not always the case. 
Theoretically, this focus has the potential to enhance cooperation and common 
understandings around water and to consolidate shared norms and values that exist 
56 See also footnote 31 and related text. Froestad (2003) speaks of the 'long history of pillar is at ion' 
which he defmes as a 'tendency of various professions and agencies to work in silos' (2003, p. 30). 
57 The South African Water Law Review process involved research into international examples of 
integrated catchment management, in particular: Australia, North America, United Kingdom, France 
and other African approaches, where there was more limited success to resolve these issues at the time 











between water management systems (Farrington 1999; Levi 1996; Ostrom 1996).58 
Pollard & du Toit (2003), Desai (1994) and others (Agrawal & Gibson 1999; Robins 
2002) are attentive ofthe mUltiple interests and contested meanings that are all too 
often sidestepped in "participatory' approaches, for most only theoretically place 
stakeholders at the centre of the planning and management process. 
In South Africa, the present continuation of the technological regime that is 
structurally connected to urban development, industry and commercial farming is 
dominated by discourse that was part of the apartheid water regime. This was a 
regime that fostered fear and distrust in rural populations, homelands, townships and 
amongst farm workers on large commercial farms (Marais 2001; MacKay 2003). 
Deepening democracy at the local level and including ordinary water users in decision 
making processes provides, ~n theory,59 an opportunity to build trust between water 
users and between water users and government. 
Importantly, the new Draft White Paper on Water Services includes Section 4.7, 
entitled 'the role of civil society' (DW AF 2002b, p. 27), and although this notion of 
inclusivity was expressed in the previous policies the linkages between a "durable 
democracy' and a 'strong civil society' are now made explicit. 
Knowledge regimes 
With the emphasis on participation, one of the key challenges is to "level the playing 
field amongst users' who are notably heterogeneous (Faysee 2003, p.2). But it is 
unrealistic to accept, as has been proposed by many, that users would, or indeed 
should, all gain the same level of technical and specialised expertise (ibid). It is 
realistic and desirable, on the other hand, to ensure that water users who do not have 
the habit of discussing water matters amongst themselves, become involved in the 
process (ibid). It is also realistic and desirable to ensure that different segments of 
58 The problems in achieving participation and inc\usivity are at the core of the discussions followed in 
Chapter Five, but Chapter Four, the role of the state in producing trust, is also relevant here. 
59 Note the cautionary warning by development practioners, e.g. Pollard et al. (2003), working in the 
Sand subcatchment of the Inkomati Catchment portrays the gap between policy ideals and their 
practical effects. Agrawal & Gibson (1999) reconsider the role of community in natural resource 
conservation in their article entitled' Enchantment and disenchantment' and explore the conceptual 
origins of 'community.' Varughese and Ostrom (2001) believe in institutions and rules of the game 












water users exchange their respective and distinct knowledge regimes and skills base 
in the domain of water management (Miller 1993). 
The different visions and notions of water and how these notions affect 
participation and issues of equal access for water users - are obscured in Western 
conceptions of water that identify water within a framework built on "scientific' 
technology and economic classifications of nature (Miller 1993). For some water 
users, water is predominantly 'untamed' while for others it is conceived in terms of a 
'tamed' resource.60 Within the Western knowledge regime, water is measurable and 
water systems and progress in the domain of water are considered in terms of 
domination and control over nature (Kotze 1997). Yet for other water users, water 
remains natural and wild or "untamed' and access to it is considered erratic. 61 
These cultural differences are important for they convey information about the 
maintenance and adaptation of social systems to the environment and in particular to 
water (Kotze 1997). People who come together to discuss water matters assume and 
are often unaware of their own cognitive assumptions that then guide and inform their 
decisions and are closed to realities that are different.62 The knowledge regime that 
dominates the water sector is also focussed primarily on the environment - and the 
consumption needs of the ecological reserve are consequently adequately and 
eloquently represented through specialists in the water management institutions. As 
the empirical evidence comes to light, it reflects on the many domestic consumers and 
some small-scale farmers who are frustrated in their attempts to protect their 
60 Anthropologists, for instance, Levi-Strauss (1987) have long been interested in the ways that people 
organise their universe through myths and rituals that give meaning to an otherwise chaotic universe. 
61 White farmers speak of dams, weirs, canals, boreholes which are important to them. Their references 
to water are organised in terms of organising supply and taming water, by building another dam, 
redirecting a canal and so forth. Yet even these terrains and understandings are contested as the 
'irrational' understandings of springs, weather or water are found amongst 'commercial' farmers where 
there is evidence of suspicion and distrust that is irrational and idiosyncratic. Acknowledgement in 
particular to Tim Huisamen in the Department of Afrikaans at Rhodes University for his insights into 
belief systems of the Afrikaner, 'ons bybel, ons taal en ons land' (our bible, our language and our land) 
which contain distinctly 'irrational' understandings of the way in which the universe is organised. In 
the same way, and importantly, there is deep rationality at the base of 'non-Western' or non-
technological views of water where, as the empirical data in Chapter Four suggests, water users 
manage and organise water and have a deep understanding and mastery of the environment. 
62 Closedness and fixation are discussed in some detail in the theoretical analysis but, as is evident in 
these discussions, closedness does not encourage the building of trust or social capital amongst water 
users. The symbolic representation of organised and rational thinking in water matters (obvious in 
many water management meetings) is evident in the use of cartography, the choice of specialist input 











consumption needs, and this has negative effects on the building of trust between 
consumers. 
Prior to 1994, environmental issues were of low priority and narrowly defined as 
nature conservation.63 Although the definition of the environment has expanded to 
include people, there has been a failure to integrate environmental concerns into 
economics whose focus is on efficient use of scarce resources and equity. The 
ecological Reserve, required to protect aquatic ecosystems, is important to ensure 
future generations' access to scarce resources as well as to ensure financial gain 
through tourism. The importance of the aquatic ecosystem was manifest in the South 
African Water Quality Guidelines (DWAF 1996) and 'found its way, after much 
heated debate, into the Water Law Principles of 1996' (MacKay 2003, p. 59).64 
According to MacKay (2003) the National Water Act was one of the first pieces of 
legislation in the world to 'provide for this water as a right rather than an allocation 
(2003, p. 60). Water policy focus on human health is overshadowed by concerns for 
environmental aspects of biodiversity, coastal management, industrial pollution and 
conservation of natural resources. 
The intended institutional systems propose to facilitate the effective, sustainable and 
accountable management of water resources for the country and balance the national 
strategic issues with local ones (Eberhard & Pegram 2000, p.ii). An important 
function ofthe Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, as custodian of the nation's 
water, is to determine that water is allocated with equity - while offering sustainable 
solutions - between different interest groups. But the mismatch between commercial 
or industrial water allocation, agricultural usage (Beuster 2001) and the allocation for 
domestic consumption remains. Despite legislation to the contrary, water for 
agricultural use and stock farming is used in large volumes. Many poor communities 
63 During the 19908 the Rio Earth Summit 1992, Second World Water Forum, The Hague 2000, Third 
World Water Forum, Japan, Monterrey Conference, March 2002, Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable 
Development, 2002, Kyoto Forum, also the Millennium Development Goals and in particular the 
Agenda 21, linked the environment to poverty and development. 
64 An informative discussion with Bill Rowlston during the WiIlowvale symposium, April 2004 in 
Johannesburg, indicated that in the same way that this aspect of the environment was considered the 
'stepchild' of the environment and did not feature in water discourse, so too people are not yet 'taken. 










have not been able to take advantage of their 'right' to primary water supplies 
(DW AF 1994).65 
Tariffs and cost for water 
The 1994 White Paper stated that free basic water should be provided to the very poor 
in South Africa, and despite the clear policy, that no one will be deprived of basic 
water supplies, all poor people have not been able to benefit. The Equitable Share 
subsidy, obtained through direct intergovernmental transfers, covers the cost of free 
basic services to the very poor. Since early 2000 DW AF has been investing in the 
process but it was only in June 2003 the Cabinet approved a three-staged Free Basic 
Water Implementation.66 The amount of free basic water referred to in the paper is 25 
litres per person in line with the W orId Health Organization's guideline on minimum 
daily water required for drinking, washing and personal use. This has been increased 
to 6000 litres per household within 200m of the dwelling. However, the need for 
water is higher as this estimate does not include water for home-grown vegetables and 
neither is it sufficient to respond to special needs for the sick, particularly relevant in 
the light of the HIV/AIDS crisis (CCRS 2004, p. 9). Comparative analysis of 
international experience suggests that an average domestic consumption of between 
100 and 200 Htres per capita per day is sufficient to maintain a high standard of living 
(Eberhard 1999, p.l).67 
65 A significant addition to the National Water Act and later the 200 I White Paper is the introduction of 
monitoring and evaluation of national programmes. A series of broad categories are identified, from 
which the key performance indicators are yet to be developed (DWAF 200 1 a). Data collection and 
measurement, particularly at the local or municipal level, is expected to form an integral part of the 
£,erformance-monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation. 
http//www.dwaf.go.zalFreeBasicWaterlDefau!tHome.asp. The legal framework for implementation 
of Free Basic Water is that of tariff-setting which is guided by the Constitution Act (Act no 108 of 
1996), the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act no 32 of2000) and the Water Services Act 
(Act no 108 of 1997) (DWAF 2001, p.8). 
67 Such an 'average' level of consumption is already attained in South Africa's major urban areas. But 
note too the skews within the urban sites are pronounced and along racial lines. Also across towns. 
Eberhard says, for example, in Grahamstown average domestic consumption is very low while in 
Gauteng or Cape Town it is average and compares with developed countries. In his budget speech on 6 
June 2003, Minister Kasrils announced his vision ofa 'water ladder' and that government is not content 
to simply provide the basic requirements but that 'the promise for the next ten years is to move up the 
ladder, from communal taps to the convenience and dignity of having water in people's own yards with 
each household having its own toilet and even, in time, hot and cold running water inside the house 
enjoyed by many more of our people. That's what I mean by climbing the water 











Although the right to basic water services is 'not an absolute right, it is subject to the 
state taking reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights' (DWAF 2002b, p. 33), there are 
expectations of the ANC that it is a 'caring' government and that it should be 
providing water and services to all (Fjeldstad 2003; Ruiters 1996) and as Tapscott 
(2002) notes: 
... the state' (in the form of Bantustan administrations) was seen to bring 
rewards to those who supported the government in power. In a democratic 
state, run by a popular government, it is readily assumed, rewards in the 
form of jobs, housing and services should be forthcoming (2002, p.2). 
The multiple and conflicting roles of the state in water delivery continue to stimulate 
heated debate in South Africa and are particularly apparent in the area of water 
pricing and tariffs.68 
More recently statistics collected by the Department of Provincial and 
Local Government (DPLG) showed 133456 water disconnections in the 
last quarter of 2001. This translates to a ( conservative) estimate of 500 
000 people affected by water disconnections over a three-month 
period. (McDonald: June 2003. Sunday Independent). 69 
A sound tier70 tariff policy ensures recovery of full costs associated with water 
resource management and infrastructure development (Eberhard & Pegram 2000; 
Eberhard 1999) that is aimed at reconciling notions of equity and basic needs. The 
user pays approach, based on neo-liberal policies supported by the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, is aimed at cutting government 
expenditure and reducing budget deficits (Carmichael & Midwinter 2003, p. 122). 
Tariff reform in developing countries requires guidelines and tools that establish an 
appropriate equity framework as there is a lack of consensus among policy-makers 
and local municipal officers on the meaning of equity (ibid. ). 
68 Debate about water cut-off's and water tariffs between DW AF and civil society: see Sunday 
Independent June 22-July 15,2003 and Nothingfor Mahala, Centre for Civil Society Research Report 
no 16. 
69 David McDonald is the co-director of the Municipal Services Project. 
70 First tier: the use of water from the water resource (all ground and surface water 'extracted' from the 
environment and bulk raw water schemes managed by DW AF). Second and third tier water is treated 
water that is supplied in bulk (often by water boards) and then distributed to municipalities (for 











The lack of knowledge and awareness of water management has consequences in 
tenus of human and financial capita1. 71 Under-investment, for instance, in the 
reticulation system leads to water leakage (Conradie et a1. 2001)72and delivery that is 
too hurried compromises sustainable solutions.73 Although inroads have been made -
30% of people had inadequate supply of water near their homes in 1994, reduced to 
20% in 1997 (Marais 2001, p. 190) there were thousands of water cut offs every 
month because users were unable to pay for these services (Marais 2001, p. 190).74 
The South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU) reported that as many as 
two million of the water taps installed were not working properly (cited in Marais 
2001, p. 191). 
In an attempt to appease the public, DWAF has adopted a 'name and shame' strategy 
for municipalities that fail to implement Free Basic Water to ensure that all consumers 
will have access to water and that municipalities must provide this service.75 But this 
71 According to a parliamentary media briefing between Dr Hemson of the HSRC, KzN, and Minister 
Kasrils, DW AF, in September 200356% ofRDP projects (sample of 113 projects where 23 were 
selected) that were surveyed by the HSRC were not working, but Dr Hemson said that of the projects 
that were not working he was not looking at the infrastructure. The problem was that people were stilI 
further than 200 m away from a standpipe. A highly developed infrastructure could be underutilised. 
On the other hand, a three-phased project might be regarded as complete after only one or two phases 
were done. 
72 In some contexts within South Africa, there is as much as 40% unaccounted-for water and 
unnecessary losses. Source: Eberhard 1999, p. 15). 
13 See footnote 60. But also note, involving communities in projects has been identified as critical but is 
all too often sidestepped. A pilot project, by Sandra Spagnol, submitted as an engineering thesis for the 
University of Toulouse and the University of Natal, Durban (May 2003), examined the status of roof 
tanks in the EThekwini Municipality area of Cato Manor. Although the sample was small, a 
disconcerting trend emerged, indicating that more than half of the consumers interviewed had bypassed 
or completely removed roof tanks and made illegal connections directly to the water main, thus 
benefiting from a full-pressure level of water service while only paying for a semi-pressure level of 
water supply. 
74 According to a report released in July 2001, there were 10 million South Africans who have had their 
water cut off for non-payment of bills (McDonald in Centre for Civil Society Research Report No 16, 
2004, p. 5). See also Centre for Civil Society Research Report, No 16 (2004), 'Nothing for Mahala.' 
The report is written by the Coalition Against Water Privatisation and the Anti-Privatisation Forum. It 
covers in considerable detail the effects offorced installation of prepaid water meters at Orange Farm, 
Johannesburg. 'Nothing for Mahala' translates as 'Nothing in life is free.' Minister Sonjica, in her 
budget speech, vote no. 34, in the National Assembly in June 2004, said that the main reason for cut-
offs was not the supply interruptions. Sonjica announced at this occasion that R265 million is included 
in the annual budget for local government support and capacity building and that 'it will be 
supplemented by generous donor 
funding. !.Lt1Ih'.·~,~~--..Q&'lL~?'y'{:£'.~&lIUIl.~ltll(;.illl~!ill'..IMII"ITI!~r..~~t~~L":ll11:!'J;$I1.ill~D!YJC~LL~..L~ 
75 Minister Kasrils's June 2003 budget vote address: !.!.'.o,,,-,,-~c..:~:..c=,,c=.=~~.,,~,~~.,~,'C.!!.,,--,-!= 
Rek.2l.sestZ003. 4 (3) (c) of Act 108 of 1997 says that procedures for the limitation or discontinuation 












will not solve the problem of non-payment. Certainly, as Eberhard & Pegram (2000) 
note, the positive health externalities associated with investment in water services 
suggest a rationale for government subsidisation of basic water services (2000, p. 14). 
On the other hand, as Eberhard and Pegram (2000) also note, the external costs need 
to be costed into the price of water (ibid.). Some feel that it is government's 
responsibility to provide water without charge, but as was stated as early as 1994 in 
the White Paper, 'this is incorrect and is leading to serious financial problems and the 
possible interruption of services' (DWAF 1994, p. 23), and DWAF urged 'such 
communities' to resume payment (ibid.). These problems place additional burdens, 
such as high costs in water pollution, maintenance and infrastructure, on already 
overburdened delivery authorities. With the establishment of' A Pricing Strategy for 
Raw Water Use Charges (DW AF 1999) the statutory framework for financing 
catchment management has been set (DWAF 2001a): the financial viability of the 
proposed Catchment Management Agency (CMA), the governing authority for a 
water management area, is dependent on 1) the willingness by the users to pay the 
water resource management charges and 2) the extent to which government commits 
subsidies for the CMA. 
The following diagram provides a useful overview of the water cost and pricing chain 
that is at the centre of so much debate and distrust between consumers and 
government at all tiers: 76 
76 Source: Draft White Paper on Water Services 'Water is life, sanitation is dignity,' the financial 
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The core tensions between water as an economic good and water as a public good are 
yet to be resolved, but the present debate on the non-payment of services is twofold 
with a distinction drawn between those who are able to pay, but don't, and those who 
are willing to pay, but can't. Rural households, shouldering two-thirds of the poverty 
burden in South Africa, are unlikely to be able to pay for services. 
Assuming that expenditure of less than 5% of expendable income on 
water services is affordable, less than 5% of black households in South 
Africa can afford the full cost of a high-use-in-house water connection 
and only some 15% of black households can afford the full cost of a 
moderate-use- in-house water connection .... more than 80% of 
households can afford the operating and maintenance costs for an off-site 
water supply and about 70% of households can afford the operating and 
maintenance costs of a yard tank supply (Eberhard 1999, p. 4). 
As already stated, the right to basic water services is 'not an absolute right. It is 
subject to the state taking reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights' (DW AF 











for services rendered. The government's Masakhane campaign,77 launched in 1995, 
was 'intended to be an education programme to persuade residents to pay their 
charges, along with the improvement of services' (Cameron 1999, p. 250; Hart 2002, 
p. 246), but it did not solve the problem. Interestingly, Conradie et al. (2001)78 argue 
that the poor might be willing to pay and to pay more than suspected, a view that is 
reinforced by the proliferation of informal water vendors in Africa and elsewhere 
(ibid.). Furthermore, evidence from developing contexts 79 indicates that the worst 
possible approach is to regard poor people as having no resources as this treats people 
as objects rather than subjects of development. Nevertheless, promises of free services 
for all have in practice usually resulted in some service for a few and little or none for 
most (DW AF 1994, p. 7). 
Importantly, studies have found that poor communities experience a higher 
prevalence of disease, especially preventable and infectious diseases such as 
malnutrition, diarrhoea and tuberculosis.80 As cholera is contracted from faecally 
contaminated drinking water or food, there is a high risk of cholera in the absence of 
appropriate facilities for water and waste disposal. A range of related issues are also 
responsible for waterborne diseases, such as contamination of ground water or water 
blockages that are a cost hazard to municipalities and a health hazard to people.81 The 
only sure means of protection against cholera epidemics are adequate water supplies. 
Addressing the issue of poverty in South Africa cannot be delinked from redressing 
77 Neil Mcleod in his presentation at the Cape Town International Convention Centre in May 2004 
reported on recent research that revealed 10, possibly even only 5, out of 150 municipalities are 
financially sustainable and of these only 70% of money that is owed is collected. He reported that 
'many municipalities collect virtually nothing. Bills rise because people don't pay. There is bribery, 
corruption and municipalities disconnect because they are desperate." Mcleod also drew attention in his 
speech to the fact that there are 10 000 child-headed households in South Africa. The impact of 
HIV/AIDS on payments is critical. Neil Mcleod heads Water Services at the eThekwini Municipality in 
Durban. eThekwini has been reported as one of the most successful municipalities and, according to 
Mcleod, it is difficult to perform the duties that have been designated to local municipalities. 
78 Conradie et aT. 2001. They propose that as a 'rule of thumb' households can afford to spend about 2-
3 percent of their income on water. See footnote 72. 
79 Abidjan 1990, New Delhi 1990 and Dublin 1992 in DWAF 1994, p. 7. 
80 Hemson 2003 determined that the' immediate precipitating factor for the rapid spread of the cholera 
epidemic was the disconnection of a rural community from a supply of clean water for not paying a 
connection charge.' 
81 An outbreak of cholera in K waZulu-Natal in 2000-2001 led informed critics to believe that the 
outbreak would force the DW AF to review its policy and implementation strategy. At the peak: ofthe 
epidemic, 1 500 cases were reported each day. (Holtzhausen 2002) In fact, approximately 118000 
cases of cholera were reported and nearly 265 deaths resulted from the epidemic. This was the worst 
cholera outbreak: in South Africa in 18 years. Currently there are heated debates between government 











the uneven distribution of water facilities. There is suspicion and distrust amongst 
many water users around DW AF's strict enforcement by local government ofthe 
'user pays' principle and the setting of tariff structures at the municipal level 
compounds the problem. 
Local government 
The Second World Water Forum (WWF) in March 2000 highlighted the complexity 
of the challenges facing developing countries striving for effective governance of 
water (Wester et al. 2003). In line with global trends of environmental awareness, 
South Africa today places more resources and effort on integrated sustainable 
development. 82 Despite mounting efforts to focus on environmental integrity, the 
pressure on the infrastructure of cities and the challenges that local government face 
to deliver services are increasingly complex. The assignment of delivering water 
demands that public servants perform a wide range of activities. Local government 
has traditionally been weak in delivering services and in particular in servicing the 
poor in South Africa; yet the fundamental shift in institutional arrangements, as a 
result of changed government policy, places more emphasis on local economic 
development. 
In terms of the national policy framework national government has the constitutional 
responsibility to ensure that local government is capacitated. Although provincial 
government has the constitutional mandate to take responsibility for services, clearly, 
the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and the Integrated and Sustainable Rural 
Development Strategy (lSRDS) have placed the onus of delivery on local government 
whose function as water services authority has been defined in the Water Services Act 
of 1997 (Eberhard 1999; Conradie et ai. 2001; DW AF 1997,2002). The right oflocal 
government to set the tariffs is also established in the 1998 White Paper on Local 
Government. 83 
82 The defmition offered by the WRC (1996) is 'sustainable development can be defined in broad terms 
as development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own aspirations and needs' (1996, p. 9). One of the outcomes of the summit 
was that the United States committed $970 million over the next three years on water and sanitation 
projects and the United Nations an extra $20 million in resources for water and sanitation, to be 
distributed particularly amongst the rural poor of developing nations. 











Given South Africa's political history, local governments are in varying stages of 
development, from non-existent in certain areas to effectively functioning institutions 
(Tapscott 2001; White Paper on Local Government 1998). But according to Tapscott 
(2003), 'in its totality, local government in South Africa is in crisis' (2003, p.3)84 and 
Oluwu & Wunsch (2004)85 proclaim that they lack the authority and the resources 
proportionate to the problem they face (2004, p. 7). One of the problems in 
implementing the water policy is, as Mutahaba et al. (1993), speaking of African local 
government, notes, that local governments do not have the capacity and where they 
do, are often overpowered by government officials who are in higher places. Coning 
(2000) identifies the dissonance between top-down and bottom-up approaches and 
contends that the legacy of top-down ruling and style of government was part of the 
regime which lacked legitimacy at the grassroots level and it meant that change was 
not jointly planned (2000, p. 88) and that this might impact on the project of trust. 
Because, according to Tapscott (2002, 2003) municipalities are experiencing 
difficulties as well, many district councils have come to rely heavily on the private 
sector in the form of Build Operate Train and Transfer (BOTT) schemes to ensure 
delivery of water (Indicator South Africa: Volume 17, No 4). In its evolving state, 
local government needs additional capacity and institutional support, particularly as 
government funding for water and sanitation has declined. The focus on 
private/public partnerships and deployment of non government agencies could be seen 
either as a realistic response to government's inability to respond alone to these 
challenges of a better life for all or as a retreat by the state in the performance of its 
duties. It might provide a solution too to the tension between water connections that 
are politically driven and those that are demand driven. The equitable distribution of 
scarce resources is bound to have an impact on the way in which trust is or is not 
produced. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Marais 2001, p. 16) are key factors in 
determining the way in which the water management process unfolds and how trust 
relationships between different segments of water users are shaped (Sztompka 1996), 
a central theme in the discussion pursued in Chapters Four and Five. 
M To make sure that the reader is not misled, Tapscott also notes that 'by no means all municipalities in 
South Africa are in crisis' (2003, p. 3). 
85 The authors refer to local government on the African continent but their observations are helpful for 











As is clear from the above overview, water delivery operates within new institutional 
restraints and opportunities. The formation of new and more legitimate local 
government, which did not exist in 1994, is a positive change, but institutional reform 
is difficult and relationships between local, provincial and national government and 
between DWAF and other departments responsible for planning and delivery, remain 
strained (MacKay & Ashton 2004, p. 1). Roles and responsibilities between district-
level and local municipalities are blurred and budgets and human capacity restricted. 
Capacity constraints will undoubtedly remain until the necessary lacunae in human 
and organisational capacity have been reconciled. 86 
The IDPs and ISRDS were designed to deliver a 'basket of services' (Tapscott 2002, 
pp. 7-8) and were supposed to coordinate and integrate existing government 
programmes in order to attain stable communities with viable institutions, but most 
local governments are struggling to meet their development challenges (ibid) and 
perturbingly, 'few people appear to actually participate in the process of local 
democracy as intended' (Tapscott 2002, p. 10). This has a negative effect on trust as 
residents simply do not believe that local government will deliver the necessary 
services (ibid.). 
Urban versus rural water supply 
In view of the multi-dimensional nature of rural development, the successful delivery 
of services to rural communities depends, to a considerable degree, on the extent to 
which the various spheres of government are able to coordinate their activities. The 
demand for equity in access to water is exacerbated by an inequitable distribution of 
funds to urban and rural areas, for a gap exists between subsidies allocated to urban vs 
rural service delivery. But the gap in distribution is largely due to the plethora of 
problems that local municipalities face, particularly in the rural areas. Tapscott 
(2001) observes that both structural problems and a lack of skills result in immobility 
in addressing the widespread poverty and welfare problems. Despite the emphasis on 
rural areas being the 'worst served' and the most in need of water (DW AF 1994, p. 
19), government has not been able to resolve the almost total lack of viable local 
86 Public officials are overworked and taking time off from everyday activities is not always practical 
(Social Development Monitoring and Evaluation of Service Delivery Research Project: August 2004). 
This data has not yet been officially released but it suggests, together with other research (DW AF 
Working for Water Exit Strategy research project: September 2003), that training efforts - in both time 











government that it identified in the 1994 White Paper. Local government has 
experienced difficulties in the implementation of rural development and is unable to 
carry out substantial new responsibilities (ISRDS in Tapscott 2002, p. 8). 
The statistics reflect the social· dislocation and malfunction of the apartheid years. 
(2001, p. 197). But the gaps that are apparent in the statistics, where the figure of 
access to basic services rises considerably in the rural areas 1 in 10 people collect 
water from dams, rivers or streams and 20% use a public tap less than half have 
running water in their homes. According to Census 2001, of the approximately 11 800 
households in South Africa, 32% have running water, 12% have piped water 
available on a community stand that is over 200 metres from the dwelling and 7% of 
households have water from stagnant water, river, dams or streams.87 
In the absence of both capacity and institutional mechanisms for coordinating and 
implementing effective delivery programmes, particularly in rural areas, service 
delivery is far from efficient, equitable and sustainable. 
Water and trust 
Key development concerns of the 1990s, such as empowerment, enabling 
environment, choice and sustainability (Coetzee et at. 2001, World Development 
Report 2003), have not replaced the dominant technological and economistic 
discourse in the area of conservation as in many other areas of development. Concerns 
around social agency as a key to social development and integrated water resource 
management are all too often sidestepped (Farrington 1999). 
Although, as Marais (2001) notes 'citizens are appreciative of the slow but 
determined efforts' (2001, pp. 192-193) to provide services for the poor, scarcity of 
water is intimately linked to issues of social justice and uneven distribution of goods. 
Unaffordable costs and inadequate supply of water aggravate not only relationships 
between local authorities and water users but also affect family or community 
87 Average household size 4.3. Excluding water vendors, springs, rainwater tanks and boreholes where 
distance from dwelling is non-specified, according to Census 2001, 10.3 million people have a supply 
of water that is substandard. This does not take into account households, such as those in Kassiesbaai, 
the fishing village in Amiston described in Chapter Five of this study, and other villages where there is 











relationships. In particular they erode trust between different segments of water users, 
entrench notions of shame and affect inter-household relationships. 
5. Summative remarks 
Institutional fragmentation and the lack of coordination between the different bodies 
remains a problem in water delivery today, and cooperation between institutions, 
departments and people is fraught. The indelible legacy of apartheid, evident in the 
present day skew in services such as water, housing, land, health, education and waste 
removal, remains overriding. The study will reflect on whether and in what way, the 
historical legacy affects the interaction of water users with one another and relations 
of power that are manifest between water users. If the legacy continues it would 
result in chronic distrust between many water users and feelings of shame amongst 
others, which could take years to uproot. 
Politicians view clean water as a desirable campaign, yet the inadequacy of water 
poses critical threats to the health of people and impacts on environmental integrity in 
both urban and rural areas. Although DWAF seems to have made significant progress 
in reversing the water backlog it has focussed primarily on the delivery of water 
supply, both in approach as well as fiscally. 
The transformation in the water sector has been slow with inadequate service delivery 
biased toward urban households and insignificant institutional reform, declining 
funding from central government, capacity constraints at the local level, and 
problematic trade-offs between efficiency considerations and equity requirements. 
These problems result in a lack of belief or decline of trust in government's 
commitment to transformation in the water sector. 
In the absence of commitment to maintenance and transfer of knowledge, whether or 
not these campaigns will help build trust in water delivery agents remains to be seen. 
For, in all aspects, community participation is pivotal to the success of water projects, 
in particular in driving the user-pays policy (Farrington 1999). As long as water 
delivery is results-driven and seen first and foremost as a project and not a process, 











Chapter Four: the role of the state in the production of trust 
The idea of the state as a (shrinking) fortresslike zone in the field of 
society lives on. Consequently, the complex interconnectedness of the 
state and civil society ends up being rendered in terms of externality and 
exclusion, thereby neglecting the interwoven ways by which power is 
exercised and reproduced (Marais 2001, p. 283). 
The central theoretical question of this chapter is whether and in what ways the 
changing state responsibility for the delivery of water to consumers affects trust in the 
water sector. Ingelhart (1999), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (2000) and Offe (1999) 
contend that people are more trusting under a democracy. They propose that certain 
types of state structures are more likely to produce trust. Can government produce 
trust? Uslaner (2003) argues that it is state policies and not state structures that 
produce trust (2003, p. 171). Progressive policy is more likely to produce trust and is 
a necessary but not a sufficient ingredient for the production of trust. In the water 
sector, water policy and water legislation are more than adequate for the tasks that lie 
ahead to transform the water sector (MacKay 2003, p. 83), but trust between water 
users is low. 
The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise the changing role of the state and to reflect 
on the way in which national government officials interact with local government and 
other role players and how this interaction affects trust-building processes. Three 
themes have been identified and organise this discussion: 1) synergy between non-
state and state actors (and their intermediaries, the consultants) 2) bureaucrats and 
change, and 3) style of government. These three themes are discussed within the 
following main contexts: a) the transformation of an irrigation board into a water user 
association, b) establishment of a local catchment management plan, and c) 
implementation procedures at local government leveL The chapter begins with a 
general discussion on the role of the state in producing trust using the three themes as 
an organising tool. This general discussion is backed up by empirical evidence 
gathered within a number of selected contexts in the Breede Water Management Area 
(WMA) no 18. Particular reference is made to the Greater Hermanus Water 
Conservation Programme, experiences of the transformation from the perspective of 











development of the Palmiet Catchment Management Strategy in the Western 
Overberg region of the Breede WMA. The chapter concludes with a general 
discussion section followed by sumrnative remarks. 
The core argument contained in the selected themes is that despite the changing 
responsibility of the state for the delivery of water to consumers and a policy 
emphasis on local service delivery, for a number of reasons the state has maintained 
strong central powers while relinquishing managerial responsibility for delivery of 
water and integrated resource management. The chapter puts forward an argument 
that this is one of the reasons that the social landscape of water reflects low trust 
between different spheres of government and between government and 'ordinary' 
water users. 
General discussion on the changing role of the state 
One of the cornerstones of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) 1 is that people be 
given an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process 'as and when it 
affects them'. MacKay (2003) notes that efficiency and effectiveness are possible 
when the lower levels of government carry out functions of delivery (2003, p. 61). In 
order to achieve these ends, the Constitution envisages a complete transformation of 
the local government system.2 The final Constitution made provision for a three-
sphere system where each sphere is 'distinctive, interdependent and interrelated' 
(Cameron 1999, p. 293), but it also reconfirmed that the state is, as popularly 
considered, the institution that is best able to organise the lives of ordinary citizens 
(Coetzee et al. 2001; Tapscott 2001). The government's adoption of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) in 1999 has placed the emphasis on 
the role of provincial and local government in the delivery of services and the 
alleviation of poverty, but there are tensions between the RDP redistribution emphasis 
1 The fmal constitution came into effect in February 1997 and became fully effective after the 2000 
local government elections (Cameron 2003, p. 120). 
2 Section B of the White Paper explores the notion of 'developmental local government. Foreword by 
Mohamed Valli Moosa, Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development. 
http://www.local.gov.zaJDCD/policydocs/whitepaper/wpf.html. The local government transition began 
with the negotiated Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) that 'sought to deracialise local 











and the macroeconomic stabilisation emphasis of GEAR, tensions that have, as 
Oluwu & Wunsch (2004) note, a disruptive impact on local governance (2004, p. 84). 
The current shift towards localised ownership of delivery and decision-making 
processes around delivery activities is consistent with national post-apartheid policy. 
At the core of the local development agenda, laid out in the framework of the Local 
Economic Development (LED),3 is the mandate of local government to empower a 
wide spectrum of water users in the management of water. To further these ends, the 
devolution of powers to local authorities is critical (DW AF 1994, 1997, 2001; 
Coetzee et al. 2001; Tapscott 2001; Friedman 2002). This devolution of decision-
making to the local level is not a process unique to South Africa (Lowndes 2003; 
Cameron 2003; Tapscott 2001). Newman et al. (2004) propose that this is part ofa 
shift in the role of the modem state which changes from governing through direct 
controls to governance where state actors interact with a wide range of actors (2004, 
p.204). 
It is agreed that water resources should be managed at the level of the catchment area 
or groundwater aquifer (Faysee 2003, p.l), and the progressive establishment by the 
Minister of Water Affairs of catchment management agencies (Government Gazette 
1998, p. 84) is also in line with international trends in water policy. The proposal for 
the establishment of the Catchment Management Agency is developed in terms of 
Schedules 77, 78 and 79 ofthe National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) for submission to 
the Minster of Water Affairs, and places the state as custodian of water resources. 
Absolute powers have been given to the national government to determine the 
reserve, approve catchment management plans, water tariffs, inter-basin transfers and 
governance issues (Conradie et al. 2001; Eberhard 1999; MacKay 2003). Other issues 
can be taken to the Water Tribunal, an independent body established in 1998, or to the 
High Court if required (MacKay 2003, pp. 63-64). 
Offe (1999) considers the dynamics of trust as 'a steady state capable of reproducing 
itself,' a super-scarce and much-needed resource. The discussion below explores 
3 Also White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997), Municipal Structures Act (1998), 











where and in what ways opportunities for trust are lost and examines the claim that 
trust itself is a super-scarce but much-needed resource. 
Synergy between state and non-state actors 
The emphasis on the role of civil society III development (putnam 1995, 2000; 
Freire 1972; Eade 1997; Warren 1999) should not be seen as a replacement for the 
role of the state. Some analysts (Foley & Edwards 1996; Fox 1996; Kickert et al. 
1999; Ostrom 1996; Tarrow 1993; Levi 1996; Evans 1996; Evans et af. 1985; 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Ritzen & Easterly 2000) have carefully examined the way 
in which state and civil society together contribute to democracy and development. 
Foley and Edwards (1996) in their article 'The paradox of civil society' do not 
question the ability of civil society to produce trust. However, they do refute that civil 
associations have the capacity to socialise participants into 'norms of generalised 
reciprocity and trust' (1996, p. 41). These authors propose that this view is based on 
certain assumptions, for instance, that the trust produced by civil society is a public 
good, available to society at large (ibid) and that this trust is independent of the prior 
achievements of both democracy and the presence of a strong state (1996, p. 48).4 
These contentions are of particular relevance when considering change and 
assumptions of pre-packed trust as they manifest themselves in the water sector whose 
historical legacy is undemocratic and where water was managed with disjuncture and 
fragmentation. 
Peter Evans (1996) recognises the 'state-society synergy' as a catalyst for 
development. Evans (1996) sees the combination of strong public institutions and 
organized communities as a powerful tool of development (1996, p. 1130), with the 
emphasis on synergy as the most reliable contributor to development. On their own, 
horizontal networks between local organisations 'lack the clout to offset concentrated 
elite power' and 'reformist government officials' who might be insulated from their 
constituents (1996, pp. 1130-1131).5 Fox (1996) considers this as a process of co-
4 In essence, Foley & Edwards (1996) argue that if civic life is able to oppose tyrannical rule then it 
could also oppose democracies. 
5 Fox's (\996) empirical work is on the rise of autonomous peasant organisations in authoritarian rural 
Mexico. He discusses the ability of local groups - when in this extreme case there is zero cooperation 
between state and civil society - to benefit when 'reformist government officials' are able to provide 











production (Fox 1996, p. 1089) of social capital. Tarrow (1993), in discussing Tilly's 
The Contentious French stresses the interconnectedness between popular movements, 
culture and history, proposing that although rooted in popular culture civil action 
depends on ' ... the development of state building and capitalism' (1993, p. 71). For 
Tilly, the relationship between history (of the state) and popular movements should 
not be separated. 
Evans et al. (1985) also emphasise the 'meeting point of states and societies' (1985, p. 
27). For these authors, interest groups and classes depend on the structures and 
activities of the 'very states the social actors, in tum, seek to influence' (ibid.). 
Synergistic relationships between the state and local actors are championed by 
Ostrom (1996, 2000) and Levi (1996, 1996a). Ostrom (2000) argues that government 
agents can strongly affect the level and type of social capital that is available to 
sustainable development efforts (2000: 173). Levi (1996) stresses the importance of 
the state in 'making trust possible' (1996, p. 51) and that governments influence civic 
behaviour and elicit trust, or distrust, towards themselves (ibid) because 'policy 
performance can be a source of trust, not just a result' (1996, p. 50). 
There is enough evidence from the above to make a strong case for synergy between 
state and local actors. Kickert et al. (1999) are specific about the importance of 
collaboration 'because they cannot attain their goals by themselves, but need the 
resources of other actors to do so' (1999, p. 6), and they achieve their goals because 
there is participation from the bottom up and from the top down. Common 
assumptions from the above theorists are that synergy assumes an interaction between 
actors but it is the style of government that is critical in determining the outcomes of 
this interaction. If, according to Sztompka (1997), this style is non-interventionist and 
nurturing, there will be trust and if not, the opposite, distrust, will be produced. 
authoritarian conditions. Although the context differs from our own, the notion of co-production 











Intermediaries between state and non-state 
Kickert & Koppenjan (1999) acknowledge that government is not the single dominant 
actor that can impose its will for there are a range of individual actors and interest 
groups that are able to do so. One group of actors, briefly considered in the context of 
the Breede Water Management Area (WMA), are the intermediaries between the state 
and non-state actors, the consultants, who operate in the complex domain of systems, 
institutions and people involved in the building of the catchment management agency. 
This group of actors have the interesting role to play in-between state and citizen, as 
'middlemen' or 'network managers' (Kickert & Koppenjan 1999, p. 58). It is the role 
of consultants to distinguish between diverse target groups (ibid.) and, tasked with 
communicating information from one set of actors to the other, these intermediaries 
contribute, at least according to Kickert et al. (1999), to the establishment of patterns 
of social relations between interdependent actors that are stable (1999, p. 7). 
Theoretically, according to Selener (1997), intermediaries act to equalise the basis of 
power and control by drawing stakeholders into the forums and by guiding and 
informing state officials of the needs and preferences or problems that have been 
identified by the non-state actors - and vice versa. But it appears that instead of being 
'middlemen' or 'network managers' between DWAF and local water users, and 
imposing their own will as independent actors (Kickert & Koppenjan 1999), the 
consultants that act as intermediaries in the Breede-Overberg CMA process are 
spokesmen for the state. 
It appears that the network leaders are what Hardin (1999) calls 'men of honour' and 
'trustworthy' others (1999, pp. 36-38) who play the advisory intermediary role and 
whose actions are not questioned because they are assumed to be 'grounded' in the 
interest of the person who is trusting (1999, p. 26). The consultants in the context of 
the Breede WMA occupy 'legitimate' and accepted positions of power as they 
delegate, organise and retain full support from state officials as well as local 
stakeholders (Kickert & Koppenjan 1999, p. 58). Notions of 'encapsulated interest' 











this discussion, and trust, between the elite in-group and between DWAF and these 
trustworthy 'others,' does appear to be high. 6 
More to lose and less to trust 
In the early phases of the transformation process, trust appeared to be high between 
commercial white farmers and consultants, but as new issues are brought into the 
agenda there are new risks, and new trust relationships are currently being negotiated. 
Trust in the consultant-influenced water policy network is, for instance, threatened as 
the issue of compulsory licensing, water tariffs and levies has been raised, with prices 
set to rise over the next decade (Girdwood 1999, p. 25). 
We are supposed to register all the hectares, what was grown, irrigated, 
capacity of darns and so forth. Where is the money that we are going to 
have to pay for water going to? It is not clear at all why a farmer should 
pay for water that runs freely in the river. He has built the canals, the 
darns, why must he pay for rainwater? It's not like domestic users who 
have purified water that is brought to them through infrastructure where a 
town engineer needs a salary. I am a farmer and we are annoyed. Many 
farmers are not registering. Those that have small farms in the mountains, 
they hardly use water and why should they register? Wheat doesn't need 
to get irrigated nor does sheep farming need irrigation. (Interview: 
Farmer one, Breede WMA, Robertson, Final Public Meeting on the 
Breede River Basin Study, November 2002) 
At the present time, policy reform pertaining to these issues has not yet been accepted 
and there is a Jack of trust that the long-term gains of pricing and licensing are greater 
than the short-term losses (Ritzen et at. 2000, p. 3). 
We will pay even though we might not use that water one year. If you 
don't use a particular orchard for a few years, then you still have to pay 
because that is water that has been allocated to you. It doesn't make sense 
to a farmer. (Interview: Farmer Two, Overberg WMA, September 2001) 
Farmers are also concerned about raised tariffs to cover government's Working for 
Water programme as one commercial farmer in the Breede WMA complained: 
6 Certainly this appeared to be the case in the earlier interviews. However, in the interstitial places 'on 
the stoep' there was also suspicion and distrust by some segments of water-users, particularly as 











Why must we pay for the clearing of alien invasive vegetation if we don't 
even have aliens on the farm? Why should the catchment tariff costs 
include this because we are paying for others? (Interview: Farmer Three, 
Breede WMA, Robertson, Final Public Meeting on the Breede River 
Basin Study, November 2002 
Other concerns expressed at the Breede Overberg Reference Group in October 2001 
range from: 
Must we who use groundwater pay the same price as someone who 
irrigates taking water from the Breede River? Must the Overberg pay the 
same as the Breede? (Farmer Two, Overberg WMA, October 2001) 
Or again: 
If water is not purified, not good quality or it smells, does it cost the 
same? Is there any provision for difference in use and payment structures 
for water? (Farmer Five, Overberg WMA, January 2003) 
At the same meeting there was suspicion that local users are going to be asked to 
carry DWAF costs and raise funds to pay staff for functions that DW AF performed in 
the past. 
Who will pay for the financial and auditing aspect of the CMA? DWAF 
is doing these functions but they say they will charge for these services. 
Are we paying things that government should be paying for? Are we also 
going to pay for DWAF salaries? (ex DWAF official, Overberg WMA, 
interview September 2002) 
As MacKay (2003) confirms, CMAs are expected to be financially self-sufficient, 
covering the costs of their operation from water use charges (2003, p. 63). 
Commercial farmers are concerned that they will be carrying charges for catchment 
schemes although they were self-reliant and carried costs themselves for their 
infrastructure 
Water is te duur vir privaat boere met de netwerke en damme.7 
(Farmer Five, Overberg WMA, September 2001) 
Or again: 











Commercial fanners pay for their own pumps. Why must they also pay a 
fee for the catchment agency to subsidise the emerging farmer? 
(Water User, Central Breede Water User Association, Robertson, 
September 200 1) 
The go-it-alone strategy of commercial fanners is now being challenged, and trust 
between fanners and government officials is being tested. 
The importance of being part of a whole area doesn't hit home. They have 
always looked just up to their own borders and they don't consider the 
catchment as a watershed area. Others are beginning to realize that they 
now must look further than their own fences and this forces them to ask 
questions and to start being aware of the way they fit into a larger puzzle. 
It is important so that proper planning in the catchment can take place but 
farmers are resisting that. They are also a bit daunted by the paper-work. 
It is not simple to register. DWAF officials are prepared to come to the 
area at particular times to help with the paperwork. The process of 
registering is very new and is alanning for some. (Chairperson Central 
Breede Water User Association, Interview Robertson, Breede WMA, 
September 2001) 
A number of other concerns were raised around what could be considered an 
acceptable degree of cross-subsidization. Some consumers prefer fixed tariffs while 
others question whether equitable cost structures are fair. The above data reflects the 
high degree of uncertainty and that many stakeholders are unlikely to take a risk and 
trust government officials or their intermediaries until their concerns are addressed. 
Lack of clarity about administrative duties for collecting finances exacerbates 
conditions of uncertainty. Is the CMA responsible for the auditing aspect of finances 
or should this be seen as a separate function that is outsourced? DWAF itself is 
experiencing uncertainty within its own department that does not make transformation 
any easier. Currently DWAF has assumed the role of 'proto-CMA' where CMAs are 
not yet up and running. However, functions that are currently performed by DWAF 
are expected to be carried out in the future by the CMA. If D WAF were to continue to 
perform duties, it would 'charge for any services offered.'s 
8 DWAF's acceptance that it is unrealistic to have CMAs in all the WMAs as was expected has resulted 
in a restructuring and reshuffling ofthe organisation. A model is now being set up within the 
Department where DW AF takes the role ofproto-CMA. Minister Sonjica announced in her budget 











DWAF itself has expressed concerns about lack of funding and considers the CMA 
process to be financed as a 'once off.' According to DWAF, should further funds be 
needed, the CMA has three options to procure funds: 
• Water use charges made in its WMA in terms ofthe pricing strategy 
• Money from any other lawful sources such as grants, loans and so on 
• Money appropriated by Parliament 
(DW AF Water Management Institutions Overview: 2004) 
Evidently, from the above data, the contentious issue of water user charges and water 
management charges has not yet been resolved. Lack of trust in the policies has 
negative repercussions on trust between water users and state actors as well as 
between themselves and the intermediary 'spokesmen for the state' who are seen as 
the bearers of bad tidings. Hardin's (1999) theoretical assumption that encapsulated 
interests drive trust is useful in understanding the permutations of trust, uneasy trust 
and mistrust. In instances where state (or spokesmen for the state) actors are seen to 
no longer have converging interests, they are perceived to be less trustworthy. 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad (2003), in his paper examining compliance behaviour in respect 
of service charges, asks whether trust can affect economic behaviour. White 
agriculturists have seen themselves in the past as entitled to free water, and water and 
land rights were inseparable. The culture of entitlement continues to plague the sector. 
The fanners fear the process. They think that if they register they will 
definitely have to pay for something that they have always had privileged 
access to, that is water to irrigate their lands. These fanners' fanns that 
have their own boreholes and irrigation systems don't actually have to be 
regulated to function, only to plan for the whole region which is the point 
of the new integrated catchment management strategy. They can't see 
what is in it for themselves. For instance, if something is polluted up the 
river then it affects something else, and someone else down the river. 
(Chairperson Central Breede Water User Association, Interview 
Robertson, Breede WMA, September 200 1) 
Inkomati, UmvotiIMzimkhulu, Breede and Crocodile WestlMarico water management areas. Twenty 
eight million rand has been budgeted for this in 2004/2005. The Minister notes 'the Department will 
devolve administration to the local water users and communities, accompanied by vigorous capacity-
building so that historically excluded communities can participate in water management.' Source: 











The intended consequences of the law are to ensure that no one can own water 
privately and that water is a national asset and the 'user-pays' principle is paramount. 
The unintended consequences are that social capital between the richer white fanners 
is being activated and strengthened. The extract above indicates that some commercial 
fanners are beginning to see the advantage of cooperation and of not acting as anomie 
individuals. 
What they don't realise though is that they don't have a choice anymore. 
They must register. It is the law. Also it is important so that proper 
planning in the catchment can take place. If they don't register, then there 
will be no provision made for water for them and they might find 
themselves depleted of a resource that was always working for them. 
(Chairperson Central Breede Water User Association, Breede WMA, 
September 2001) 
It is here that the contradictions apparent in the debates on risk and trust that were 
presented in Chapter Two are relevant. On the one hand, Seligman (1997), Warren 
(1999), Levi (1996), Luhmann (1979), Offe (1999) and Giddens (1991) contend that 
risk and trust go together and that, as rational actors, people take the risk to trust one 
another. Trust involves risk, says Offe (1999), because there might be some 
undesirable event caused by the trusted (1999, p. 47). On the other hand, Hardin 
(1993, 1999) and Patterson (1999) present different arguments. Hardin (1993, 1999), 
for instance, considers that it is common interests that drive trust relations. Patterson 
(1999) investigates sites of uncertainty and notes that when people are insecure, 
anxious and uncertain, distrust is more likely to manifest itself than trust. 
How are these ideas able to throw light on what is happening in the CMA process 
where a situation such as Inglehart (1999) or Stolle (2003) describe as one where 
everyone trusts everyone else is far from the reality? If there is low trust, does it 
mean then, as according to Ingelhart (1999) or Stolle (2003), that the process is 
undemocratic? Luhmann (1995) posits that risk and trust are visible when people are 
adequately assured against losses, but the cost of taking a risk that an 'undesirable 
event caused by the trusted' (Offe 1999, p. 47) might occur, is too high for many 
commercial fanners. As a result this segment of water consumers is unlikely to open 
up their familiar networks where these do exist, and they prefer what Schaap & van 











discussion it is worth considering that non-participation of the previously 
disenfranchised might be because of trust rather than distrust (or shame). Because 
there is less to lose, the risk of trusting in the system - and the people who operate 
within it - is more tenable. 
The role of the state is pivotal and because there is so much uncertainty, style of 
government is more critical than ever before in brokering trust and in catalysing 
changing patterns of inclusion and exclusion. 
Style of government 
Kickert et al. (1999) argue that government gIves way to governance when 
governments 'proclaim a strategic retreat from the public domain by promoting 
privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation'(1997, p. 2). Piotr Sztompka (1997) 
identifies style of policy as one condition9 that is presumed to engender generalised, 
diffuse trust, basing this on the argument that 'trust breeds trust; trust received is 
usually reciprocated' (Sztompka 1997, p. 12). If government treats people like 
subjects, not objects, it will engender generalised trust, but if people feel that they are 
not being listened to and are treated as objects, there will be distrust or, in extreme 
cases, as reflected on below, shame. 
Sztompka (1997) assumes too that prolonged absences of trust will lead to an 
embedded tradition of distrust (1997, p. 13). This view is confirmed by Marais 
(2001), Ruiters (1996) and Ridaeus (1998) with their reminder that the interventionist 
approach adopted during the regime was not conducive to trust-building. The 
consequences of failure 'to proclaim a strategic retreat' today and of maintaining a 
strong government presence, impact on the potential of new water policy networks to 
take shape and are reminiscent of the way government did things in the past. 
Trust can bridle expressions of hostility and civilize disputes (Parry in Sztompka 
1997, p. 10) because as people get to know each other and learn about different needs 
or opinions to their own, they begin to develop trust amongst one another. In its 
--.. ---------
9 The other six are: 1) nonnative certainty, 2) transparency of social organisation, 3) stability of the 
social order, 4) accountability of power, 5) enactment of rights and obligations and 6) enforcement of 











absence differences, inquiries, debates that have a positive effect on democracy 
dwindle. Sztompka (1997), like Levi (1996) sees the state as the main agent for 
nurturing trust. Sztompka's (1997) focus on intervention from the top down places 
government as a key determinant in the process as opposed to Rose (1994), who 
suggests that trust is built from the bottom up. It is synergy between the state and 
society that is critical and neither state nor civil society can produce trust alone. 
It is pertinent to note that both top-down and bottom-up interaction, whether nurturing 
or interventionist, depends on a flow of knowledge between the various parties. The 
distinction between interventionist and nurturing impulses is the extent to which 
actors are able to equalise the basis of power and control (Selener 1997) and to 
acquire knowledge on both sides. Inequality and differences between people can 
hinder the flow of information and they can be disastrous for sustainable development 
(Ostrom 1996; Farrington 1999). The problem with interventionist styles, or what 
Gillian Hart (2002) calls 'interventionist impulses' (2002, p. 260), is that they do not 
tolerate process and neither do they accommodate exchanges where trust can be, as 
Fox (1996) notes, co-produced (1996, p. 1089). Interventionist impulses not only do 
not produce trust, but they inhibit innovation and change, making progressive reform 
programmes in the water sector difficult. Could the change from the old to the new 
be easier if the interventionist impulses of government were curtailed? 
The second of the six thematic schema is bureaucrats and change and the following 
subsection presents some ideas on this theme and reflects on ways in which the 
empirical data matches these ideals. 
Bureaucrats and change aversion 
Meyer & Cloete (2000) call to mind that people do not like change and 'will be 
sceptical about anything that threatens their status quo' (2000, p. 246). Meyer & 
Cloete (2000) also remind us that resistance to change is not only a phenomenon 
found amongst conservative people but that it affects all sections of society (ibid.). 
Andrews & Shah (2001) examine a particular set of people, bureaucrats, and note that, 
'strictly hierarchical, centralised organisations, like public bureaucracies in the 











efficiency of these structures depends on their ability to remain stable. Although, as 
Rainey (1991) notes, public organisations are constantly changing and should not be 
considered only as bastions that are resistant to change (1991, p. 223), the changes 
required in the water sector at the present time are radicaL Public officials in all tiers 
of government, but in particular within the context of this discussion, officials in the 
third tier of government, are plagued with uncertainties. Roles and responsibilities of 
government officials are not as the final Constitution envisaged 'distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated' (Cameron 1999, p. 292), but blurred. Rainey (1991) 
suggests that successful organisation change requires: 1) sustained support from 
higher levels, 2) participative planning and 3) flexible implementation (1991, p. 233), 
little of which is happening in the water sector today. 
Evans (in Levi 1996) considers that the key to successful reform is the need to embed 
the bureaucracy in civil society (1996, p. 244). 
In the eighties, Department of Water Affairs officials had the mentality 
that they are public servants. You can't make rash decisions that affect 
people's lives. Local government, the old civil servants in the council, are 
practical. They are there to fix leaks, lay pipes and work closely with 
people. You have a very different idea of people. As a public servant, you 
learn to be very practical (ex-DW AF official: interview, Overberg WMA, 
September 2002). 
The extract above is important for it describes the way in which many public officials 
do embed themselves in civil society and respond in practical ways to problems on the 
ground. But for some bureaucrats, jobs are related to their profession as technocrats 
and appointment criteria are not always well matched with the tasks that are required 
(Ostrom 1996, p. 211). Many bureaucrats lack the skills to liaise with communities. 
Others, as Gran (2001) notes, do not necessarily have the 'professed objectivity and 
political neutrality' that they are claimed to have, and that they 'often served the 
strongest clients best, even when the government wanted otherwise' (2001, p. 11 ).10 
Many public officials welcome policy reform and are willing to adjust and adapt to 
the changes required, there is frustration at not being acknowledged by higher levels 












of government, for local level public agents are required to perform tasks that are 
impractical and unrealistic. I I Another obvious constraint on trust between local and 
central government officials is, as Levi (l996a) notes, the lack ofincentives that 
promote professionalism, including payment and support from higher levels of 
government. Change is likely to be more readily embraced if it comes with incentives 
in the form of status or salary increases but for many public officials the opposite is 
true. Some professionals see that their workloads and responsibilities have increased 
but that support from higher levels that Rainey (1991) identifies, as so important, is 
lacking. Public servants who do have the ability to liaise with communities, without 
incentives, to make the credible commitment 'to serving the public good' are 
insufficient (Levi 1996a, p. 244). 
Despite the goodwill of many public servants to embrace change, there is also, as 
Mutahaba et al. (1993) note, resistance to change by senior public service personnel 
who do not recognise and accept the need for changes or policy reform (1993, p. 99). 
Empirical data reflects on ways in which executive personnel in administrative 
institutions have difficulty in adapting to new development-oriented roles (Oluwu & 
Wunsch 2004, p. 91). Oluwu & Wunsch (2004) note that although professional city 
personnel might be aware of the need to change direction, 'even anxious at times', 
change does not necessarily follow, and that existing habits, policies, standard 
operating procedures or existing clientele might explain this (2004, p. 103).12 In 
summary, those who do embrace change within their organisations often experience 
resistance and as Ostrom (1996) confirms, their initiative and creativity is discouraged 
(1996, p. 212). 
Policies have changed, but behaviour and attitudes of government officials are more 
difficult to change (ibid.). Within bureaucracies, overall, there is a reluctance to 
wholeheartedly embrace the challenges that go with deep change and transformation 
and to engage in a process where information about water is shared in a meaningful 
way. In stakeholder committees exchanges and ideas are limited: 
II Recent work (July 2003-March 2004) evaluating projects on behalf ofthe Impumelelo Innovations 
Award Trust provided empirical evidence ofthis. 
12 Oluwu & Wunsch (2004) describe empirical work undertaken in the NeJspruit municipality in 











Pleasing politicians and doing things in the same way rather than trying 
new ways of doing things ... seems the preferred way to go (ex-DWAF 
official: interview, Overberg WMA, September 2002). 
The above extract resonates almost word for word with experiences in the water 
sector in other developing contexts, described by Elinor Ostrom (1996): 'faced with 
an incentive structure in which pleasing politicians rather than working hard pays off, 
irrigation officials are strongly tempted to assist politicians in their rent-seeking 
. activities' (1996, p. 212). State officials who drive the CMA process at the provincial 
and local level are eager to please each other and officials at the national level. Their 
intermediary spokespersons are also eager to please DW AF, their client, and there is 
little time in meetings for dissent, debate or innovation. 13 But the aversion that 
bureaucrats have for innovation has serious consequences for the way in which the 
project of reform in the water sector unfolds, for it inhibits human agency. Not only is 
innovation blocked but trust is undermined. As the empirical data reflects, local users 
feel that they are invited to be contributors in the building of the CMA but that their 
contributions are not taken seriously. It is likely that it is not only commercial farmers 
but also government officials themselves, particularly at the national level, who 
consider that the costs of change are greater than the benefits (Meyer & Cloete 2000, 
p. 246-248). Certainly, the way in which the CMA process is now being reconsidered, 
at least for the majority ofWMA, suggests that this might be true. 
The resistance to handing over decision-making to local water users who stand 
outside DW AF is unsurprising as within the historical context all decisions were 
controlled by the state. In the water sector there are a range of actors that have 
different and sometimes conflicting objectives. Farmers, for instance, are against 
compulsory licensing as they feel that water that is consumed from farm dams, or 
rivers running through the farms, should be free. Agriculturists in the Palmiet are 
against the transfers of water to the Metro. But actors need to change their 'go-it-
alone' strategies (Ostrom cited in Kickert & Koppenjan, p. 40) in order to achieve 
synergy and to attain goals together (Kickert et al. 1999, p. 6). The concerns of local 












water users are all too often not discussed 14 and the state-society synergy proposed by 
Evans (1996) is not producing the expected trust. The terrain in which the water 
policy is being implemented is complex and uncertain and is rife with problems. Trust 
at the lowest sphere of government is particularly low. 
Local government 
The ordinary water specialists working for municipalities in the Breede-Overberg are 
key actors involved in the building ofthe Breede-Overberg CMA and are supposedly, 
within the realm of ideas, key agents of change, but in fact they have very little 
agency. Assigned a wide range of responsibilities in chapter seven of the South 
African constitution, 152 (1), the objects of local government include: to provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities, to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner, to promote social and 
economic development, to promote a safe and healthy environment and to encourage 
the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local 
government (Cameron 2003; MacKay 2003; DW AF 1997). 
Section B of the 1998 White Paper on local government explores the notion of 
developmental local government, and the mandate of local government, in addition to 
the tasks noted above, is to contribute to local job creation and community 
empowerment (DWAF 1998). Government's commitment to accountability 
downwards has been to bring local representatives into the arena of municipal 
governance. The intention is to voice the needs of the poor closer to areas of public 
service and implementation, but local municipalities struggle with the entry of 
politicians into public service and the effect on service delivery is not always positive 
(Cameron 2003, Tapscott 2001).15 
Capacities olloeal government 
Mutahaba et ai's. (1993) insights into public administration in Africa, pinpoint 
the problem of capacity, suggesting that the burden placed on local 
administration is far in excess of its capacity (1993, p. 5). According to these 
authors, the 'ecology of public administration in Africa is in disarray' (1993, p. 
14 This discussion will be taken up thoroughly in Chapter Five as it forms part of issues of 
inclusion/exclusion and knowledge exchanges. 
15 The local government system consists of 843 municipalities and over 11 000 democratically elected 











8). There appears to be a paradox with, on the one hand, the onus on local 
institutions to deliver, while on the other, an ethos, reminiscent of the previous 
regime to 'command and control' (Cohen & Rogers 1992, p. 437) from above. 
The following extract from an interview with a public official involved with 
water services is relevant: 
We get sent these piles of documents to read. Every day there is a new bill 
to read. How can we be expected to read everything and make a 
contribution? Then we are in meetings all day. At the same time, the 
distances are huge here and there are not enough people to do the work. I 
myself must drive to Bot River, which is 150 kilometres from here, when 
I hear that a borehole has been vandalized. (Interview, Town Engineer, 
Overberg WMA, Agulhas Municipality, October 2001) 
The data suggests that the ability of local government to serve the needs of citizens is 
more and more restricted, and that, as Mutahaba et al. (1993) note, public 
administration at the local level is taking on a 'load far in excess of their capacities' 
(1993, p. 5).16 Financial and human capital is scarce and decentralization, at the core 
of the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 
1997), is meaningless unless local governments have sufficient resources to perform 
their functions (Cameron 2003, p. 114). Sustained support from higher levels means 
providing budgets and staff, but the government's official position is to cut 
government expenditure in order to reduce budget deficit and that local government, 
according to GEAR policy, should be largely self-sufficient (Cameron 2003, pp. 122-
123)Y In order to fulfill its constitutional mandate, local government requires 
considerable additional resources (ibid.). 
At the same time we have been told that there is new water quality control 
legislation. This means that there are obligations to put chemicals in the 
16 Mutahaba et al. are referring to African public administration, but their observations match well with 
the South African case, despite the differences in economic status between South Africa and its 
neighbours. 'Taking on' should be balanced against 'landed with' as many local authorities are unable 
to resist the load that is put on them. 
17 Budgets do not match although there are financial arrangements through, for instance, the municipal 
infrastructure programme of the Department of Constitutional Development that finances infrastructure 
in areas where local government needs financial support to provide it. Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Grants (MUG) fund residential properties. The Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Plan 
(CMJP) of the Department of Constitutional Development provides the backup for those service 
authorities and service providers that are unable to alone finance the delivery of water to the 
households under their jurisdiction (DWAF 2001a). The phased introduction of these reforms will be 











water purification works. We have to measure and monitor the level of the 
chemicals, probably on a daily basis. Who is going to do that work? Our 
budgets are being cut back and we have less staff. This has not been 
thought through and it is causing a lot of uneasiness amongst the people 
who work here (Interview, town engineer, Agulhas Municipality, 
Overberg WMA, November 2001). 
Theoretically local government, under the new Constitution, is no longer subordinate 
to national and provincial government and is a sphere of government in its own right 
(Cameron 2003, p. 120). The empirical data confirms what Oluwu & Wunsch (2004) 
have noted that national policies and directives are a1l too often imposed on 
provinces and localities without sufficient regard for their specific situations (2004, p. 
84). Lowndes (2003) identifies a critical gap in policy and proposes that this gap 
provides an explanation for the dissonance between practice and policy. Lowndes 
(2003) contends that it is not because the central authority reduces its power that this 
will mean more autonomy at the local level and that, in fact, it signals more, not less, 
central control because the reduction in control is managerial and not political (2003, 
p. 144). Lowndes (2003) proposes that this is indicative of strong centralized 
tendencies that contradict apparent rhetorical notions of local development (2003, pp. 
135-143). Although her conclusions refer to the White Paper for Local Government 
2001 in the UK and are therefore drawn within the context of a 'developed' country, 
these insights are eminently pertinent within the context of the Breede-Overberg 
WMA. Lowndes (2003) observes too that policy is 'very thin in terms of substance' 
and that simply soliciting more input from citizens, as is the trend in current water 
policy, will not deepen democracy, neither will it increase local institutional 
autonomy (2003, p. 144). In the water sector, decisions continue to be taken by 
higher-level tiers of government and local government is left to manage as best as it 
can. 
Friction and mistrust have grown within municipalities in the WMA, making the 
everyday job of delivering services such as water difficult. These problems are 
unlikely to be resolved by the establishment of CMAs or WUAs, and the emphasis of 
catchment management on the resource, rather than services and delivery, only 
aggravates the problem. Constructing institutional systems, such as those that inform 
the CMA, catchment management forums, catchment committees, reference groups or 











government, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to redress the imbalances of 
the past. 
The statutory bodies and the supporting committees that inform them are intended to 
perform functions that were performed by DWAF in the past,18 but they cannot be a 
solution to the limited administrative capacity, the inadequate supply of human and 
financial capital or fragmentation within local authorities. The case of Hermanus, 
described below, provides empirical evidence to support this discussion and confirms 
the findings of Lowndes (2003), Cameron (2003), Tapscott (2001) and Mutahaba et 
al. (1993). 
Restricted opportunities to implement water policy in the Overberg 
The Greater Hermanus Water Conservation Project (GHWCP) in the Overberg, was a 
collaborated effort between the (former) Greater Hermanus Municipality and DWAF. 
In 1997 the GHWCP introduced a series of steps that would make it a model for 
improved water management. The project is a package of incentives and disincentives 
aimed at promoting equity, efficiency and sustainability in the supply and use of water 
in Hermanus. The twelve-point 'carrot and stick' plan was intended to make 
Hermanus a model town for water conservation, providing a blueprint for other 
similar projects in South Africa. One of the most successful aspects of the 
programme was the design of an informative billing system. Water users under the 
jurisdiction of the municipality were shown their month-by-month consumption for a 
period of 13 months, allowing them to manage their own consumption. Additional 
information on the billings reflected the users' consumption relative to other 
consumers in their neighbourhood. In 1999 the GHWCP was 'becoming one of the 
most-quoted water-conservation initiatives in the world' 19 and was on its way to being 
the standard model for water management in South Africa. 
18 WUAs for instance may operate and control abstraction and/or distribution, manage certain dams, 
rivers/streams, groundwater use and effluent control within a quaternary, tertiary andlor secondary 
catchment that could have a detrimental impact on their source. Under the 1956 Water Act, these 
functions were previously fulfilled by irrigation boards that were primarily bodies that represented the 
needs and preferences of an economically active elite agriCUltural constituency. The WUAs are 
established to do local management of water use under the authority ofthe CMAs. 











Paradoxically, despite savings, due largely to the awareness campaign and wise water 
management, including the fixing of broken taps, reporting leakages, etc., the 
conservation programme today receives almost no support within the municipality. 
One of the most important components of the 12-point plan, the informative billings, 
has been phased out. The successful implementation of the programme depended on 
sustained support from higher levels (Rainey 1991), in particular from DW AF but 
also from within the municipality, but this is not happening today. DW AF withdrew 
its support from the programme in 2000 and, as the programme lacked internal 
backup, this despite international acclaim for its vision and achievements in water 
conservation, for the conservation initiative, it was severely curtailed. 
01uwu & Wunsch (2004) identify seven key political elements that contribute to 
effective local governments, three20 of which are relevant to this discussion; they must 
be able to 1) identify problems, 2) set priorities and 3) mobilize resources. Water 
services within the local municipality did not have the authority to make decisions nor 
to extract the necessary funds from the treasury department within the local 
municipality. Trust between government officials within the municipality is low. 
Although demand-driven management has been identified by DW AF (1994, 1997, 
1998) as the single most important component of delivery, the relaxing of controls 
(Lowndes 2003, p. 135) by central government, illustrated here by the absence of 
support from DW AF, has increased the gap between policy and practical 
implementation. DW AF's lack of support for the project is in contradiction to its 
demand-driven policy rhetoric, and the result is that local water demand management 
strategies are being compromised. DWAF, ostensibly providing powers to local 
authorities through the legislative frameworks of water policy, has not created an 
environment in the water sector that is conducive to implementing its policies and 
empowering its local partners (Lowndes 2003, p 138). 
There is resistance to change, within the municipality, where bureaucrats' preferences 
are for the routine duties of billing and costing for water services. Public officials are 
unsupportive of innovation and creative solutions for policy implementation. The 
local municipality is a site where Balogun (1989), in his critical assessment of the 
20The other four are: 4) implement programmes, 5) evaluate results, 6) learn from those results and 7) 











need for managerial adaptability for Africa's development, notes the 'official's 
preference for bureaucratic methods' produces obstacles to visionary policy (1989, p. 
229). Given the unfortunate match between the ideals and the reality, the opportunity 
for trust production between a wide set of actors is all too often undermined in the 
water sector. 
In certain instances it is likely that the lack of financial and human resources makes 
managerial tasks difficult (ibid.) for, as Agrawal & Gibson (1999) note, in order to 
implement processes that are the outcome of decision-making at the local level, 
adequate funds must be forthcoming (1999, p. 641). Water services are not ring-
fenced and income from water cross-subsidises other municipal services. The 
GHWCP had reduced costs to the Greater Hermanus Municipality but despite this the 
savings were not made available. MacKay (2003) highlights the need to allow for 
transparent ring-fencing of the revenues that are collected via water use charges so 
that the revenue collected from water can be fed directly into improving and 
supporting water resources (2003, p. 80). Hermanus is a case where organizational 
culture obstructs rather than promotes successful policy implementation (Cloete & 
Meyer 2000, p. 250), but, importantly, it illustrates the inability of a local 
municipality to perform its duties and to meaningfully participate in policy 
implementation. The gap between the Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997) and the 
National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) compounds the problem as the opportunities to 
gain a voice in the statutory bodies that are being constructed in the WMA are 
primarily for water resource management and do not match the concerns of water 
services, despite the obvious interconnections between the two. 
Water User Associations 
During the years of apartheid, the most organised water management systems were 
the irrigation boards that together with water boards ensured water for white 
commercial farmers was delivered (Eberhard 1999; Eberhard & Pegram 2000; Faysee 
2003). The two statutory bodies that are now proposed are the Catchment 
Management Agency (CMA) and the Water User Association (WUA). WUAs are the 











(DWAF 2004).21 WUAs are institutions mandated to control localized water resources 
and to plan, advise and inform the CMA. In order to clarify the difference between 
the WUA and the CMA, the purpose of the CMA is to 'delegate water resource 
management to the regional or catchment level and to involve local communities ... ' 
(Act 36 of 1998: Chapter 7, Schedule 45). Schedules 2 and 3 of Chapter 7 of the Act 
deal with the functions and operation of catchment management agencies which 
include the promotion of community participation. The water users associations, on 
the other hand, 'operate at a restricted localised level and are in effect co-operative 
associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water- related activities 
for their mutual benefit.' (Chapter 8, Schedule 30). As the name implies, WUAs are 
supposed to represent all water users - industrial, domestic, commercial farmers, 
small-scale farmers, as well as farm-workers (Conradie et al. 2001), and are supposed 
to undertake activities for their mutual benefit. 
Before transferring water from one catchment to another, before any major 
development can take place in a catchment, or when licences for water use are issued, 
the WUA must be consulted. As a statutory body it can raise funds for improvements 
in the catchment.22 A WUA may operate and control abstraction and/or distribution; 
manage certain dams, rivers/streams, groundwater use and effluent control within a 
quaternary, tertiary and/or secondary catchment that could have a detrimental impact 
on their source. Under the 1956 Water Act these functions were previously fulfilled 
by irrigation boards that were primarily bodies that represented the needs and 
preferences of an economically active elite agricultural constituency.23 In summary, 
WUAs are being established in the catchments to perform the local management of 
water use under the authority of the CMA. The importance of these local statutory 
bodies is that decisions are made at the local level after consultation with all parties 
21 Besides the two statutory bodies that are prescribed by the Act, water boards also play critical roles 
in the delivery and maintenance of water. Their functions are set out in the Water Services Act of 1997 
but their primary function is to provide efficient, reliable and sustainable water services. 
22 For example, clearing of alien invasive vegetation operations. 
23 Section 98 (4) of the NW A provides that within six months of the commencement of the Act (i.e. no 
later than 31 March 1999) a board must prepare and submit to the Minister a proposal prepared 
according to sections 91 and 98 (4) of the NW A, to transfonn the board into a water user association 
(DW AF 1998a, p. 2). According to DW AF (1998a), due to a large number of institutions involved, the 
Minister has extended the time limit to 29 February 2000 (ibid). In April 1999 a notice of extension of 












involved. The powers invested in WUA are considerable, because, for instance, a 
WUA is able to shape the pricing policy according to local conditions as long as these 
tariffs are within the national framework. 24 
As WUAs formalise the provision of water not only for irrigators but for all water 
users, farm-workers, who were historically serviced by the owners of the farms who 
supplied them with water, now have legitimate claims to water. Farmers are now 
obliged to supply their workers with water services, but they also reserve the right to 
be paid for these supplies and services?5 
The importance of WUAs has been stressed because these are statutory bodies and 
they are representative of local needs. WUAs are part of the strategy as laid down in 
the Act (Section 98 (6) of Act 36 of 1998) 'to establish suitable institutions and to 
ensure that they have appropriate community, racial and gender representation' (Act 
no 36 of 1998). The contradictions between rhetoric and process and the tensions 
between policy and practice are apparent in these systems. As these bodies are 
empowered to act as authorities, albeit under the jurisdiction of the CMA, it is critical 
that they are representative of all stakeholders in the catchment. These micro-
management systems mirror the process of building a CMA and the complex set of 
social interactions that are taking place in the Breede-Overberg WMA. 
One of the intentions of retaining powers at the central level is to ensure that local 
elites do not dominate (MacKay 2003), but the retention of power at the central level 
is working against democratization and has the unintended consequence of embedding 
old elites in new systems. The problem of the top-down interventionist style has 
created tensions and resulted in lost opportunities for trust production. The case of the 
CogmanskloofWater User Association, serves to illustrate this. 
24 The extent to which this 'shaping' is really possible will be taken up in further chapters 
25 Conflicting opinions from municipal officials: one is that it is the responsibility of the private land 
owner, the farmer, the other that it is the municipality's responsibility. Responses to market pressures 
play an important role, for according to international norms and standards and farms that do not comply 











Templates from above 
Cogmanskloof Irrigation Board maintains a pumping scheme that was commissioned 
in 1981 to supply water to farmers in the Montagu and Ashton areas of the Breede. 
The irrigation district is situated around the towns of Ashton and Montagu. The 
security of supply is dependent on the Greater Brandvlei scheme (DW AF 1998b, p. 
22). 
The transformation of Cogmanskloof from an irrigation board into a water user 
association raises a number of concerns. Schedule 91 prescribes what must be 
included in the proposal for the establishment of a water user association. Members of 
the pre-existing local irrigation board worked long hours to agree upon and establish 
the ground rules for the new WUA. After considerable deliberations and eventual 
agreement, a development plan for the Cogmanskloof catchment region and a 
proposal for the establishment of the WUA was submitted to the national office in 
Pretoria. The plan was returned to the chairperson, after considerable delays,26 with a 
suggested templatelblueprint, from a very different WMA, of a water user association 
proposaL A letter was attached with the returned proposal explaining the procedures 
for how water plans should be written up and that the words should be used exactly as 
provided in the blueprint accompanying the new plan. 
Why did they not draw it up for us and just ask us to sign? It is supposed 
to be bottom up but it is not. They are wasting our time and money. 
(Interview Cogmanskloof Irrigation Board, Montagu, September 2001) 
The priority was clearly on the correctness of the formalistic rules, not the generation 
of substantive policy input from below. The water planning process remained top-
down, and the local WUA was unable to gain significant influence within the pre-
existing water policy decision-making network. Despite recognition that previous top-
down approaches to water resources management are no longer accepted by the 
general public (WRC 1996, p. 6), nor are they supported by policy rhetoric, this 
approach persists. In the strong words of Golola (2003) this makes a 'nonsense' of 
earlier attempts by central government to cede power to local authorities (2003, p. 
26 The plan was reportedly lost in Pretoria. After a long silence, it was dispatched for the second time, 












266). The process undermines an opportunity for the state to ensure the 
responsiveness of its policies and practices because, as Newman e/ al. (2004) contend, 
state actors are 'dependent on citizens and users to participate in dialogue with them' 
(2004, p. 217) and could be viewed as a form of governance failure (Bovens in 
Newman et al. 2004, p. 218). 
The process also undermined the trustworthiness of the officials of provincial 
government, representing the national department, who spoke at public meetings 
advocating local input, control and ownership of the management systems. 
Confidence in the participation-oriented priorities laid down in both the Constitution 
and the National Water Act is weakened. The Act has created a space for local players 
to take an important part in their management systems, but the style of government 
does not create trust and state-society synergy (Evans 1996) and co-production (Fox 
1996) of new management systems is curtailed. 
But the establishment of the Cogmanskloof WUA raises other concerns. Although 
DWAF (2003) is clear that the 'purpose of the WUA is to enable people within a 
community to pool their resources (money, human resources and expertise) to more 
effectively carry out water-related activities' (DW AF 2003, p.27), this seems to be an 
ideal. In fact water users associations in the Breede-Overberg appear to be governed 
by 'old elites' who have been connected to water policy networks for years, and the 
transformation from the old to the new produces uneasy trust. 
Fox (1996) notes that the institutions that are well organized are often dominated by 
elites and do not represent local diversity (1996, p. 1091). Synergy between state and 
society (Evans 1996) is intended to equalise and counteract the tendency of local 
elites to dominate, but in reality the state has not used its authority for this purpose 
and the new forms of governance are compromised. Newman et al. (2004) observe 
how conditions such as these mean that the old is not displaced but rather that the old 
and the new sit uncomfortably alongside one another (2004, p. 218). In this case, the 
Cogmanskloof WUA is dominated by elites who have been involved in irrigation 
boards for years. Although the WUAs are intended to include ordinary water users, 
the nature of the concerns remain technical: maintenance of infrastructure and water 











and so forth. The dominant knowledge regime does not encourage the loosening of 
old network structures to include newcomers. 
Network closedness or network fixation (Schaap & van Twist 1999, p. 63) in the 
social dimension affects the way in which actors are able to relate to one another. 
Because they fail to recognize the contribution of another actor, or do not consider it 
to be relevant to the discussion, the opportunity for exchange is restricted. This 
restriction can be either conscious or unconscious. For instance, in the case of this 
WUA, informal rules of behaviour have been developed which now regulate the 
inclusion of actors without this being made explicit in the formal rules (Schaap & 
van Twist 1999, p. 63). In the case of the water user associations, the networks remain 
closed. 
We will not change, we will continue exactly as we have always done. 
(Interview CogmanskloofIrrigation Board, Breede WMA, February 2002) 
It is unclear whether this is a consciously or unconsciously applied rule (Schaap & 
van Twist 1999, p. 63), but it is put into effect. Votes are weighted27 - farmers who do 
not have capital investment in the irrigation canals have less weight than those who 
do. Schaap & van Twist (1999) claim that 'veto power' is a management intervention 
that is exercised by certain members (1999, p. 66) and that this is a way of 
maintaining the status quo and determining the balance of power, and the actors do 
not 'automatically accommodate the objectives of one actor' despite the fact that this 
might be ordained by government policy (ibid.). The veto power is an instrument of 
social control where the virtues and values that Bickford-Smith (1999), Ross (1999) 
and Kvale (2003) investigate, in this case of the water management systems that were 
in place - the irrigation boards - are maintained. Water users who are subjected to the 
'veto' and excluded from decision making are unlikely to challenge the system 
because they want to remain respectable. Water users who are subjected to the veto 
are not equal and it is likely that for some of these water users, feelings of shame are 
more or less intense as it is unlikely that water users who are excluded will feel good 
about themselves or experience the pride that Scheff (1990) refers to. 
27 The National Water Act, Chapter 8, Schedule 93 ordains that the constitutions for a proposed water 











Termeer & Koppenjan (1999) state that social variation can be influenced by external 
pressure and the threat of regulation by government (1999, p. 85), but this has not 
happened. On the contrary, the Cogmanskloof Water User Association is in the 
process of being legitimised and the opportunity for government to exert external 
pressure has not been forilicoming.28 The role of government in creating an 
environment where those who were excluded in the past from decision making in the 
domain of water is pivotal for the rules and regulations with which the system 
legitimizes its actions need to reconcile with the individual who is able to engage or 
feel part of a system, rather than alienated from it. Heller's (1985) and Williams' 
(1993), Pattison's (2000) and Scheffs (1990) work on shame is particularly relevant 
because these authors are alert to the relationship between the self and the exterior, 
with an understanding that the individual person has a voice and is somebody rather 
than nobody. These authors are concerned in particular with the dimension of power 
and a strong authority that is likely, in this case, to be an alienating one. If the 
somebody is unable to speak, they are made to feel like nobody. The repercussions 
that feelings of shame or inability to engage in decision making processes have on 
larger institutions and on the project of reform in the water sector in general is 
relevant. 
Termeer & Koppenjan (1999) propose that there are opportunities for change and that 
confrontation with other perceptions can be a catalyst for this change (1999, pp. 84-
85), but if actors see new ideas as a threat to their interests and values, 'we will not 
change,' they will not be eager to take them into consideration (ibid). It is in these 
instances that the relationship between trust and risk, identified by Seligman (1997) 
and others (Warren 1999; Levi 1996; Luhmann 1979; Offe 1999) is put to the test. 
Evidently, 'we will not change' implies that there is no place for risk-taking where the 
issue of power, exclusion and knowledge is critical. 
The veto power is a prime example of what Schaap & van Twist (1999) identify as 
'conscious social exclusion at the actor level' where the actors are not prepared to 
provide another actor with resources and therefore refuse to interact (1999, pp. 66-
28 Despite the direction laid out in Chapter One, Schedule 2 (k) of Act (no 36 of 1998) which states that 
the purpose of the Act is ... to establish suitable institutions and to ensure that they have appropriate 











67). The actors cannot be excluded, because policy will not allow this option to be 
followed, but a more subtle 'informal' form of exclusion has been adopted. It is 
understandable that there is a distinction between those who have invested money 
(and time) in building irrigation canals and those who have not; the distinction 
determines the status quo of· water user association membership and marginalizes 
those who were already marginalized in the past. The veto power has been 
determined by a discourse that has structured the reality in this instance wealth or 
worthiness is measured in terms of capital outlay and financial gain. It is this reality 
that configures the institutional culture of the Cogmanskloof WUA and becomes an 
authority that can produce feelings of not fitting in for those who are marginalized and 
who, instead, experience shame based emotions. As Schaap & van Twist (1999) 
maintain, certain aspects of reality have been emphasized at the cost of others (1999, 
p.76).29 
The status quo will only be equalized when actors become cognitively open to other 
frames of reference. Actors become subjects and are given a meaning as the culture 
of the network contributes to the inclusion but also the exclusion not only of actors 
but of their views. A process of inclusion encourages the 'agency-shaping' or 
'agency-enabling' potential of water users (Offe 1997, p. 27). As Ostrom (1996) 
notes, when groups work together they enhance abilities to learn from one another as 
they exchange information about what works and what doesn't work (1996, p. 229). 
This would be an ideal to strive for, but it is dependent on an exchange of knowledge 
and equalizing of power. Culture functions in a structuring way (Schaap & van Twist 
1999, p. 77).30 The WUAs have a culture of irrigation boards, and those who are not 
part of that culture are, for the moment, distanced from the dominant network culture 
(ibid). 
Theoretically catchment management agents, at the WMA level, and WUAs, at the 
localised level, are able to represent local diversity, but this is not happening in 
reality, a situation that can offset the iron law of oligarchy (Fox 1996, p. 1091), 
reinforcing government rather than governance. The spaces that are created, such as 
29 Schaap & van Twist (1999) refer to discourse analysis an important aspect of policy networks and 
the dimensions of powerthat are part ofthem. 











stakeholder committees, reference groups, stakeholder forums or the statutory bodies, 
theoretically provide opportunities for diversity and multi-stakeholder representation, 
but this is not happening as planned. The style of government is top-down and the 
effect is neither positive for democracy nor conducive to the building of trust 
(Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2003; Krishna 2002; Warren 1999)?1 Although 
democratic policies are present, the democratic process has not yet been acquired. 
Further empirical data, presented below, has been gathered from the plenary sites that 
form part of the CMA process, local government and finally from a localised sub-
catchment, the Palmiet catchment in the Overberg. 
Palmiet catchment management plan 
The Palmiet Catchment Plan, initiated by the Palmiet steering committee, is 
composed of six management units, Eikenhof, Arieskraal, Klein Palmiet, Solva, 
Kogelberg and the estuary, with the following priority issues: riverine ecology, water 
quality, land use, siltation, water allocation and water demand management, and 
social issues. The catchment plan is designed to ensure that the water in the Palmiet 
River is managed in a sustainable way. MacKay (2003) proposes that writing a 
catchment management strategy, business plan and submitting annual reports is one 
way of ensuring that local elites do not drive and dominate the water agenda in a 
WMA (2003, p. 64), and MacKay (2003), like Ostrom (1996), claims that with these 
procedures in place, it should not be necessary to control the process any further. In 
reality, however, there is disjuncture between local procedures that are in place and 
national procedures that lag behind. Local actors, in the case of the Palmiet 
Catchment, were well organized and ahead of the national actors and they put together 
the catchment management plan for the Palmiet by June 2000, after much deliberation 
and discussion between themselves. But, according to local actors, the rules of the 
game were changed by central government and controls were put into action because 
the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS)32 was not yet in place. According to 
national actors, the plans were stopped because the catchment committee was not 
representative and local elites were dominant, in particular, the interests of wildlife 
31 See also Selznick (1949) and Kotze (1997) who expand on themes of top-down versus bottom-up 
decision-making. 











and nature conservation took precedence over the supply of water for irrigation and 
basic human needs. 
There are interested parties that want to make themselves rich off the 
process. They are gatekeeping and they have an advantage because they 
have been involved in environmental things and they don't want to let 
others come in now. These people defend their turf and they are not true 
conservationists but they are there for power. (Interview: Committee, 
Overberg WMA, Onrus, February 2001) 
Whatever the reason, contradictions are rife and local water users perceive that on the 
one hand government at the national level encourages and drives local innovation, 
initiative and process, but on the other hand restricts and curtails it. 
Stakeholders involved in building the CMA at the local level are uneasy about 
decisions taken by officials at the national level. Water users are also distrustful about 
the power invested in the Minister and the way in which DWAF is able to determine 
the reserve, allocate water and influence and control water matters that affect their 
lives. Opportunities for trust-building between government and local water users 
were, at least temporarily, compromised when the catchment management plan was 
stopped, and these water users were frustrated due to poor communication between 
local and national actors that caused the delays (at best) or the incompetence (at 
worst). Cooperation and trust that was being built between water users in the localised 
Palmiet watershed area was undermined when their local planning activities were 
curtailed. 
The state acting through the Minister has the public trusteeship of the nation's water 
resources. Schedule 3 of the National Water Act (no 36 of 1998) confirms that 'the 
National Government, acting through the Minister has the power to regulate the use, 
flow and control of all water in the Republic.' Schedule 4 of this Act overrides all 
existing rights as laid down in other laws; ' ... this Act replaces any right to use water 
which that person might otherwise have been able to enjoy or enforce under any other 
law'. And in Schedule 7, 'The Minister, The Director-General, an organ of state and 
a water management institution, must give effect to the Reserve as determined in 
terms of this Part when exercising any power or performing any duty in terms of this 











override decisions made by statutory bodies at the local level or local government as 
per its constitutional duties. This persistence can be interpreted in either of the 
following ways: that the state maintains the right to protect the public and ensure 
public good or that the state maintains the right to protect its own interests and to 
ensure that decision-making is-not devolved to local level. 
The process is a complex one. The Palmiet River Catchment Forum, responsible for 
the plan, focuses on controversial developments in the catchment and in particular on 
the demand for transfers to the adjacent Berg WMA in order to meet the needs of the 
expanding city of Cape Town. But Palmiet water users, making economic 
contributions by producing agricultural goods in the Elgin and Grabouw areas of the 
Palmiet Catchment, feel that their needs are not prioritised. In the words of one 
disgruntled water user: 
Cape Town always wins. (Interview: Onrus, Overberg WMA, February 
2001) 
The Breede has a population of approximately 380 000 people with irrigated 
agriculture as the main user of water. Tbe Berg WMA has a population of over 3 
million people with most of these living in the Cape Metro and water use divided 
between the Metro and irrigated agriculture.33 Cape Town is expected to grow by 
between % and 1'l2 million people by 2025 whereas estimates for the Breede WMA 
are declining figures, with the exception of Worcester. The Western Cape has 10% of 
the national popUlation, produces 15% of the GDP and generates 25% of all tourism 
earnings. It is likely that the relative importance of agriculture will decrease in the 
Breede WMA over time.34 
These statistics reflect the difficulty of 'fair' allocation. From DWAF's perspective 
(DWAF 2004) the national perspective must be overruling as it is at this level that the 
needs of mobile populations (and their effect on urban growth), tourism and national 
interests, and the economic wellbeing of the country can be protected. DW AF 
considers selling water to the Metro is also an economically viable business. 
33 BRBS stakeholder committee ad hoc meeting. Record of key points and discussion, August 2001. 












Walk but don't run? 
The Water Law Review Process identified one of the major obstacles to achieving 
Integrated Catchment Management as the lack of appropriate experience and 
inadequate involvement of all stakeholders in a given catchment (WRC 1996, p. 30). 
The same source expressed· doubts that South Africa has, at the present time, 
'sufficient expertise and skill at the local level, which can be utilized in catchment 
authorities (WRC 1996, p 35). The WRC (1996) is of the opinion that the 
disadvantages of local level involvement outweigh the advantages (WRC 1996, p. 46) 
and that the 'appropriate expertise, experience and judgments are not likely to be 
available within stakeholder communities at a catchment level' (ibid.). It is likely that 
the lack of faith in local capacity has allowed for stronger control from the centre, but 
the result has been an erosion of trust at the local level by both state and non-state 
actors. This vision or cognitive closedness is a symptom of what Schaap & van Twist 
(1999) identify as an inability rather than unwillingness to see (1999, p. 65), because 
from the perspective of the local water user local expertise in the Overberg WMA is 
not lacking. 
These doubts, that are overriding, are therefore inappropriate in the case of the 
Breede-Overberg. MacKay (2003) notes that there will be pockets of success 
depending on local capabilities and that 'at present, the Western Cape appears to have 
the best potential for success' (2003, p. 81). Adopting a 'one size fits all' (Tapscott 
2003; Pritchett & Woolcock 2004) approach erodes trust building opportunities as it 
negates individual competencies and efforts. In the Breede WMA water users are 
discontent because DWAF imposes 'experts', at great cost, to perform tasks such as 
the measurement of in-stream flow requirements. 
We can do it by ourselves. The people who live here can get on with it 
and we don't need outside experts or 'Sun City35 consultants'. All we 
need are guidelines from DWAF. We can do the job ourselves. Pretoria is 
taking all the decisions. Why are they determining the reserve? It is 
absurd that Pretoria must be making decisions about the reserve. Local 
people know what amount of water should remain for the reserve and it is 
different per region. It is wrong to lay down as one of the principles of the 
National Water Act that the Department has the right to allocate the 
amount of water needed for the reserve. This should be determined by 











local experts. Will government ever hand over control? (Interview: 
Onrus, Overberg WMA, February 2001) 
Opportunities to build trust between local water users and government in the Breede-
Overberg WMA do exist, but these opportunities are lost when DW AF sidesteps local 
experts and imposes their oWn selected 'experts' to perform tasks that could be 
performed locally. This then erodes opportunities to develop trustworthiness, where 
people are able to monitor the accountability of their own members (Ostrom 1996, p. 
229). It undermines what Offe (1997) terms 'agency-shaping' (1997, p. 27). Trust is 
slow to build, for the style of government reflected above mimics the 'golden age of 
supply-sided management' or the 'hydraulic mission' era in the history of water 
(Turton 2001, pp. 5-6). 
Opportunities to share competencies and synergy between the state and local actors 
exist, but these opportunities need to be nurtured (Ostrom 1996), and a style of 
government that is less interventionist would do better to foster trust between 
government and water users (Stompka 1999). 
Progressive policy is more likely to produce trust, but, although South Africa's water 
policy is progressive and has been, as noted above, heralded as in fact one of the most 
progressive in the world (MacKay 2003), trust is low. There is good reason to bring 
decision-making closest to the water users who are influenced by the decisions and 
the policy makes provision for systems, institutions and people to participate in water 
management closest to the local water user. Agrawal & Gibson (1999) argue that 
actors in the local space are better placed to make the rules because it is these actors 
who are in possession of specialized information about local context and resources 
(1999, p. 638). But the centre is in control. The role of local players, be these water 
users who come together in the context of a statutory localised body such as a water 
user association, local authorities struggling to implement DWAF policy at the 
municipal level, or water users developing catchment plans, is under-developed. 
Although there might well be a gap in local capabilities and an inability to innovate it 
is also likely that, as Gran's paper on professionalism in African settings assumes 
(2001) 'the room will be filled rather quickly' (20001, p. 17). It is unhelpful to assume 











institutions and people in the Breede-Overberg WMA confinns MacKay's (2004) 
assumption that there are pockets of capability and expert skills. 
Coordination between departments at the local government level and between local 
level stakeholders and central government and central government and local 
government is inadequate. The analysis suggests that water policy lacks substance in 
its ability to enforce overall vague notions of localised water user participation and 
that vagueness provides an opportunity for central government to maintain control in 
the water sector. Central government emphasis appears to be more directed to 
outcomes rather than process. Process requires strenuous efforts to ensure the transfer 
of authority and not only managerial power to local water users and to encourage 
negotiation on tenns of equality - so that, as Agrawal & Gibson (1999) advise, 
government officials and community members, based on a notion of diversity and 
contested meanings - are held accountable (1999, p. 641). In the case of the Greater 
Hennanus Municipality, it is possible that a broad-based user group, supportive and 
included in local government decisions, could better demand accountability and 
reduce friction between departments at the local level. But one of the more 
fundamental structural problems is the separation of water services (Water Services 
Act 1997) and water resources (National Water Act 1998). The forums that are built 
as part of the CMA process do not provide opportunities to discuss water delivery and 
the principles that are part of Integrated Water Resource Management are poorly 
integrated into local development plans, despite the emphasis on local governments to 
produce Water Service Development Plans (DWAF 2004). 
There is a requirement for consultative processes and synergy between a range of 
actors and a focus on process rather than outcome would go a long way in the 

















transfers (bottom up and 
top down), empowerment 
and accountability skills 
Outcomes: delivery, 
resource management + 
conflict resolution + 
knowledge acquisition + 
negotiating on equal terms 
+ 
HIGH TRUST 
Figure 3: Ingredients for the development of high trust 
Agrawal & Gibson (1999) warn that the need for certainty and controlling outcomes 
results in the 'same utopian longings' that identify community as the solution to 
problems of conservation (1999, pp. 640-641) where a 'reasonable process' of 
decision-making is implemented rather than guaranteed outcomes (ibid.). Accepting 
that communities are dispersed, not only geographically but in their interests, is 
critical (Fox 1996, p. 1091), and the commercial farmer group is by no means 
homogenous, nor do the 'previously disadvantaged' all have common interests. But in 
taking note of the heterogeneity the emphasis should then shift more evenly from 
outcomes to process. This is, as Ostrom (1996) advises, an investment that needs to 
be carried out over a long time (1996, p. 229). 
There is empirical evidence that the style of government is reminiscent of a low-trust 
society. In the spirit ofpatemalism, or the 'hydraulic mission' epoch, the process of 
building statutory body corporates to manage water at the level of a WMA is not 











that is unsurprising because, as Putnam (1993) warned, hierarchical, unresponsive, 
centralised bureaucracies seem to corrode interpersonal trust. 
Summative remarks 
Marais (2001) notes that because the reconstruction and development of the 
nation was perceived to be a 'common endeavour' it was deemed important to 
encourage 'restraint' on the part of the popular sector in the demands that they 
made or changes that they pursued (2001, p. 94). It was preferable therefore to 
'reconcile' differences and compromise on conflicting interests. According to 
Marais (2001) some of the solutions were found in providing new opportunities 
'political and social spaces, seeking reconciliatory positions that minimized 
conflict and restructured state civil society relations' (2001, pp. 96-97). 
Although this argument points to a 'reasonable' approach adopted by 
government, it is unlikely that actions are led by rational decisions to steer away 
from conflict and to be reconciliatory, but that they are rather likely to be the 
result of inadequate experience and practices of any other way to operate. 
Klijn's (1999) question is fundamental: 'under what conditions would these 
rules and resource divisions change' (1999, p. 33)? 
Levi (1996) emphasises that political power, vested interests and national government 
institutions can undermine the possibility of local institutional solutions (1996, pp. 
241-242) and the empirical data also suggests that, at this stage of the implementation 
of the National Water Act, local institutional solutions have been undermined by over 
-involvement of national government. 
Lowndes (2003) states clearly the problems that arise when managerial tasks 
have been increased at the local level without ceding authority to those 
responsible for implementing the tasks. And so there is distrust between 
different segments of water users, between government and their consumers and 
between government officials. Transformation, particularly of local 
government, is riddled with problems of redesign as old systems and institutions 
are restructured, reshuffled and replaced by new ones to achieve the required 
changes in the water sector. Stakeholders involved in building the CMA at the 











Water users are distrustful about the power invested in the Minister and the way 
in which OW AF is able to detennine the reserve, allocate water and influence 
and control local water matters. In the light of these fears, water users prefer old 
water policy networks where they already have 'credit slips.' They are hesitant 
to venture into new terrain, and segmentation and network closedness in the 











Chapter Five: knowledge, power and agency 
Closedness in the social dimension occurs when certain actors are 
excluded from the interaction ... In that case, the range of possible links 
between actors in the network is consciously restricted. (Schaap & van 
Twist 1999, p. 63) 
Introduction 
This chapter continues to expand on the features that were covert in the trust discourse 
developed in Chapter Two, and further develops the themes of democracy and 
participation that constituted the closing arguments ofthat chapter. Chapter Four was 
tasked with elaborating three themes: synergy between actors, style of government 
and bureaucrats' resistance to change. The current chapter promotes these important 
topics by featuring in particular the following four facets: 1) participation, 2) 
knowledge, 3) power, and 4) agency. The discussion makes explicit the 
interconnection between these four features and the constructs of trust and of shame. 
The empirical data proffers that participation, knowledge, power and agency are 
critical components of the attitudinal construct of social capital, trust and advances 
the argument that shame belongs alongside trust - both being important detenninants 
of social action. 
In the course of the discussion that follows, theoretical notions put forward by 
theorists are further specified and critically grounded in data in selected case 
narratives taken from the case study area of the Breede-Overberg. Despite ample 
evidence that the theoretical analysis is both relevant and useful in understanding the 
social processes that are taking place in the water sector, there are tensions between 
the theory and the grounded narratives. In the ideal, it has been proposed that 
institutions, committees, forums can have positive effects for democracy but the data 
reflects the problematic manifestation of these and other ideas put forward. Is risk 
conducive to trust production or is it trust-averse? Under what conditions does risk 
impel trust and under what conditions is it a repellant of this feature? Is the trust that 
we are observing in the field the same trust that Seligman (1997, 2000) identifies as a 
feature of modernity, or is it the reproduction of familiarity, kinship or neighbourhood 
ties or what Offe (1997) calls 'primordial units' that are not bridging old alliances but 











relationship between common knowledge regimes and trust or is there trust across 
knowledge domains? And is knowledge intentionally or unintentionally withheld with 
the purpose of reproducing familiarity and decelerating change? 
Chapter Five consists of an introduction, eleven subsections and a conclusion. The 
eleven subsections are as follows: 
1. Knowledge, power and agency 
2. Erkenntnisinteresse or knowledge interest 
3. No recipes for getting to Pretoria 
4. Style of government revisited 
5. Filtering effect of the frame 
6. Localised expert knowledge 
7. Stoep talk breaks bounds of 'acceptable limits' 
8. Impenetrability of 'real' world out there 
9. Reinforcing patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
10. Honour, shame and trust 
11. Schizoid transformation process 
Introduction 
Participation is critical to the transformation process which is about redressing the 
inequalities of the past by including those who were marginalized and excluded from 
benefits and rights as citizens of the nation. This chapter is burdened with tackling the 
critical features of knowledge, power and agency, for it is the absence of knowledge, 
the unequal power relationships between water users and the inhibition of agency that 
thwart the procedure of participation because the production of trust is inhibited and 
at times feelings of acute shame are activated. 
The discussion demonstrates that the production and use of knowledge and power are 
interconnected. Power cannot be equalised until different types of 'expert' knowledge 
are exchanged, but there are no quick fixes or ready recipes for how to do this. Style 
of government is a recurring theme in this text, for the top-down management style of 
the authority is not an equaliser of knowledge and power and, on the contrary, it 











difficult. The style is manifest, for instance in the following manner: overload of 
information, preset agendas and through the filtering effect of the frame of reference 
that defines what is acceptable and what is not acceptable for debate. 
New institutionalism in organisational theory presents institutions as contested, 
contradictory and conflictual sites, but the distinction between formal and informal 
institutional space is understated in the theory, yet blatantly apparent in reality. 
Although the formal spaces are controlled and covert contradictions and tensions 
between members are pruned, a stark contradiction appears between what is said and 
what in fact happens. But the most pronounced contradictions and tensions are in the 
interstitial spaces outside the formal venues where there is dissidence, debate and 
discussion. The data below expands on the formal and informal institutional settings 
and shows how these settings are intimately connected with the notions of knowledge, 
agency and power. 
This chapter is also tasked with examining non-participation and the consequences of 
non-participation, in particular the constructs of trust and shame and their roles as 
determinants of social action are scrutinised. If institutions are sites where trust is to 
be produced then they fail in their goals when informal spaces are the only places 
where people have a voice. In the interstitial spaces, new social capital is not built for 
the old formations and social fixations and dominant power relations, recognised so 
well by Fergusson (2004, p. 291) and others (Newman et al. 2004; Williams 2004; 
Briggs & Sharp 2004; Parfitt 2004) are reconstructed and reproduced. Power is 
equalised in the informal institutional spaces, but it is equalised within groups and not 
across groups. Water users feel free to share ideas and to make evident their choices, 
dissents and differences, but these remain in group, between members with common 
interests and shared norms (Dasgupta 2000; Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna 
2002; Warren 1999; Woolcock 1998; Granovetter 1983). 
'Universal', 'technical', 'objective', 'public sphere' desirable knowledge is contrasted 
to local, 'specific', 'subjective' or 'private sphere' knowledge. The data suggests that 
the use of universal knowledge predominates over the specific localised knowledge 
regime. The following section, on knowledge, power and agency, portrays the effects 











Management. The section also presents what is called a schizoid transformation 
process where trustworthy others who have been given the authority to act on behalf 
of water consumers, for instance councillors and community leaders, are called on to 
assume roles that they are unable to meet. Yet in order to retain trustworthiness they 
dissemble their inadequacy in grasping the 'desirable knowledge', the 'facts' and in 
order to remain 'respectable' or honourable in the eyes of their constituency, deceive 
themselves and others. 
Knowledge, power and agency 
Ribot & Peluso (2001) define well how knowledge is central in determining 
who can benefit from which resources (2001, p. 12). But there are barriers to 
acquiring knowledge and the distinction between knowledge and information is 
blurred. The information that is made available to water users is 'scientific', 
largely 'universal' and a large proportion is devoted to the protection, use, 
development, conservation, management and control of the resource (National 
Water Act, no 36 of 1998, Chapter 2, Part 1, Section 5 (3». In other words, the 
CMA focus is predominantly the management of the resource rather than the 
delivery of basic services (water) which is the most pressing need for the poor. 
The propensity of government officials or their spokespersons to provide an 
environment where people gain knowledge and capacity to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the rules (Cohen & Rogers 1992, p. 417) and participate 
meaningfully is, as Giddens (1990), Desai (1994), Parfitt (2004), Newman et al. 
(2004) and Offe (1997) assert, closely connected to features of power and 
knowledge. Paulo Freire (1972), over thirty years ago, maintained that 
education for liberation must be a process of problem-solving and dialogue 
among equals. Freire's (1972) point is about knowing how to confront a strong 
and old tradition of transferring knowledge (1972, p. 10) by critically examining 
text so that reality is 'illuminated' in a reflexive process (1972, p. 13). In other 
words, the critical part of the transfer of knowledge is it's penchant for 
illuminating reality and for enabling reflection. But this reflexive process has 
not yet been brought into the sphere of integrated catchment management in the 
Breede-Overberg WMA. There are clear voices (Newman 2004; Williams 2004; 











involves more than just having a toolkit with which to solve problems and that it 
is a process through which power is made more equal and meaningful dialogue 
is encouraged. Notions of participation as they are manifest in the Breede-
Overberg WMA remain impoverished. 
Cohen & Rogers's (1992) emphasis is that good information! sharing improves 
the ability of citizens to deliberate and clarifies why certain policies are 
necessary (1992, p. 424), and it also has, as Newman (2004) suggests, the 
purpose of creating dialogue between state and non-state actors. State actors are 
dependent on citizens and users not only so that they can ensure the 
responsiveness of their policies and practices and render the policies legitimate 
(2004, p. 217) but because synergy between state and non-state actors is the 
better way to achieve sustainable development (Ostrom 1996; Evans 1996; 
Evans et al. 1985; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Levi 1996; Sztompka 1997; 
Tarrow 1993). 
In the domain of water, learning about the water cycle and the effects of patterns 
of water consumption on people and the environment is crucial if water users 
are to be able to make choices and be active in decisions concerning water 
management. In order to be responsible agents in the domain of water, for 
instance to report leakages, conserve water, decide which level of water services 
can be afforded or to maintain responsible hygiene and health practices, 
minimise pollutants to ground water and so on, water consumers need to have 
knowledge about a range of water issues (Pollard & du Toit 2003). But it is also 
important that those with 'scientific' knowledge and expertise in these areas 
gain knowledge about the living conditions of the poor, for it is the ability to 
access knowledge across domains that is useful (Barberton 1998; Vroom 2002). 
Appropriate knowledge transfers enable water users to make choices and to be 
active agents in the forums that they are invited to attend. It is assumed that as 
people feel included they are able to build trust between one another, across 
segments of water users and not only within segments of water users. Although 
lKnowledge and information are used loosely by many theorists. Cohen & Rogers's (1992) use of 











the trust literature alludes to notions of power, in particular, Granovetter (1973, 
1985) and Portes (2000) who acknowledge unequal status and access to 
economic gains as being intimately connected to trust, it is sparse in its 
explicitness of the linkages between knowledge, agency and power. The 
contribution that is made in the discussion that follows is to emphasise the way 
in which these three features interlock and how critical the interconnectedness 
of knowledge, power and agency is for the production of trust and the 
development of new networks. 
Erkenntnisinteresse or knowledge interest 
Giddens (1990), Desai (1994) and Offe (1997) recognize that knowledge and the 
process of agency-shaping or agency-enabling are intimately connected to features of 
power. Information sharing can equalize partners and groups whereas unequal access 
to knowledge exacerbates, as the empirical evidence below so clearly illustrates, in-
group and out-group dynamics (Scheff 1990; Serageldin & Grootaert 2000). Vroom 
(2002) refers to what is known in German as the erkenntnisinteresse (knowledge 
interest) that divides the domain of the non-scientific - the average practioner's 
experience - with that of the 'scientific' (2002, p. 55). The contested terrain of 
knowledge and information is pervaded by 'ideological controls and discursive 
practices, as well as negotiated systems of meaning' (Ribot & Peluso 2001, p. 12) 
which shape the way in which actors are able to engage with one another. Parfitt 
(2004) notes that tools deployed to drive participation and equalize power 
relationships operate largely in the public domain and as such they reinforce the 
exclusion of women's issues (2004, p. 544). The recurring themes in integrated water 
resource management, reticulation pipes, weirs and pumps, stream flow regulations 
and ecological requirements are part of the dominant water sector discourse and are 
distinctly alienating for those who do not master the language. 
Knowledge includes those who have it and excludes those who do not. The 
acquisition of knowledge is itself a process and there are no blueprints as to how 
it can be achieved. Eade (1997) links knowledge to self-esteem and argues that 
awareness and the capacity for political action mutually reinforce self-esteem. 
(1997, p. 11). With the right information, the marginalized have the right - and, 











esteem and a sense of self in tum reinforce trust and reduce feelings of shame 
(Scheff 1990, pp. 92-93). The link between meaningful transfer of knowledge 
across domain, high trust and absence of shame-based feelings is critical. 
No recipes for getting to Pretoria 
Not only irrigation farmers but many of those who are involved in water management 
wrongly presume that management of irrigations systems, including weirs, canals, 
dams and so forth, equals water resource management (BRBS 2000, p. 3), thus 
continuing to reinforce the dominance of the hardware system of understanding water. 
Although there has been an ideological shift in focus to people, the problem in the 
Breede-Overberg WMA is that.the old way of doing things has not yet shifted, and the 
empirical evidence points to a gap between the ideological vision about rights to 
participation and equality enshrined in the Bill of Rights and in the National Water 
Act (no 36 of 1997) and the Water Services Act (no 108 of 1997) and their practical 
implementation. The Water Law Review Process (WRC 1996) states unequivocally 
that 'where individuals may lack the necessary skills for full participation, the lead 
agencies must take responsibility for assisting with their development and application' 
(1996, P 2). 
The discourse of the lead agents for change in the water sector alienates many water 
users whose most urgent needs are for basic water supply, and despite changes in the 
regime, many water users in Breede-Overberg continue to be deprived of water. 
There are no standard ingredients or recipes, find some landless farmers or 
women refugees, start with income generation, the stir in some literacy 
classes followed by a drop of social organization, a pinch of 
conscientisation, and finally a sprinkling of management training. (Eade 
1997, p. 28) 
An interactive process allows for creative responses and interchanges between 
different segments of water users so that water policy can 'better fit local needs' 
(Palumbo & Colista in Brynard 2000, p. 169). But seemingly, provincial government 
officials are making policy fit by driving and implementing change rather than 
'reinventing' it in an interactive way. The sense of achievement is that the Breede-











behind the Inkomati CMA that was launched on 30 March 2004 in Nelspruit. The 
forerunners feel pride that they are achievers and that they are ahead of other WMAs. 
The focus is top-down, giving preference to those who have been charged to carry out 
policy rather than on exchanges with water users who could be responsible for 
formulating it (Lipsky in Brynard 2000 p. 169). The numerous meetings that are part 
of the CMA process in the Breede-Overberg are supposedly, in the spirit ofthe law, 
agency-enabling and agency-enhancing opportunities where there is 'mutual respect, 
compassion, comprehension and appreciation of fellow members' (DWAF 2001c, p. 
5). These attitudes are important cognitive and emotional attributes that act as 
contributors to a common vision and trust-building. But the erstwhile top-down 
implementation paradigm with its 'interventionist impulses (Hart 2002, p.260) 
continues. Trust-building is constricted. 
Style of government revisited 
Agency-enhancing opportunities are few and far between and trust amongst water 
users in the Breede-Overberg is difficult to broker for a number of reasons, such as: 1) 
style of government, 2) nature of the language and knowledge regime, 3) agendas are 
preset, 4) information overload and 5) deep social cleavages and segmentation. 
Sztompka's (1997) consideration of style of government as one of the seven important 
determinants of a culture of trust was discussed. Sztompka (1997) asserts that a style 
of government that is both nurturing and inclusive will foster a culture of trust. It is 
significant that Williams (2004) speaks of participation as a new 'tyranny' whereby 
the previously marginalised are mainstreamed but that this takes place in a way that 
binds them 'more tightly to structures of power that they are not then able to question' 
(2003, p. 563). In referring to participation as a 'tyranny' the effects of style of 
government become far less benign and can be considered as a way of ensuring that 
the marginalised are 'mainstreamed', and lose, rather than gain, power. 
Change from a non-inclusive and interventionist style of government is particularly 
important within the South African context where distrust is imprinted in the 
historical memory of the majority of South Africans. Ineffective public sector 
performance may, as Bruijn & Ringerling (1999) suggest, undermine legitimacy 











information-sharing certainly undermines trust. From Williams's (2004) analytic 
perspective, the performance would be considered as 'effective' and not ineffective 
public sector performance because it has achieved its intended purpose of retaining 
power. Brynard (2000) in agreement with others (Ostrom 1996; Evans 1996; Agrawal 
& Gibson 1999) recognizes that both top-down and bottom-up forces exist 
simultaneously and appreciates that both sides theoretically at least should be shaping 
the way in which policy develops. The cross-fertilisation suggested by these theorists 
remains in the realm of ideas, for the style of government is overwhelmingly top-
down and, as such, discussions and sharing knowledge is curtailed because the 
exchanges are as Katerere (2002) notes, controlled (2002, p. 23). Selznick's (1949) 
idea of co-optation as a process that absorbs actors into the system in order to avert 
threats to the stability of the system (1949, p. 13) is supported by Katerere (2000) who 
identifies a strategic position that authorities take in order to appease communities or 
stakeholders by bringing them on board (Katerere 2002 p. 34), and once they are on 
board to reduce frustrations by having the business of transformation and building 
water management systems, in this case, interrupted. 
Selznick (1949) elaborates on informal and formal co-optation, arguing that the two 
types of co-optation represent a state of tension between formal authority and social 
power (Selznick 1949, pp. 13-15). The type of co-optation that is evident in the water 
institutions is formal as the bodies must be seen to be legitimate (ibid.) and water 
users who qualify as 'previously disadvantaged,2 have been co-opted into the formal 
meeting-spaces. 
Information overload crowds out the space for meaningful exchanges. There is very 
little contestation around any information that is passed 'down.' This is contrary to 
what is said: 
It is here today that you have the opportunity to comment and input into 
any of the issues that are shown and to say whether you are happy with 
the process. We expect you to give your input... (nWAF official Breede 
WMA Stakeholders forum, November 2001). 











The extract above that includes the words 'we expect you to give input' is a symptom 
that DW AF is succumbing to the overriding temptation to follow a 'recipe' (Eade 
1997, p. 28; Pritchett & Woolcock 2003, p. 202). The following extract largely 
contradicts the first one, as for the following response to questions is not unusual. 
Let's get a move-on. We must just press ahead otherwise we will never 
advance and only go backwards. This is not the place here to discuss these 
matters. People can discuss things later - we must submit the plan and we 
are getting there (DW AF official, Breede WMA Stakeholders Forum, 
November 2001). 
Newman et al. (2004) refer to this as 'fobbing off' or a process of deflection (2004, p. 
214). There is almost no time for questions or additional input from members that is 
of any significance. Schaap & van Twist (1999) refer to this type of language as 
closedness or unwillingness to perceive from the frame of reference of actors who are 
not considered part of the 'in' network. These authors refer to phrases such as 'we're 
not discussing that now', and 'you can't consider every angle' as being symptomatic 
of this process of exclusion and closedness (Schaap & van Twist 1999, p. 64). 
Utterances of this nature reveal that actors are closed to different meanings because 
either they are unwilling or unable to perceive the view of another that might differ 
from their own, and as the post-modernist Lyotard (1979), contends 'there are things 
that should not be said' (1979, p. 17). Schaap & van Twist (1999) adopt the position 
that such language is symptomatic of a 'conscious strategy to reduce complexity' 
(ibid.). Government officials are reluctant to open up discussions and to reconsider a 
strategy for the CMA as 'we will never get anywhere that way' (DW AF official, 
September 2001). 
At these formal meetings, there is a contradiction between the appraisal of notions of 
participation and the unwillingness to put beliefs into practice (Desai 1994, p. 227). 
For example, Karar, in a position paper for DWAF (2001c) on the establishment of 
catchment management fora, remarks that although the fora are water-orientated, 
more often than not, more pressing issues might need to be addressed and that a 
catchment strategy should be holistic and should be able to encompass the vision for 
the catchment 'including aspirations for basic needs, development and growth' (Karar 











needs of those who remain in the domestic sphere, the wives and mothers whose 
private water issues, such as absence of toilets, inadequate washing facilities, poor 
quality drinking water and so forth, are of a private nature and require exposure in the 
public sphere (parfitt 2004, p. 544). But this is not happening. 
Rothstein & Stolle (2003) identify fairness and impartiality of public servants as a 
critical component for the building of trust (2003, p. 192), but when the interests of 
some are amplified and the interests of others muffled, public servants are not giving 
equal opportunities for trust-building to all stakeholders. According to Offe (1997), as 
institutions can be, at least in the ideal, mediators and generalisors of trust (1997, p. 
18) and again, in the ideal, are what Ingelhart (1999) notes as important factors in the 
emergence and development of trust or distrust, they have the ability to provide an 
opportunity for dialogue (Ellison 1997). The role of public officials in the 
transfonnation is to create an enabling space for institutions to become conduits for 
the deepening of democracy and to be venues for agency-shaping and agency-
enabling (Offe 1997, p. 27). Undoubtedly a culture of trust, according to Stompka 
(1997), does activate and mobilise human agency, but for trust to be brokered there 
needs to be an enabling and nurturing space and the recognition of uneven distribution 
of power between groups and within groups (Parfitt 2004; Briggs & Sharp 2004; 
Williams 2004). Parfitt (2004) notes that lessons learnt by research organisations 
suggest turning the 'top-down procedures, systems and structures' of development 
bureaucracies into 'learning organisations' wherein people are assisted to enhance 
their capacities to undertake and participate in development (2004, p. 549). 
Filtering effect of the frame 
In furthering the understanding of knowledge, power and agency, the way in which 
selective types of knowledge are perpetuated is pertinent. Schaap and van Twist 
(1999) illustrate that 'pragmatic civil servants' are used to talking in tenns that are 
different from those of the public who voice their fears about water shortage or 'dirty 
water' in ways that are considered by the 'pragmatic civil servants' as 
incomprehensible or unintelligible (1999, p. 72). The responses to many questions 
are dismissive and uninfonnative, but Schaap & van Twist (1999) consider this as the 
'filtering effect of the frame' that controls the actors' way of perceiving (1999, p. 67). 











and in so far as, their own frame allows. The filtering effect of the frame serves as 
scaffolding to reinforce existing systems and structures and to resist change or threats 
to their stability. There is tension between DWAF's desire, stated in the position 
paper on catchment fora, that stakeholders in catchment fora should, according to Hart 
(2001), be able to perform specific tasks on behalf of the CMA and other water 
management institutions and the need for these fora to be inclusive. For, given the 
legacy of apartheid, those who are able to lUldertake the tasks, as proposed, are likely 
to be those with technical expertise in the domain of water and whose language fits 
the filter. 
Powell & Dimaggio's (1991) argument is that institutions are rife with conflict, 
contradiction and ambiguity (1991, p. 28). But very little 'conflict or contradiction' is 
evident, suggesting that these institutions are restricted sites that will not produce 
trust. Information sharing is curtailed because oflUlequal power, knowledge and 
agency - what Serageldin & Grootaert (2000) refers to as the levels of equity (2000, 
p.49). Adequate and accurate information enables people to make appropriate and 
efficient decisions (Serageldin & Grootaert 2000, p. 48). Power, on the other hand, 
controls the way in which information is shared and, as Scheff (1990) contends, the 
lUlequal access to knowledge is in turn responsible for perpetuating in-group and out-
group dynamics. Scheff (1990) notes that 'in modem society, experts usually see 
laypersons in their own society, that is non-experts, as an out group whose common 
sense is tantamount to ignorance' (Scheff 1990, p. 142).3 The theoretical position of 
Serageldin & Grootaert (2000) and Scheff (1990) is important to consider in the 
analysis of trust and transformation in the Breede-Overberg alongside that of Powell 
& Dimaggio (1991), for their emphasis is that lUlequal access to knowledge renders 
impotent the conflict, contradiction and ambiguity (1991, p. 28) inherent in the 
system.4 
The selected extract' let's get a move on' demonstrates well how the confrontation 
between different points of view is avoided based on 'the' facts (ibid.) in this case that 
this is not the venue for this discussion to take place, although, if the frame of 
3 Also see Miller (1993) and Ostrom (1996). 












reference were different, it could be. Involvement does not interfere with the 'core 
business' (Newman et al. 2004, p. 215) and the 'let's get a move on' is 'coercive 
persuasion' (Parfitt 2004, p. 546) fulfilling what Newman et al. (2004) present as a 
rational approach to avoid consultation. A voiding consultation safeguards having to 
modify decisions based on the view of what the public might say (Newman et al. 
2004, p. 210). Too much consultation could inhibit 'moving on' but too little 
undermines deep changes that are ordained by the law. The concern with efficiency 
overrides the desire for empowerment and the redressment of unequal power 
relationships (Parfitt 2004, p. 539). 
Localised expert knowledge 
Elinor Ostrom (1996) and Margaret Levi (1996) acknowledge that the merging of 
technical proficiency of state officials and local competences is ideal. Both agree that 
the sustainability of managerial systems at the local level is jeopardized if local 
people are not taken seriously and if decision-making is not consultative. The 
contention is that ordinary water users, although lacking in competence in the 
'scientific' generalized language of old water user networks, possess high levels of 
localized specialist knowledge in water matters. The following extract describing the 
shortage of water on farm schools in the Matroosberg Area of the WMA is pertinent. 
There is no water at the property. Water is carted from the resort or taken from a 
canal ... closest source is 200 m. And another example: water is obtained from 
Mr Du Toit. There is one standpipe and a water tank is needed as irrigation 
activities in the summer leave the school without water. Or at Nuy primary 
school, the rainwater tank is broken and there is no permanent water supply. Or 
again, at Glen Heattlie School, there is no water supply. Wysersdrift Primary, 
no permanent water supply ... (Breede River Basin Study 1999). 
This extract reflects a keen knowledge of water scarcity within a rural school context 
in the Breede-Overberg. But the issues of 'ordinary' water users are not discussed, 
and as a result the water users with these troubles remain silent. The constraints 
between public officials and ordinary water users inhibit the process of dialogue and 
engagement in the forums (Newman et al. 2004, p. 213). Concerns with the quality of 
water, weirs and pumps, inlets and outlets, fynbos5 or whale-watching are high on the 
agenda, and the ecological reserve, for the fIrst time a consumer in its own right, is 











also eloquently represented. As Ribot & Peluso (2001) note, those who have not only 
the ability but, importantly, the authority to name things are best able to profit and 
control the process of water management (2001, p. 13).6 The more 'mundane' water 
matters that are impacting on the lives of many water users in their daily lives are not 
brought into the public sphere and remain invisible. When there isn't water for pupils 
to wash their hands after using the toilet at the local primary school, the needs to keep 
the catchment pristine seem indeed trivial. 
Bekker & Leilde (2003) in Exit voice and loyalty in South African towns note three 
possible scenarios that face local non-state actors when their needs are not met: they 
remain loyal (but not committed), they exit from the system (non-attendance, non-
participation) or they remain silent. (2003, pp. 158-160). The ordinary water user (and 
approximately 80% of civil society in the Breede-Overberg WMA forms part of that 
social segment that was previously excluded - and who are coloured or black) does 
not have the issues that affect their day to day living considered in the management 
systems that are being put together today. 
We try and get them to come but it is difficult. They will go to meetings in 
the township about housing and other things but they won't come here. 
We have had numerous public participation meetings but it is really 
difficult. (Interview: Consultant, Overberg WMA, February 2002) 
There are several reasons why it is difficult 'to get them to come.' 1) Water users with 
higher incomes more easily have the time and the money to get to meetings. Grootaert 
& van Bastelaer (2002) notes that those with higher incomes can devote more 
resources to network formation and thus acquire more social capital more easily 
(2002, p. 67). The transaction costs are higher for the poor (Barberton 1998, pp. 245-
248). 2) Water is not the most pressing issue. Ranking priorities for the poor, housing, 
jobs and education have been ranked over and above water (Clark 2003, p. 105).7 3) 
Non-consequence of non participation. 
6 Ribot & Peluso's (2001) argument is that scientific narratives are used to control and profit from 
natural resources and land use. Access includes much more than merely owning property. 
7 First priority -- job, second priority -- housing, third priority - education, fourth priority - income, fifth 
priority - family. The survey was undertaken in Wallacedene (squatter town, Cape Town Metro) and 











Non-participation signifies closedness (Schaap & van Twist 1999). According to 
Tenneer & Koppenjan (1999) confrontation and dissent is only possible when there is 
social variation as well as cognitive variation - that is people who are from different 
social configurations as well as people who have different views (1999, p. 85). The 
intimations of Tenneer & Koppenjan (1999) ignore the dimension of knowledge and 
power which is overriding. There is social and cognitive variation amongst the water 
users but the dominant discourse and power relationships that play themselves out 
neutralize these variations. 
They want national puppets not players. (Interview: Onrus Steering 
Committee, Overberg, September 2001) 
The above extract was uttered by a technical expert in the field of water, but an expert 
who has unusual knowledge and skills in 'both domains' with an experience of 
cooperation and understanding of poor water users that is apparent in some of the old 
school public officials. But the 'power' of this expert, who has cognitive - and 
emotional - dissonance with the water user elites, is undennined and he feels like a 
'puppet' not a 'player'. It is at the meeting-point of differences and variations that the 
dimension of power is critical. 
Despite cognitive and social variations, unequal access to knowledge inhibits 
discussion. Knowledge flows are restricted and it appears that decisions are taken 
outside of the meetings and that the agendas are preset. Mitchell & Schoeffel's (2002) 
analysis of No am Chomsky'S critique of power highlights Chomsky'S insights into 
the way in which actors shroud their working in 'mystery' so that the infonnation is 
'above the ordinary person' (2002). It is here that the shame theory is pertinent. When 
ordinary persons/water users seemingly accept decisions that are not clearly explained 
and are shrouded in mystery, the actor will be unlikely to take the risk of speaking 
out, for fear of ridicule. Silence or withdrawal are attractive alternatives. In turn, 












Stoep talk breaks bounds of 'acceptable limits' 
The above discussion confirms what Ostrom (1996) asserts that the way in which 
knowledge is produced, used and understood has a political dimension (1996, p. 229). 
Technological objectivity controls the actions of others, and this objectivity is 
repetitively reconstructed in social groupings and is manifest in the way in which 
different water users interact with one another (Loveridge cited in Vroom 2002).8 
Powerful elites are also able to use the existing information that they do have 
available to strengthen their arguments, and there is very little accurate information to 
contest biases that might occur (ibid.). Lack of information by participants includes 
low literacy and numeracy, factors that complicate organizational activities and that 
limit the ability of people to engage in debates. Low literacy levels particularly affect 
the way in which many ordinary water users are able to participate in discussions 
about numbers in budgets or financial forecasting. Information is an important source 
of power and, as the discussion so far suggests, without the necessary information 
people are unable to organize and act appropriately to protect their interests 
(Barberton 1998, p. 256). Barberton (1998) lists a number of other practical problems, 
such as lack of transparency of institutions, which require skill and persistence to 
overcome, and additional costs in gaining access to information (1998, p. 265), 
gatekeepers such as consultants or community leaders who keep some out and others 
in (1998, pp. 266-267), distances, inconvenience of venues and so forth (1998, pp. 
246-265). 
Mitchell & Schoeffel (2002) discuss Chomsky'S understanding of power and note that 
when debate is bounded 'within certain acceptable limits' it is 'tolerated, and in fact 
even honored' (2002, p.13). The 'chic engineers' are able to bound the debate within 
the 'acceptable limits' and they are seen, at least by OW AF, as trustworthy others.9 
Chic engineers Ninham Shand consultants are presenting high tech power 
-point slides. These meetings are for consultants, not for farmers. Why 
8 The same volume refers to what is known in German as the erkenntnisinteresse (knowledge interest) 
that divides the domain of the non-scientific - the average practioner's experience - with that ofthe 
scientific. Also see Ribot & Peluso (2001) who refer to individual or group social identity, 
membership and knowledge as elements of access and influence over authorities and, importantly, the 
distribution of benefits from things. But this discussion will be pursued in Chapter Three. 












don't they stop spending so much money on consultants? (Commercial 
Farmer BRBS Stakeholder Committee, August 2001) 
Within the current domain of water, economistic and technological discourse 
dominates. The short extract on the 'chic engineers' is an extract of behind the scenes 
talk that took place on the 'stoep.'l0 When trust is not brokered formally, shared 
values may be exchanged informally or what Erving Goffman (I 959) describes as the 
'backstage' where there are 'off-the-record' performances. During the course of water 
committee meetings important exchanges take place in the corridors, or what Wicomb 
(I998) describes as 'the ambiguous space between inside and outside, between public 
and private .... '(Wicomb 1998, p. 104). Wicomb (1998) refers to the phenomenon of 
shame that 'cross-eyed and shy, stalks the post-colonial world broken mirror in hand, 
reproducing itself in puzzling distortions (Wicomb 1998, p. 92). Although not 
suggesting that shame can be generalized and that all who do not have the expertise 
and knowledge feel shame, the 'puzzling distortions' are worth considering as they 
provide insights into the social configurations that exist on the 'stoep' and in the 
interstitial spaces around the formal venues. It is possible that people who have status 
and respectability (Ross 1999; Bickford-Smith 1999) and who are co-opted into 
public space where they are unable to make meaningful contributions, feel shame. 
The interstitial or liminal spaces are understood well by Turner (1974) who uses the 
term to describe ritual where 'those being moved in accordance with a cultural script 
were liberated from normative demands ... and were betwixt and between ... ' (1994, 
p. 13). As water users move into the 'bewixt or between' 'stoeps' the 'prestigious 
programme' (1994, p. 14) of DW AF can be revisited. These are significant spaces as 
the formal meetings are crowded with information and, often because the meetings 
start late, are interrupted before the agendas are fully complete. Knowledge is 
circulated in backstage ways outside what Thompson (2001) refers to as the centred 
spaces of male power. Significant knowledge, experience and strategic insight about 
the problems and strategic needs of local water users do exist, but the ways of 
exploring confound the rational scientific paradigm that is all-pervasive. Discussions 
continue in the informal spaces but unequal access to knowledge determines the in-
group and out-group dynamics (Scheff 1990; Serageldin & Grootaert 2000, p. 49). 











Interpersonal trust is far more difficult to build across different groups of people than 
between people in the same groups. 
Impenetrability of the 'real' world out there! 
It is possible that shifting the 'science' from technological infrastructure and water 
discourse to people discourse would help reconfigure social regroupings and render 
intergroup exchanges more probable. Andrews & Shah (2001) note that unresponsive, 
centralised bureaucrats do not manage change easily and are, as Parfitt (2004) 
suggests, also resistant to it. As a consequence bureaucrats and public officials resort 
to top-down interventionist mechanisms that are counterproductive for trust. Very 
many of them lack the skills required to drive a 'people-centred' process and are 
unable to introduce new mechanisms for integrated water resource management that 
are pro-poor. As the developing of the CMA is seen largely as a technical process 
(Wester et al. 2003, p. 808), the 'rational-choice' paradigm of 'scientific knowledge' 
and pipes and pipelines of the bureaucrat is juxtaposed to what Thompson refers to as 
the 'objective reality' or 'science ofpeopJe' (2000, p. 233). Thompson writes: 
'silence of the peasant farmers, the laborer, the houseworker, the 
mineworker, the truck driver and the informal urban dweller on 
environmental issues does not of course imply a lack of knowledge. Nor 
does it imply a lack of concern' (ibid.). 
The notion of hard knowledge implies a rootedness in the real world out there as well 
as a masculine normative vision of immutability and impenetrability which is seen to 
be simply not possible in the 'soft social' sciences (Thompson 2000, p. 233). The 
danger of adopting this position is that unnecessary resources are dispensed in order 
to 'skill up' the public and to develop training manuals or mini courses on a variety of 
topics. But, as Newman et al. (2004) warn, this approach simply reinforces the 
standards that are being set by bureaucrats and 'technical' experts, or what Thompson 
(2000) refers to as the masculine normative vision of immutability and 
impenetrability rather than enabling bureaucrats to be skilled up to learn about what 
participants are bringing to the process (Newman et al. 2004, p. 212). Newman et 
al. 's argument is that the culture of public services requires change and that the 
frustrations that are felt when local concerns are not met would be mitigated if there 











make the bold proposition that lay people be brought into public institutions and that a 
more collaborative form of governance, rather than government, would be conducive 
to the building of trust between domains. 
Reinforcing patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
eloete & Wissink (2000) identify reasons for policy failure, one of which is bad 
implementation. The authors list a number of reasons for 'bad implementation' such 
as lack of sufficient human resources or lack of financial resources, but in particular 
'defective management processes or organisational cultures' (ibid.). Information 
overload, preset agendas and exclusive dominant knowledge regimes are symptoms of 
a style of government that is top-down and makes synergy between actors difficult, 
reinforcing closed networks and historical patterns of inclusion and exclusion. The 
model, one which is, as Thompson (2003) states, typically rational-choice with an 
emphasis on management (2000, p. 233), with the implications being control from 
above, is rigid and it reduces a willingness to attempt change (Hardin 1993 in Levi 
1996, p. 243). 
The decisions that are taken, whether or not they reform and improve access to water 
for those who do not have it, are made with or without the voice of the water users. 
Actors are prepared to change their go-it-alone strategies (Ostrom, in Kickert & 
KopperUan 1999, pp. 40-41) when they see that cooperation is to their advantage. But 
when the transaction costs of participating are higher than the benefits and their social 
interests are inadequately serviced (Kickert & Koppenjan 1999, p. 42), the incentive 
to participate is amputated. The real consequences of non-participation are marginal 
(Granovetter 1985; Woolcock 1998), and this has dire repercussions for participatory 
development. If the consequences of non-participation are marginal are the efforts that 
are spent driving participation worthwhile? (Williams 2004, p. 565). 
The two short narratives that follow are set in similar geographical settings but with 
starkly contrasted social landscapes. The first is a narrative of commercial farmers in 
the Ruensveld and Duivenhoks region of the Overberg WMA and the second is a 
narrative of the fishing village of Kassiesbaai in the Overberg WMA. The first story is 
about building social networks in the Ruensveld and Duivenhoks area of the Overberg 











networks and lack of social capital between the residents of Kassiesbaai and 
government. 
Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves 
In the late 1940s the Soil Conservation Act (No 48 of 1946) brought together farmers 
who gave of their most precious resource, time, in meetings where they discussed soil 
conservation. Closely related to soil conservation were issues such as grazing, crop 
growing and, with these, water. Later on farmers' wives, driven by a common 
experience and frustration, came together and became drivers for change. The 
following extract is pertinent: 
All water for house and stock was dependent on good rains .... A cartload of 
water cost RI8 ... adults can manage a water shortage. The animals just have to 
get by. But it is when the babies arrive that the nuisance is experienced more 
acutely. Drinking water from the village used to stand in our kitchen in six large 
milk cans ... One morning there was a terrible smell of putrid water in the 
kitchen. The water in the milk cans! I was fed-up, discontented and angry, and 
was on the warpath (Wilson 1999, p. 27). 
During the apartheid period, white farmers had established their own in-group social 
networks based on a common interest in improving water management, and the 
common need for drinking water motivated some farmers ll to activate the networks 
and to lobby the government of the day. Three farmers' wives from the Duivenshoks 
farming area in the Overberg went to Pretoria and presented their case to the Minister 
of Water Affairs. As a result of negotiations between government and farmers eight 
months later, a water project was announced that was to bring water to 540 000 
hectares (Wilson 1999). 
'Today there is a 1 400 km network for farmers at present; if that network of 
pipes had to be laid today it would cost between R2S0-R300 million.' 
(Interview Overberg Water Board, May 2002). 
However, notions of belonging remained contested and as other rural water schemes 
were being developed costs were revisited and commitment to the scheme by 
commercial white agriculturists was less secure. The Heidelberg Farmers' Association 











water users in the area, and these networks created patterns of cooperation and built 
generalised trust and formed a safety net for elite experts (Kickert 1999). 
Significantly, the network linkages affirmed that there could be gainful economic -
and social - production through individual and collective efforts (Knack & Keefer 
1997; Rose 2000; Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2002; Putnam 2000). The financial 
gains were substantial but so too was the production of social stock that included 
feelings of pride and honour (Woolcock 1998; Lynd 1958). 
It also provided sufficient face-to-face relationships where a reputation 'for keeping 
promises is an important asset' (Ostrom 1996, p. 214). Knowing that indiyiduals share 
a commitment to keep the promises made to a group - so long as others keep their 
promlses - affects individual expectations about future behaviour and is a 
'prerequisite for organizing association to undertake major, long-term collective 
action' (Auman, in Ostrom 1996, p. 214). The pride, honour and sense of achievement 
resonate in the passage below: 
Despite the problems encountered, the completion of the scheme brought major 
satisfaction. It was highly gratifying to see years of planning, design and 
construction coming to fruition to see raw water being extracted from the 
river, undergoing the purification process ... (Wilson 1999, p.11). 
There were 'virtuous' cycles of reciprocity established and there was no need to break 
these. 12 Their farm labourers, and any other marginalised water users, were not 
consulted when decisions were made about water. Nor were they provided with 
training or skills development regarding water resource management. They were 
involved in the water schemes, but as manual labourers who dug trenches for the 
reticulation networks (Wilson 1999). It was because of these existing state-society 
networks and established relationships of cooperation and reciprocity that commercial 
farmers were the first to be approached by government in the early years after 
democratization to participate in their new schemes and to contribute to water 
planning and management 












in 1979 appealed to farmers to remain united and their scheme was agreed to with 
revised costs for 198 000 hectares (Wilson 1999). 
Government understood that it was in the economic interests of the country to provide 
fanners with access to water, and through negotiations the economic consequences of 
water scarcity were highlighted. Small stock units could be increased from 2.11 per 
hectare to 2.87 with water schemes and the positive net income for farming was of 
national interest. In stark contrast, the provision of water to black farm labourers was 
never considered a priority (Wilson 1999). 
Commercial farmers in the Overberg became wise to the workings of government and 
to water matters. They gained self-confidence and competence and the networks gave 
them what Cohen & Rogers (1992) call 'educative powers' (1992, p. 424). They 
knew exactly how much water was needed for their stock, where the water came 
from, what the problems were relating to water (salinity, instream flows, flooding, 
drought) and how to work with government specialists in managing these problems. 
Importantly, white agriculturists learnt how government bureaucracy worked, and by 
activating their social resources they were able to manoeuvre through the corridors 
and to galvanize nodes of power within government where decisions were being made 
(Gran 2001). 
The value of these farmers' land was so intimately linked to their ownership of water 
that any issues relating to their economic wellbeing and land production were 
included in the policy discourse concerning water resource management. Exclusive 
networks were built between farmers in the Overberg long before the collapse of 
apartheid and credit slips (Coleman 1988; Warren 2001) were accumulated that would 
serve the water users forty years later. 
The Duivenhoks and Ruensveld rural water schemes were built in the Overberg and 
the construction of the schemes demonstrated how cooperative relationships between 
neighbours contributed to sustainable water management systems for white farmers. 
The schemes improved access to scarce resources and secured sustainable livelihoods. 











The white agriculturists took a risk, but in the process considerably widened the 
potential for action (Luhmann 1995, p. 128). The present action of the farmers' wives 
was premised on the expectation of a future favourable response the implementation 
of the scheme (Offe 1997, p.14). The present action of the government of the day was 
most likely premised on the expectation of a future favourable response at the polls. 
Molenaers's (2003) argument of the attraction of network closedness is pertinent for it 
is understandable that trustworthiness of the existing farmer network was a valuable 
resource and that it reinforced shared obligations and expectations. (Molenaers 2003, 
p. 122). Resistance to open up these networks to newcomers, of a different 
background, is also resistance to 'lose' the trustworthiness that has been consolidated 
between network members (Molenaers 2003). These farmers who interacted over long 
periods of time created rules that regulate their behaviour today and influence their 
strategic options (Klijn 1999, p. 33). 
Muddied waters for Kassiesbaai 
In stark contrast to the networks that were established in the Overberg between white 
farmers and government, Kassiesbaai, a small coloured fishing village, less than 100 
kilometres away, in the adjacent area of the same catchment, is poor in water and poor 
in social resources to manage the water (Turton 2002). Trust is low between 
government officials and water users and here there has been no history of 
cooperation between government and water consumers. It is likely that Kassiesbaai's 
water supply will be improved in the near future, but the decisions that are being 
taken in Kassiesbaai today are taking place between 'knowledgeable' elites who are 
members of the ratepayers association, the conservation corporation, the municipality 
and technical 'experts'. There is only one representative from Kassiesbaai village on 
the ratepayers association as most of the erven in Amiston as a whole are owned by 
holidaymakers. There are approximately 200 households in Kassiesbaai. Decisions 
are not taken in consultation with the residents of the village and trust between water 
users in Amiston and the water users of Kassiesbaai is low. Trust between the 
residents of Kassiesbaai and the Agulhas Municipality, under whose jurisdiction they 
fall, is tenuous. One of the residents, an elected councillor involved for some time in 












I have been talking to the municipality for years but I still don't understand 
anything about water. Oh, water is such a difficult thing. I don't know where the 
water comes from or what is going on but only that it doesn't taste good and 
that this has been like that for centuries (Interview: Kassiesbaai Councillor, 
Amiston, February 2004). 
Because local government is the sphere of government 'closest to the people' 
theoretically, according to Fick (2001, p. 43), councillors have the opportunity to 
engage with and respond to their constituencies in relatively small areas. But in the 
case of small towns such as Kassiesbaai the councillors have neither the knowledge -
nor the authority - to promote and protect the interests of the town. 
The relationship between scarcity of water and scarcity of social ingenuity to resolve 
the Kassiesbaai water problem is stark. Despite the reversal of the regime the 
problems of organization and of distribution of information and negotiation of 
powers, for those who were not part of water policy networks during the apartheid 
years, are deep-rooted. Water consumers in Kassiesbaai suffer water resource 
deprivation and social resource deprivation. 13 
Old networks are not easily unstuck. The deepening of democracy and the building of 
trust between water users depends on equality in knowledge and wealth (Farrington et 
al. 1999; Ravaillon 2001). Without a real understanding of the principles of integrated 
water resource management and the water cycle, and a radical change in the way in 
which government officials interact with local water users, networks will remain 
exclusive rather than inclusive and trust between different segments of water users 
remote. 
Making cracks in exclusive networks of trust 
It is through shared meanings and experience that, over time, thick trust and social 
capital was established amongst white farmers and bureaucrats responsible for water 
!3 Amiston received 65% of its requirements from the Ruensveld East schemes and to a lesser extent 
Bredasdorp where about 27% of the town's current water requirements are supplied from the recently 
built Klein Sanddrif Dam. The remainder of water supply to Amiston and Bredasdorp is from 
boreholes delivering groundwater of varying quality. During peak periods, Amiston also receives water 
from Denel. The water from local boreholes is extremely brackish. Source: Proposal for the 











management. The competing 'pockets' of social capital that were formed during the 
apartheid years shape the way in which stakeholders operate today and entrench 
feelings of distrust between segments of water users. On the one hand, the social 
capital of the white agriculturists and water experts that produced the Duivenhoks and 
Ruensveld rural water schemes, and on the other, the contrasting context of the 
everyday experience of water users in black townships, such as Kassiesbaai. Water 
users in such towns have developed deep distrust for government officials that it is, as 
Termeer & Koppenjan (1999) state, part of the social configuration that is so 
embedded (1999, p. 83) that it will take years to eradicate. 
Black farm labourers, who were not owners of land, developed their networks and 
trust amongst themselves out of long-term grievances and a shared sense of 
marginalization from these embedded water networks. These different kinds of trust 
relationships were more tenuous as the networks of political activists that were 
formed were constantly undermined by the police and apartheid authorities who were 
eager to use any occasion to smash allegiances that threatened their regime (Ruiters 
1998, Marais 2001). The police created cracks wherever possible through gossip, 
slander and undermining the social capital that was being constructed. Under this 
climate of rule and divide, trust was difficult to build and unlikely to be sustained. 
The relationship between trust and risk (Seligman 1997 ; Warren 1999; Levi 1996; 
Luhmann 1995; Offe 1999; Giddens 1990) is particularly relevant in the context of 
water management that is currently dominated by uncertainty and changes. Contrary 
to the theorists who claim that exaggerated uncertainty is part of the reason that 
people take risks, in the water sector people are unwilling to take a risk. It is unlikely 
that new social capital will be produced because closedness or social fixation of a 
formal or informal, conscious or unconscious, nature intrudes with the way in which 
people connect (Schaap & van Twist 1999, p. 64). Levi (1996) also notes the way in 
which network closedness restricts innovation and inhibits the construction of new 
social capital. The obvious attraction of the closedness was referred to in the earlier 
theoretical discussion where Molenaers (2003) observed the propensity of closed 
networks to retain trustworthy members (2003, p. 122). The likelihood of white 












As the provision of water (and other services) to the majority of South Africans was 
not a priority it is unsurprising that ten years into democracy it is difficult to co-opt 
water users into networks from which they have been excluded and with which they 
have no history of trust or common meaning. The elected councillor of Kassiesbaai 
has no voice in decision-making institutions because he does not have the 'scientific' 
knowledge or erkenntnisinteresse (Vroom 2002). Eade's (1997) links between 
knowledge and self-esteem (1997, p.ll) proclaim the compelling desire to avoid 
embarrassment by showing ignorance through being poor and uneducated (Desai 
1994, p. 227). This negative chain reaction is not transitory and, as Heller (1985) and 
Scheff (1990) warned, reverberates within larger systems and institutions as 
knowledge includes those who have it and excludes those who do not. 
Granovetter's (1985) argument that it is through linkages in social and political 
networks that people gain access to new sources of information, avoid 
inefficient information redundancies and facilitate information flows to wider 
social circles, is more than evident from the short narratives presented above. 
Information empowered the commercial farmer group to demand transparency 
and accountability of government officials and to actively participate in 
decisions that would have a lasting effect on their social and economic 
wellbeing. The farmers lobbying for water schemes in the Duivenhoks and 
Ruensveld gained new sources of information and years later are better able to 
avoid information redundancies. At the other extreme, the water users of 
Kassiesbaai have not engaged with 'trustworthy others' in the past and have not 
experienced agency-enabling exchanges with public officials. 
The principles of democracy are merely advertised and displayed as 'nice to have', 
but for these principles to be displaced from the window to the floor the connection 
between knowledge, power and agency would need to be examined. Although 
Agrawal & Gibson (1999) are correct to say that institutions can change with 
'constant challenges to their form by the actions of individuals whose behaviour they 
are supposed to influence' (1999, p. 637), their assumption is that there IS an 











As the state is seen by the majority of South Africans as the protector of rights and 
carries the burden of delivery to the poor, is it necessary for poor people themselves to 
be drivers of development? Is it possible that non-participation is a manifestation of 
high trust in the elected African National Congress? The overwhelming dominance of 
white agriculturists in the fora .is likely to be a manifestation of distrust for the regime 
and a determination to control their own futures in the water sector because they can 
no longer trust government to do this on their behalf. An unintended consequence of 
participation is that the patterns of the past are not only reproduced but reinforced. In 
other words, because there is, as Halvorsen (2001) notes, trust in the system, being 
there in person is less critical in order to ensure the right to water. White agriculture is 
at risk and there is little chance that commercial farmers will leave this up to trust as 
there is too much to lose. In their case it is likely that the anticipated benefit of 
attending meetings far outweighs the cost. 
However, the venues provide empirical evidence for Mishler's (1997) bad and good 
cholesterol theory and for the vicious or virtuous cycles identified by Putnam (2000) 
and others (Ingelhart 1999; Krishna 2002). Those who have meaningful interchanges 
today are those who have already attained trust in the past and who have the language 
and the knowledge to engage with authorities, for in the new spaces they are, as 
Termeer & Koppenjan (1999) write, nonetheless 'embedded in familiar exchanges' 
(1999, pp. 83-84), endowed with similar views and interests. The distinction 
between systems trust and people trust is an important one to note and is one that is 
underemphasised in the trust discourse. Those who have trust today have given their 
trust to 'trustworthy' others (Hardin 1999), that is the provincial state officials and 
consultants who are protecting their interests, but not to the politics ofthe ANC 
government. 
Honour, shame and trust 
Although predominantly white and male, there are cognitive and social variations 
between water users, and yet decisions are unanimously passed (Desai 1994, p. 227). 
Differences are muted because water users who do not form part of the dominant 
knowledge regime that permeates the venues fear embarrassment or being considered 











opportunity to exchange infonnation is lost and the opportunity to build trust between 
actors is also restrained. 
The exclusion of new actors - and the ideas that go with them reduces variation 
(Schaap & van Twist 1999, pp. 84-85) and inhibits infonnation flows between people 
with different views. So far, the discussion has focused on the obstacle to effective 
participation that is lack of infonnation by the poor. But lack of infonnation takes two 
fonns (Barberton 1998, pp. 249-255). The first is lack of infonnation by poor people 
but the second is lack of infonnation of poor people. It is for this reason that Parfitt 
(2004) recognizes the need for a 'new type of development organisation' that 'turns 
top-down development bureaucracies into learning organizations' (2004, p. 549). 
Lack of accurate information of poor people becomes an inhibitor, for when accurate 
information is brought to the attention of the meeting there is no accepted frame of 
reference and the infonnation is either contested or considered soft or invalid 
(Barberton 1998, pp. 249-250). The following extract reflects the practical 
application of theory, narrowing the gap between the realm of ideas and the 
usefulness of these ideas in understanding reality: 
I say nothing I have nothing to say but it is high time that they have 
asked me to be there so I can learn. No I am not ashamed but I will not 
speak as I cannot. Shame is about being hungry. I know shame, when I am 
inside the committee I will just say yes until I learn and they will not 
know how poor or ignorant I am. It is a terrible thing when you feel 
hollow inside. Hunger can make you feel this and not knowing anything 
can make you feel this.' (Interview small-scale farmer, Central Breede 
Water User Association, Robertson, November 2001) 
Barberton (1998) notes that the process of empowering people involves changing 
their perceptions about themselves as well as about other people so that they are able 
to claim their right to equal treatment irrespective of their social or economic status 
(1998, p. 267). Positive social action enhances autonomy and freedom, introducing 
what Scheff (1990) referred to as gleichaltung (1990, p. 76), which is not an abstract 
idea but a feeling of wellbeing that is a practical enabler of meaningful exchanges. 
Gleichaltung (1990) was expressed well in the feeling that the Ruensveld and 
Duivenshok rural water schemes brought to the agriculturists as 'the scheme brought 











construction coming to fruition'. Quite the opposite happens when social interaction 
results in embarrassment, criticism and insult, and one of the outcomes is the 
production of shame. 
The extract above reflects what Wicomb (1998) has called 'puzzling distortions' of 
shame and the way that shame 'stifles its own discourse' (1998, p. 92). The text 
reflects these distortions - 'no I am not ashamed' and 'yes that I feel hollow inside, 
hunger can make you feel this and not knowing anything can make you feel this.' 
Schizoid transformation process 
The deep social cleavages of the past are apparent in the way in which water users 
engage with one another reinforcing cleavages rather than creating bonds and building 
trust amongst each other. Attempts to bridge the social cleavages are flawed. 
People don't really take time to involve people properly. It takes time to 
get people together and for them to give input. The distances are great and 
people are very busy now with the transformation. I have to report back 
but I don't even know what I am supposed to say. And all the decisions 
have already been made. I don't feel OK to put up my hand and say 
anything because there are all kinds of other things being said like 
volumes of water and the environment and I don't know about these 
things. I just know that the people in my constituency don't have good 
water supplies. (Councillor, CMA Reference Group, October 2001, 
Worcester) 
In principle democratically elected and accountable local councillors are supposed to 
be able to act as channels and make demands on behalf of their constituents (Desai 
1994, p. 235, Hart 2002, p. 235), but as they are unable to intervene on behalf of the 
people they represent and because they are unable to transfer knowledge which they 
have not yet accumulated, their role is undermined. Hart (2002) describes this status 
oflocal councillors as 'perched precariously on seismic fault lines' (2002, p. 235). 14 
Councillors are expected to placate white privileges but at the same time they are 
confronted with urgent demands for material improvements for the residents whom 
they represent and who see them as 'trustworthy' because they have their 
14 Hart (2002) notes too that the newly elected ANC councillors were also given an opportunity very 
quickly to see themselves as employers and managers and that in some cases their efforts at 











'encapsulated' interests at heart (Hardin 1992, p. 505). Desai (1994) describes how 
poor slum dwellers are reportedly 'just poor and uneducated' (1994, p. 227) and that 
they cannot understand the issues involved. Councillors are not 'just poor and 
uneducated' but they are poor in the resources to manage water and not proficient in 
'scientific' language. The correlation between poverty in the first-level resource 
(water) and poverty in the second-level resource (the ability to manage it) is apparent 
(Turton 2002, 2003), but it is critically important not to introduce second-level 
resources as an add-on. Councillors are supposed to understand what is being 
discussed and their 'community' assumes that their network linkages provide them 
with the opportunities to wield power (Desai 1994, p. 228). Yet the power invested in 
them is thin and they are unable to impact on the construction of water policy 
networks. The member co-opted onto such a committee experiences both honour (as 
an elected or nominated member) and shame (as an unequal partner who cannot 
negotiate) in a schizoid transformation process. Tension between retention of power 
as a leader and powerlessness as a committee member is real, and the member is 
given a voice to attend but is unable to be vocal. Epstein (1984) contends that people 
will avoid embarrassment or occasions where inadequacies might be revealed (1984, 
p. 33). An individual is also likely to be too reticent to lose 'respectability' (Ross 
1999; Bickford-Smith 1999) by confronting values that belong to a world that is 
considered to be superior or desirable, and thus the legitimacy, or lack of legitimacy 
of the procedure is uncontested. 15 According to Vincent (2004), in the quest for 
respectability and acceptance by the authority it is worthwhile 'capitulating to the 
dominant status quo (2004, p. 112). 
Pattison notes that 'the creation of strong authority is understandable but 
dysfunctional and alienating' (Pattison 2000, p. 139), and shame has been noted as a 
'perception of unacceptable inferiority produced by a sense of dependence on one's 
employers or superiors ... .' (ibid.). Not feeling 'OK' to put up one's hand for fear of 
ridicule is a feeling of 'unacceptable inferiority' and it undermines trust. According to 
Hardin (1993), this type of experience is a determinant in the 'psychology of trust' 
(Hardin 1993, p. 508). People will do anything to avoid embarrassment, as portrayed 
15 These findings have been confirmed by the author in various case studies conducted for the water 
sector case study commissioned by Impulelelo Innovation Trust between January 2004 and May 2004. 
The same fmdings were also relevant in previous fieldwork undertaken for a similar sanitation and 











in the extreme cases by the acts of Boaz in Philips's (1986) Story of Ruth or by 
Epstein's (1984) ToKutu, in The experience of shame in Melanesia discussed in 
Chapter Three. Although less extreme than the Boaz or ToKutu examples, the 
outcome is that trust opportunities are lost and networks remain fixated. The 
encapsulated interests (Hardin 1992, p. 505) of the disenfranchised are not being met. 
The extract above indicates low levels of risk-taking because people do not want to be 
even more vulnerable (Hosmer 1995, p. 383) than they are to the actions of another 
person who might make them feel 'stupid' or a 'fool' (Heller 1985, p. 48) or 'have 
one's inadequacies .... uncovered' (Epstein 1983, p. 33). Empirical evidence suggests 
strongly that those who do not have the language and knowledge remain silent in 
order to avoid being embarrassed or shamed. Seligman's (2000) argument is that the 
modem self has full agency and is able to participate. As a result exchange either 
symbolic or material is possible, and part of the symbolic exchange is the 'trust' 
produced as a credit (Seligman 2000, p. 44). For Seligman, this exchange is based on 
what he refers to as a rational actor model of self (Seligman 2000, p. 80). But not 
unlike trust, the attitudinal component of social capital, shame, is rational - the actor 
chooses to trust or not to trust and empirical evidence suggests that the water user 
chooses not to be put to shame or be embarrassed and to rather exit or withdraw. This 
confirms what Scheff (1990) contends, that shame silence or withdrawal - is 
therefore not only an emotional response but also a cognitive one. 
Summative remarks 
Distrust is deeply embedded in the historical memory of the majority of citizens of 
South Africa who have been subordinated to a strong authority. Many of the forums 
and committees are governed by water users with entrenched habits, practices and 
networks whose focus on infrastructure capital has not been replaced by a focus on 
social assets and, more importantly, by a focus on ways of negotiating and engaging 
with one another that are different. As this is the case, these forums repetitively render 
voiceless the claims of many water users and intensify the interests of others (Warren 
2001). White commercial farmers and elites who formed part of old water policy 
networks have learnt to cooperate and have developed relationships of reciprocity and 
trust between themselves and between government. But is the relationship between 
familiarity and trust so clear? Are the established networks between government and 











familiarity? The trust is more likely to be in the trustworthy (or familiar) other rather 
than the system put forward by the elected government. The distinction between 
familiarity and trust is precarious. But, importantly, although there are conflicts, 
tensions and dissent amongst these groups, over new issues such as licensing and 
catchment management levies in particular as well as between themselves, these 
farmers know where and how to proceed with their grievances and they possess the 
'scientific' language to present these grievances to government officials. 
Information empowers citizens to demand transparency and accountability of 
both public and private institutions and to participate in decisions that affect 
their everyday lives (Minogue 1998; Wester et ai. 2003, p. 810). But as the 
realm of the old and the new meet, exchanges are inhibited and public officials 
struggle to keep out public claims and noise that might influence their own 
business (Newman et ai. 2004). 
The farmers lobbying for water schemes in the Duivenhoks and Ruensveld 
gained new sources of information and are better able to avoid information 
redundancies today. At the other extreme, the water users in Kassiesbaai do not 
have social and political network contributors that are agency-enabling. 
Cooperation around funerals, religious or sports events resonates more loudly 
than cooperation around water matters. Knowledge which flows across domains 
is limited, as is social capital to manage water for those who are most in need of 
the resource. Disconcertingly, the idea presented by Stiglitz (2000) that there is 
an undersupply of social capital exactly when that resource is most needed 
(2000, p. 60) is far too real. 
If governments are sincere about their commitment to the principles of democracy, 
there needs to be a better understanding of how the features of knowledge, power and 
agency go together. The absence of knowledge, the unequal power relationships 
between water users and the inhibition of agency inhibit the production of trust and 
activate feelings of shame. Fergusson's (2004) engagement with discourses of 
exclusion is relevant because it acknowledges the constraints of social and economic 
structures that retain and reconstruct dominant power relations (2004, p. 291). In 











48) the commitment requires a style of government that is, as Sztompka (1997) 
proposes, nurturing and enabling so as to lay the basis for generalized trust (Levi 
1996). But it requires a change in the way in which bureaucrats see development so 
that water management institutions become places where water users manage water 
jointly rather than places where water users are managed to ensure that there is the 
least possible threat to the authority. 
AltflOugh bl£l.ck water consumers, who were not part of the specialist bodies during 
the £l.partheid years, are not currently water experts, over time, according to policy, it 
is expected that they will become, as Miller (1993) proposes, part of the regulatory 
process. Whatever influences might come from below, the role of the state (Evans et 
al.1985) in opening up water policy networks and redressing issues of knowledge, 












The core analytic challenge posed at the beginning of the study is to test the 
applicability and relevance of theoretical assumptions about trust in explaining 
transformation in the water sector. The study has connected to the lived experience of 
water users in the Breede-Overberg Water Management Area (WMA) and unveiled a 
certain, but not the only, reality and in so doing has presented certain, but not all, 
lived experiences in the WMA. Conditions that prevent trust are explored, one of 
which is the prevalence of shame, under certain circumstances, an inhibitor of trust. It 
is within the boundaries of the particular WMA, and within the boundaries of the 
lived experience of the researcher, that the following assumptions are confirmed: trust 
is a relevant theoretical construct and shame is useful in explaining reasons for the 
inhibition of, under certain conditions, the production of trust. 
But the question is not only whether but in what way trust influences or inhibits 
transformation and whether and in what ways trust could be used as a measure of 
reform. In engaging with this empirical work in South Africa, themes latent in the 
literature were striking, and it became more and more evident that if trust were to be 
at all useful it would require a robust analytic toolkit deploying an expanded set of 
key themes that would serve to further the investigation. In this process, six recurring 
themes emerged: 1) style of government, 2) synergy between state and non-state 
actors, 3) bureaucrats and change, 4) knowledge, 5) agency and 6) power. It was these 
themes that guided and informed the investigation into trust within the particular 
context of water management systems in the Breede-Overberg WMA and showed 
how the changing role of the state in delivering water to its consumers, affects trust. 
The concluding remarks presented in this chapter consider in what ways theory 
guided and enlightened the observations, and how the observations advanced an 
understanding of trust in the context of a changing environment in general, and in 
particular in the water sector. 
Overview 
Despite global shifts from top-down to bottom-up water management, from an ethos 











top-down planning appear resistant to change, and the prescribed reform that IS 
critical in order to redress the inequalities of the past is slow to root. 
Water policy under the 1956 Water Act actively discouraged participation and water 
was managed centrally. Under the riparian laws of the old Water Act, property rights 
to water were linked to property rights to land. Private water rights are now abolished 
and the emphasis is on water as a national asset underpinned by the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry's (DWAF), slogan 'some for all ... ' rather than all for 
some. The principles enshrined in the National Water Act (no 36 of 1998) are 
designed in line with international sustainable development goals that actively 
encourage participation of a wide range of stakeholders who operate closest to the 
resources that are being used. This entails what Newman et al. (2004) propose as a 
shift in the modern state from governing through direct controls to governance where 
the state interacts with a wide range of interest groups. 
DWAF itself recognised, at the launch of the first Catchment Management Agency 
(CMA), the Inkomati CMA, in Nelspruit, March 2004, that it is not doing enough to 
change social configurations that have emerged in the past and that are reproduced in 
the present. Those with knowledge, agency and power are the same water users who 
had knowledge, agency and power in matters concerning water access and 
consumption during the apartheid regime. It is the absence of knowledge, the unequal 
power relationship between water users and the inhibition of agency that makes 
participation so difficult and keeps those who have knowledge in and those who do 
not have knowledge, out, with the unintended consequence of strengthening bonds 
between those who have had, in the past, privileged access to water. If institutions are 
supposed to be, as Powell & Dimaggio (1991) and North (1990) argue, sites where 
trust is manufactured, then they are failing in their goals in the Breede-Overberg 
WMA. Thick trust has been developed between small pockets of water user experts 
and government officials. Knowledge transfers are effectively undertaken, power 
equalized, a climate that is agency-enabling flourishes and there are synergistic 
relationships between state and non-state actors amongst this small group of 
consumers who were actively involved in water matters under the previous regime. 
These water users see each other as trustworthy. However, as the empirical evidence 











absent In the absence of trust, there is either uneasy trust, distrust, withdrawal or, in 
some cases, shame. Causal linkages can be made between these attitudinal or 
behavioural constructs and an interventionist style of government, lack of synergy 
between state and non-state actors, bureaucrats' resistance to change, unequal power 
relations, restriction of agency and lack of meaningful transfer of knowledge. 
Although policy seemingly embraces a new water management paradigm, the old is 
being resurrected with all the contradictions and contortions that precipitated the shift 
in focus from the old to the new in the first place. Repeated failures to achieve reform 
are costly in terms of finance, and they are costly because they affect the production 
of trust. The movement of the African National Congress away from the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the neo-liberal macro-
economic Growth and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, makes it more difficult for 
government to retain the 'spirit of the law'. The ideology of discrimination where 
minority groups in the social landscapes of water occupy an undesirable no man's 
land in the water management systems continues. 
Reflection, innovation, uncertainty, polyphony necessary ingredients when an old 
system is to be replaced by a new is a scientific project, not just a fuzzy ideal that is 
part of 'soft' sciences. As Seale (2004) points outs, even the father of rationality, Karl 
Popper with his focus on rational science, admits that the field of science relies on 
refuting, reconstructing experiments, creating alternatives, counter-producing and in 
the interest of science, making assumptions to test the validity of the hypothesis. The 
conclusion examines ways in which the CMA pursues the 'scientific' project in order 
to achieve reform in the water sector. At the same time it examines ways in which the 
'scientific' project on the one hand undermines the achievement of reform in the 
water sector, but on the other has reconstructed the ideas and reproduced new ones 
that differ from those put forward in the first place. As the study is tasked with testing 
the applicability and relevance of theoretical assumptions about trust and considering 
the usefulness of shame as an inhibitor to the building of trust, the pursuit of the 
'scientific' project, in other words the way in which refuting, reconstructing, creating 











Despite the new laws and the call for change and refonn, the old has not yet been 
displaced and sits uncomfortably alongside the new. Those who suffer water 
deprivation have not been able to use their franchise to improve their access to water 
and their access to decision-making bodies in the water sector. Newman et al.'s 
(2004) concern is that change will not take place unless those that are implementing it 
are convinced of the significance of the change. As the discussion below suggests, 
there is on the one hand an undeveloped notion of what participation should entail, 
but there is also a culture in the domain of water that negotiates meanings around 
'scientific' definitions of 'fact' and that reproduces itself in order to maintain control. 
This culture is not yet convinced that there needs to be significant change in the 'way 
things are done around here'. Although the principles that emerged from the Water 
Law Review Process in 1996 infonned the behaviour of government and its 
supporters who are driving the progressive implementation of policy imperatives 
today, the implementation of the principles, later enshrined in the National Water Act 
(no 36 of 1998), undennine opportunities for the proposed changes to take affect. The 
discussion that is followed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five suggests that the 
restricted opportunities are not only due to lack of substance and clarity around what 
participatory processes entail but they are also due to a lack of desire to clarify 
meanings lest this process undennines current relations of power. 
Developing a scaffolding/or trust analysis 
The most helpful theoretical insights that were deployed to unpack the empirical data 
and develop the relationship between ideas as put forward by theorists and facts as 
presented by the empirical data were first examined in Chapter Four of the study. As 
transfonnation has everything to do with policies that were embraced by the ANC 
government and embodied in the Water Services Act (no 108 of 1997) and the 
National Water Act (no 36 of 1998), the role of the state in the production of trust is 
critical. The deployment of the themes 1) style of government, 2) synergy between 
state and non-state actors and 3) bureaucrats and their resistance to change, were 
helpful in scrutinising the role of the state and the influence that changing state policy 
and intervention has in developing or hindering the production of trust and the 
perpetuation or production of shame. The central theoretical question posed in 
Chapter Four, whether and in what ways governments are able to produce trust, 











narrow and unscientific rather than 'scientific' project that is explorative in nature, 
that considers 'facts' from all angles and allows for uncertainty, polyphony and 
indecision. The most helpful insights gained in this inquiry were gathered from the 
work of Lowndes (2003), Cameron (2003), Mutahaba et al. (1993), Oluwu & Wunsch 
(2004) and Tapscott (2001) who penetrate, from different angles, the problematic 
elements of decentralisation that are by no means unique to the water sector, nor, as 
the work of Oluwu & Wunsch (2004), Lowndes (2003) and Mutahaba et al. (1993) 
reflect, are they unique to South Africa. 
Despite policy emphasis on local service delivery, for a number of rea.;;ons the state 
has maintained strong central powers while relinquishing managerial responsibility 
for delivery of water and integrated resource management, and this is one of the 
reasons that the social landscape of water reflects low trust between different spheres 
of government and between government and 'ordinary' water users. Trust at the 
lowest sphere of government, is particularly thin for it is at this level that the 
undersupply of resources, human, financial and social capital hits hardest. 
Implementation of water policy is affected by these restraints. And it is at this level 
that those who are supposed to be agents of change have very little agency. It is at this 
level too that, as Tapscott (2001) and Cameron (2003) note, public officials have the 
hardest time bridging the divide between politics and service delivery and where the 
paradox between local responsibility to deliver and the command and control 
impulses of government is felt. Oluwu & Wunsch (2004), Lmvndes (2003), 
Mutuhaba et al. (1993) and Tapscott (2001) are concerned about the way in which 
national policies and directives are imposed on localities without providing the 
support for these implementing nodes to perform their duties effectively because they 
are under-developed. Lowndes (2003) from her perspective of local government, and 
Newman et al. (2004), Williams (2004), Briggs & Sharp (2004), from their research 
into participatory practices, contend that this is indicative of a strong centralised 
tendency that contradicts notions of local development, observations that are 
eminently pertinent within the context of reform in the Breede-Overberg WMA. 
Local municipalities, water user associations and eventually Catchment Management 
Agencies are intended to perform functions that were performed by the Department of 
Water Affairs (DWAF) in the past. Agrawal & Gibson (1999) agree with these 











perform their duties. Remarks that are made by town engineers and public officials 
operating at the lower tier of government, such as 'who is going to do the work?' or 
'our budgets are being cut back and we have less staff or 'how can we be expected to 
read everything and make a contribution?' 'the distances are huge and there are not 
enough people to do the work' are some of the 'facts' that resonate loudly with the 
ideas put forward by analysts working in the general field of development. And it is 
these 'facts' that reflect low trust between different tiers of government involved in 
the job of water delivery and water resource management. The data presented in both 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five indicates 1) lack of synergy between state and non-
state actors and lack of synergy between different tiers of government, 2) 
interventionist 'top-down' style of government and 3) the aversion that bureaucrats 
have for change. These three conditions are fertile grounds for low trust and make it 
difficult to implement the 'spirit of the law' as well as the principles that are so 
important for the reform process in the water sector. 
Andrews & Shah (2001) insights into administrative systems and bureaucrats' 
resistance to change provide a way into understanding the problems that were, and 
still are, part of the Greater Hermanus Water Conservation Programme and other 
experiences in the WMA, where innovation - and creative ways of implementing 
policy - is inhibited and even stifled. This confirms the theoretical propositions put 
forward by Cloele & Meyer (2003), MacKay (2003), Mutahaba et al. (1989), Balogun 
(1989), Gran (2001) and Andrews & Shah (2001) that bureaucrats/professionals are 
resistant to change and that the bureaucratic culture obstructs rather than promotes 
reform because of the partiality for routine duties of billing and costing for water 
services. Public officials are unsupportive of innovation and creative solutions for 
policy implementation even though, as Rainey (1991) emphasises, there are constant 
changes and adjustments that public officials experience because bureaucratic systems 
are not static. The changes that are being made at this time in the history of South 
Africa, in the water sector, as in other sectors, are radicaL Although policies have 
changed dramatically, the attitudes and behaviour of public officials are more difficult 
to change. As the empirical data illustrated, doing new things the old way inhibits 
trust and undermines new policies but it also perpetuates feelings of exclusion, 
embarrassment, ignorance or inferiority and can activate shame-based feelings that 











production as new policies are being introduced is undermined. Not much inroad 
have been made in the almost 60 years since Selznick (1949) wrote that it was 
necessary to find ways to make sure that democratic impulses were not undermined 
by administration or administrative governance. Selznick's (1949) concern was that 
the spirit of the law could be stifled by a system of rules and formal discipline. 
Even if professionals do want to change, change does not necessarily follow, because 
standard operating procedures are in place and these are inflexible to change. 
Mutahaba et al.'s (1993) insights into public administration suggest that the burden 
placed on local administration is far in excess of their capacities, and the empirical 
data presented in this study, confirms his assertion that the public administration is in 
'disarray'. Bureaucrats' change-aversion affects trust not only within water services at 
the local municipalities but also in the water management systems where the 
organisational culture of public officials - and their intermediaries, the consultants 
who are driving the CMA process - are also used to doing things the old way. Water 
users are brought into decision-making venues where agendas are preset, information 
overload prohibits new information flows and old in-group/out-group patterns are 
reproduced. The effect is that water users who believed they could make a 
contribution are disempowered and the result, for some, is to feel stupid, ridiculous, 
inadequate and embarrassed. When information is, as Newman (2004) notes, 'fobbed 
off' with words such as 'let's get a move on, this is not the place here to discuss these 
matters' being only too frequent, opportunities for brokering trust are lost. The frame 
of reference is limited to acceptable words and ones that 'don't fit' are considered 
unintelligible and incomprehensible, and that is symptomatic of what Schaap & van 
Twist (1999) call a 'conscious strategy to reduce complexity ... .' The 'facts' are 
filtered through the frame of the pragmatic public officials who control the way that 
water users perceive reality. 'We will never get anywhere that way' is part of the 
frame that conserves the status quo and is symptomatic of a need for stability during 
times of uncertainty. 
The study considered the style of government to be interventionist rather than 
nurturing and that the effect of this style is to stifle opportunities for the production of 
trust, and because water users feel stupid or inadequate, they do not as Luhmann 











expenence of shame. The empirical data in Chapter Four in particular speaks 
eloquently to the impulse to be 'pleasing politicians and doing things in the same 
way' or 'it is supposed to be bottom up but it is not,' 'Pretoria is taking all the 
decision' or 'will government ever hand over control?' 'Local people know what 
amount of water should remain for the reserve' and 'this should be determined by 
local experts' are some of the authentic words and facts that emerged while gathering 
data, and suggest that the style of government is top-down and interventionist. These 
influences challenge contemporary notions of development that are supposed to work. 
There are, nonetheless, influences from the bottom up that, although tentative, are 
worth noting. Thwarted by the uncomfortable meeting between the old and the new 
and facing a reality on the ground that is more untidy than expected - and where the 
seismatic gap between the have and have-nots is stark - OWAF's plan has not 
unfolded as expected. As Chapter Three cautioned, one of the core challenges facing 
OW AF during this period of transformation is to restrain from the temptation of hasty 
delivery and outcome-based measures of achievement rather than investment in 
greater levels of social development and capacity-building. The temptation to speed 
up the delivery process - be it taps or CMAs - and to take decisions on behalf of 
others reflects an interventionist impulse. Although the intervention and control 
might be cost-effective in the short-run particularly, in financial capital and time, the 
trade-off is the loss of trust and impoverished social capital as well as unsustainable 
delivery and water resource management in the long run. Water consumers, such as 
those in the fishing village of Kassiesbaai who were not part of the water policy 
networks during the apartheid years, continue to be deprived of water and the social 
resources to control or participate in decisions around water delivery and 
management. The consequence is distrust of government officials and shame-based 
feelings at not being able to conform to the socially acceptable values that are being 
proposed or not fitting in for those who feel inadequate and unable to understand 
water matters. 
Evans (1996), Ostrom (1996), Levi (1996) and Agrawal & Gibson's (2001) ideas of 
synergy between state and non-state actors present several challenges. The 
theorists' concern is for direct interaction between state and non-state actors around a 











gained from both sets of actors. An interventionist style of government reduces 
opportunities for exchanges and <let's get a move on' or <this is not the place' reflect 
an assumed authority by one set of actors that is difficult for another set of actors to 
refute. The style of government affects the way that synergistic relations between 
state and non-state actors are forged and makes the change from the old to the new 
more difficult. Formal spaces are controlled and contradictions and tensions appear 
outside the formal venues only. Trust across segments of water users is difficult to 
build in the informal spaces because, as Dasgupta (2000), Grootaert & van Bastelaer 
(2002), Krishna (2002), Warren (1999), Woolcock (1998) and Granovetter (1983) 
confirm, common interests and norms define the way that groups are formed, and 
these are shaped today in the Breede-Overberg WMA within in-group/out-group 
patterns of the past. Sharing of ideas, debate or discussion takes place within groups 
rather than across groups and new social capital is not generated. The groups do not 
open up networks and social solidarity, and communal allegiances shaped by the 
segregationist politics of the past, is repetitively reproduced. 
The recurring themes of 1) knowledge, 2) agency and 3) power are interlocked closely 
with bureaucrats and change, style of government and synergy between state and non 
-state actors and these themes were taken up and guide the discussions followed in 
particular in depth in Chapter Five. Newman et ai. (2004), Parfitt (2004), Williams 
(2004), Briggs & Sharp (2004), Schaap & van Twist (1999), Kickert & van 
Koppenjan (1999), Thompson (2002), Gran (2001) and Harris (2004) are some of the 
theorists whose work was most useful in analysing the relationship between 
knowledge, agency and power and linking these themes to the themes of style of 
government, bureaucracies and change and synergy between state and non-state 
actors. 
Lowndes's (2003) observation that management duties have been relinquished but 
that authority has not, explains why power is sustained at the higher levels. The 
tendency towards strong centralised control in the Breede-Overberg WMA 
contradicts, as Lowndes (2004) warns, the apparent rhetorical notions of local 
development where policy is, very thin in substance. Harris's (2004) contribution is 
to introduce the notion of power explicitly when examining the way that trust is 











contacts and connections. Although Harris's empirical data is extracted from work in 
firms and businesses in India, his insights match well with what emerges in the 
Breede-Overberg WMA. Briggs & Sharp (2004) consider that the incorporation of 
local knowledge is just place-specific 'tweakings' and note that the 'tweakings' do not 
allow for any fundamental challenge to the way things are done, developing with 
these ideas important notions around power that are useful for understanding the way 
in which things change - but stay the same - in the water sector. Parfitt (2004) notes 
that power relations maintain an essentially top-down model of development when 
participation is a means and not an end in itself. The endorsement of participation as 
an end addresses unequal power relations because it has a politically radical 
component, not embraced in the Breede-Overberg WMA, which aims to achieve 
efficiency through what Parfitt (2004) calls coercive persuasion. 
'We won't change' or 'this is not the place to talk about that' or 'pleasing politicians 
seems the preferred way to go' are examples where the dominant knowledge regime 
has empowered some but disempowers others because it appears intelligible and 
comprehensible for those who are at the centre of the decision making processes. 
Trust is also undermined when water users feel that their invitation to participate is 
token: 'how can we be expected to read everything and make a contribution?' or 'I 
say nothing, I have nothing to say.' Without adequate knowledge, or the time to digest 
it, water users at the local level are inhibited from giving meaningful input or from 
developing agency and making meaningful contributions to reform in the water 
sector. The possibility that those who do not understand the intricacies of the reform 
process could have a sense of pride in being part of it, are remote. Scheff (1990), in 
his analysis of shame as a determinant of social action, puts forward important 
observations about intact social bonds that are a result of a positive feeling of pride 
and are particularly useful in the investigation into social processes of reform in the 
water sector because they are a reminder of conditions necessary for the production of 
trust. Water users who feel connected to one another both emotionally and cognitively 
are able to build trust. But under conditions where water users do not feel good about 
themselves, they are unable to develop trust for others or to make what Seligman 
(2000) in his discussion on shame refers to as the symbolic exchange where trust is 
produced. Water users who do not connect feel incompetent and isolated, reflected in 











also, significantly, resonating particularly loudly in the silences so that "they will not 
know how ignorant I am'. The analytic framework is most helpful in scrutinising the 
extent to which power, knowledge and agency intersect, and in illuminating the way 
in which trust between water users is inhibited when they are made to feel inadequate, 
uneasy and uncomfortable. Importantly, Wicomb's (1998) ideas that shame stifles its 
own discourse, or Heller (1985), Tisseron (1992) and Scheff s (1990) observation that 
shame is a primary regulator of behaviour, provide the analytic framework necessary 
to understand the social processes that develop in the water sector. The negative chain 
reaction does not only impact on personal interactions but it has serious repercussions 
on the way in which the reform process evolves and affects the systems and 
institutions. Shame is an invisible but a critical determinant of social action, resulting 
in silence, retreat, exit or disengagement from the reform process. Investigations of 
trust are enhanced by integrating the ideas behind shame and provide a critical 
analytic tool with which to examine the process of reform and transformation from 
the old system of water management to the new. The significance of shame as an 
inhibitor of trust has repercussions in contexts of change where the features of 
knowledge, agency and power play a critical role in determining the nature and 
direction of the change. Shame based feelings are reproduced and activated amongst 
those who do not have knowledge, agency or power. 
For those theorists who elaborate on the theories of knowledge and agency, such as 
Giddens (1991), Desai (1994) or Offe (1999), agency-shaping and agency-enabling 
environments further the democratic project, an achievement that is intimately 
connected to knowledge transfers. Ribot & Peluso (2001) provide clarity about the 
ideological controls and discursive practices associated with knowledge regimes and 
contest that those who have the ability to name things are best able to profit and 
control the processes. These authors are more helpful than Termeer & Koppenjan 
(1999) who expect that because there is social and cognitive variation there will be 
knowledge flows, without heeding the dimension of power that is intertwined with 
knowledge. The ability to name things by some and to obscure them by others, is a 
way of ensuring that only some will be able to profit and control the process. 
Social and cognitive dissonance is reflected in the way that some water users 











literacy and numeracy skills, can't. Barberton (1998) grasps well the importance of 
information because it provides water users with the tools to protect their interests. 
Despite the emphasis implicit in the argument that skilling-up and capacity-building 
will allow people to name things and to master 'the facts' it is every bit as important 
that the 'facts' are not determined only by those in power and control. The 
mainstreaming of participatory practice is already a way, according to Williams 
(2004) to bring those at the margins into the centre and to bolster the power of those 
who already have it. Mainstreaming participation has, then, the consequence of 
subjection rather than the reverse, and Williams's (2004) referral to the 'new tyranny,' 
although a little extreme, is not too far from the truth, for the intention to reduce 
frustrations by having the business of transformation, as perceived by elites, 
interrupted is more than likely. Empirical evidence in words such as 'people don't 
really take time to involve people properly' or 'I don't even know what 1 am supposed 
to say' obscures the otherness or different values and visions that are being offered. It 
is for this reason that Parfitt (2004) recognizes the need for a 'new type of 
development organisation' that turns top-down development bureaucracies into places 
of learning. Development organizations that are not places of learning are likely to 
maintain old ways of doing things and filters that decide what is in and what is out, 
where decision-making rests in the hands of few rather than all stakeholders. If 
decisions are taken despite participation, reflected in words such as 'and all decisions 
have already been made,' then the costs of non-participation are negligible. Those 
water users who are supposed to act as conduits between the 'experts' and the 
'layperson' feel ill equipped to intervene on behalf of the people who they represent 
and for whom they are elected as 'trustworthy' spokespersons. 
Transaction costs of participation 
The consequences of undermining trustworthiness are costly, and in some cases the 
empirical data reflects the embarrassment or inadequacy that is reminiscent of the 
shame-based feelings depicted by Philips's Boaz in the Story of Ruth or Epstein's 
Tokut in The l!.xperience of shame in Melanesia. The feelings of shame at being 
unworthy and yet being chosen, of not being proficient in 'scientific language' and 
thus unable to participate meaningfully inhibit opportunities for trust production. 
These water users have little impact on water policy networks although they are 











and being ridiculed or feeling stupid, the procedures are uncontested. 'I say nothing, I 
have nothing to say' or '1 don't feel OK to put up my hand and say anything because 
.. .I don't know about these things' or 'oh, I still don't understand anything about 
water' are manifestations of shame and are also manifestations that 'these things' are 
defined in terms of a particular type of knowledge. Paucity in trust impacts on the 
institutional settings restricting the construction of an agency-enabling environment. 
Empirical data suggests that those who do not have the 'scientific' knowledge cover 
their inadequacies and remain silent in order to avoid being embarrassed or feeling 
stupid, '1 know shame, when I am inside the committee I will just say yes until I 
learn,' and the silence of acquiescence is not going to produce trust' ... it is a terrible 
thing when you feel hollow inside ... not knowing anything can make you feel this'. 
The response of water users who do not understand or who do not know is rational, 
and although shame is an emotional response the cognitive component is important. 
Seligman's (2000) argument that trust is rational and a symptom of modernity is 
affirmed, as the observations indicate that the shame-based reaction is a rational one. 
Uncertainty reproduces fear and anxiety, and although this does not always lead to the 
production or reinforcement of shame-based feelings it is unlikely to produce trust. 
Scheff (1990) noted that the knowledge of non-experts is considered by experts 
tantamount to ignorance, an idea that is all too real in the Breede-Overberg WMA. 
The culture of the meetings had an impact on the researcher, and because the culture 
of the meetings requires understanding technical jargon the researcher was rendered 
impotent to challenge, contradict or dissent. Without expert technical knowledge in 
water matters, silence is a more rational choice than contradiction or question. The 
rationality of shame is important because it brings shame out of the murky under-
waters of 'primitive' or 'traditional' social contexts into the contemporary world with 
the puzzling convolutions and perplexities of modernity, bearing in mind the 
problematics that have been discussed in this study, that this term raises. 
The link between 'water poverty' and 'income poverty' that Caroline Sullivan (2002) 
explores in her calculations of a Water Poverty Index are reflected in the Breede-
Overberg WMA where participation by commercial farmers and water users who 
have a higher incomes and the skills and expertise to engage with water matters is 











justice and uneven distribution of goods. Certainly farmers as a water user segment 
have a lot to lose, and the consequences of non-participation for these consumers is 
high. Entry into the venues is easier and participation therefore carries lower costs in 
the first place for instance, transport, resources and so forth to get to meetings, but, 
importantly, the skills and knowledge that match the frame of reference that is being 
used. Farmers understand water issues, they can discuss and argue about whether or 
not the pricing is fair, whether water should be paid for at all, why alien invasive 
tariffs are so high, who should be paying for hydrological studies, estuarine issues and 
how these do or do not affect the livelihood of farmers, transfers and the effect of 
these on crops or pricing and so forth. Farmers have, for years, been involved in 
decision-making processes and although many of them are characteristically loners 
they have been united by the common interests of the state and bound in the past not 
be grievances but by privileges. Today, grievances bind them together and an 
unintended consequence of reform in the water sector, is that it is this group of water 
users who are being brought together in Integrated Catchment Management and who 
are able to understand the philosophy behind watershed management and cooperation. 
In other words, it is this segment of water users who are having their social capital 
brokered. The unintended consequence of the CMA process is to strengthen the bonds 
between farmers who do not trust government because the new laws no longer protect 
their interests. But is this a symptom of what Seligman (1997,2000) identifies as trust 
in the context of modernity or is it simply a closed system of what Eisenstadt (in Offe 
1997) calls primordial units that reinforce ties of familiarity, neighbourhood and 
likeness rather than risking trust in a stranger? Certainly, it appears from the data that 
trust is high between water users who share common knowledge rather than between 
water users who are members of a different knowledge regime. Nonetheless, the 
consultants and state actors are eloquently sharing language and knowledge regimes, 
and even if pricing and tariff levies are contested there is both cognitive and social 
variation to dissent and disagree because the same filter is used. The theoretical 
construct of risk and trust is pertinent. Farmers, who have most to lose, do not trust 
state actors, and their participation is a manifestation of distrust rather than trust. 
Following this argument, it is possible that some water users who were previously 
excluded from privileged access to water are able to trust the government and that, if 
their interests are not encapsulated by the intermediaries of the state or the provincial 











regulators of the new laws to ensure gains from the reform process. Uslaner's (1999) 
view that state policies are able to produce trust is also helpful, because the lack of 
interest in the water user committees and forums is, from that perspective, likely to 
signal high trust in the policies. In the same way that voter turnout during elections 
might drop during periods of stable democracy, water consumers who were 
previously sidelined trust that today they are protected by the law and that their 
consumption needs will be fulfilled, with or without their participation. Although for 
some water consumers the policies, and trust in the ANC government might be 
necessary, for others it is not sufficient and their desire to participate in decision-
making venues is inhibited by the style of government. 
Uncertainty and distrust in the face of deep changes affect different consumers in 
different ways, and many stakeholders are unwilling to take a risk and trust 
government officials or their intermediaries until they are, as Luhmann (1995) asserts, 
adequately assured against losses. Uncertainty and change have the effect of 
reinforcing what Schaap & van Twist (1999) call network closedness or network 
fixation, and, as Molenears (2003) notes, the non threatening old networks are more 
reassuring. Risk-taking in the face of uncertainty does not impel trust but is in fact a 
repellent of this feature. Because there is so much uncertainty, the role of the state in 
brokering trust and in catalysing changing patterns of inclusion and exclusion is 
critical. Opportunities to share ideas need to be nurtured and a less interventionist 
government would do better to foster trust between government and water users as 
well as between water users themselves and would do better to ensure that shame-
based feelings are not activated. 
White elites are by no means a homogenous group, and the difference within groups 
is starkly apparent in the unwillingness that farmers, who depend on commercial 
farming for their livelihoods, have to register their water usage. The ideas put forward 
by Meyer & Cloete (2000), Mackay (2003) and Andrews & Shah (2001) are helpful 
in understanding the reality because these authors regard the resistance to change as 
unsurprising. Nonetheless, the resistance to change is also a signal of distrust in the 
new system of water management that is forcing elites to forego their privileges that 
have assured their past livelihoods. Paying for water is anathema for most commercial 











was on their land. For other elites who take up positions of authority in the CMA 
process, the gains of change, in temlS of status and/or financial gains, outweigh the 
costs. 
During the data-collection process, confusion about what was happening and what 
was said to be happening reflected not the unscientific nature of the research but, on 
the contrary, the contortions and puzzling contradictions that are part of the 
transfomlation process itself. Similarly, the inability of the researcher, as a social 
scientist, to piece together the 'technical' water matters that were being discussed 
reflects the predominance of this discourse and the way in which it shapes and 
controls the process in the WMA. 'Feeling stupid' or 'not understanding' and remarks 
such as 'oh water is such a difficult matter' are indicative of a water management 
regime that produces low trust and that shapes the way in which change is not 
happening. They have everything to do with knowledge, agency and power. 
Damned if you do and damned if you don 'f 
The Director General of DWAF, on the occasion of the Inkomati launch and again at 
the Willowvale Symposium in April 2004, stated that 'there are no blueprints' and 
that 'this is a process with uncertain outcomes', but the model for CMAs and water 
user associations (WUAs) allows only for a certain amount of flexibility and is far 
more rigid than rhetoric proposes. As discussed above, this approach is not incidental 
but deliberately limits frustration and contestation and reduces opportunities for the 
public to interfere with the business of state or make demands or changes that could 
menace the status quo. The Breede-Overberg CMA process allowed for a certain 
amount of flexibility but overall the process was pursued with an end product in mind 
that was minimally negotiable. Water expert elites and state actors drove the process, 
which had anticipated and predetemlined outcomes. Consensus from below was in the 
main co-opted. The identity of two very different water management areas, the Breede 
and the Overberg, were merged despite the feeling of water experts in the Overberg 
that this was not necessarily the way to go. Two water user associations were created 
in a relatively short period of time driven by experts and propelled forward as an 
indication of achievement and outcome rather than process. As a forerunner, the 











following behind the nation's first that was launched in March 2004. Six years after 
the National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998), these are remarkable achievements. 
Yet these gains must be measured against other losses. The prolonged absence of trust 
leads, as Sztompka (1997) noted, to an embedded tradition of distrust and makes 
construction of new institutions difficult The near completion of the CMA is a feat 
that can be heralded with pride, nonetheless, the gaps between anticipated gains of 
participation, between the drive for demand rather than supply management, 
Integrated Resource Management and decentralised decision-making involving a wide 
range of stakeholders are disquietening. The unwillingness, for instance, to 
acknowledge the important changes that demand-driven water management principles 
bring with it is apparent in the water conservation project in Greater Hermanus and 
illustrates the inability of a local municipality to perform its duties and to 
meaningfully implement policy. Aversion to change is also apparent in the assertion 
by water user elites that 'we will not change' in transforming irrigation boards into 
water user associations. 
It is also notable that the state has not used its authority to counteract the tendency, 
voiced by Evans (1996), oflocal elites to dominate. Social fixation continues in the 
new systems despite the fact that according to Termeer & Koppenjan (1999), it could 
be influenced by external pressure and the threat of regulation by government. The 
actors cannot be excluded as this would contravene the law, however the spirit of the 
law is contravened by a more subtle form of informal exclusion, and here the work of 
Schaap & van Twist (1999) is particularly helpful in examining examples of veto 
power. Unsurprisingly, because the 'scientific' is considered 'fact,' the veto power 
has been structured by the reality of wealth, or member-worthiness measured in terms 
of financial and human capital, that excludes those who lack it With a disempowered 
periphery, decisions taken by those at the centre do not need to be modified. 
The failure of the state to regulate and pressure elites is reminiscent of what Marais 
(1999) noted as 'pleasing friend and foe' and an admittance that the capacity and 
expertise lies in the hands of elites whose resources are needed for the project of 











has been argued in the previous chapter, the unintended consequence of the National 
Water Act has been to reinforce white supremacy in the water sector. 
Nonetheless, interpretations of what is happening signal extraordinary, and possibly 
unintended, consequences of 'failure' and suggest in other ways a positive and 
important cooperative relationship between state and non-state actors. In other words, 
the signal can be interpreted as not one of failure and lack of synergy between state 
and non-state actors but rather one of sufficient negotiation and interaction between 
the two sets of actors who, as Kickert & Koppenjan (1999) state, impose their will for 
the state to claim at least a partial retreat on its planned project. The scientific project 
of constructing CMAs has evolved because of interjection, interrogation, doubt and 
uncertainty a symptom of Popper's rational steps for scientific achievement. The 
restructuring of the Department to accommodate proto-CMAs and to manage and 
operate water from within the state infrastructure can be interpreted as a positive 
democratic achievement where there has been synergy between state and non-state 
actors. DW AF has accepted that only five CMAs are likely to be up and running by 
March 2005, a far cry from its primary and ideal vision. 
The review of the project of establishing CMAs in all nineteen WMAs is a product of 
wide range of actors making their voices heard, matching well with the theories of 
Brynard (2000), Ostrom (1996), Evans (1996) and Agrawal & Gibson (1999) who 
recognise that both bottom-up and top-down forces simultaneously shape the way in 
which policy develops. Although the overwhelming interventionist style suggests a 
determination that is state-driven and, as Katerere (2002) noted, the exchanges are 
very much controlled, the decisions that are currently being enforced in the water 
sector are likely to be the product oftop and bottom interventions. 
DWAF's acknowledgement that the route to Pretoria might be different, is an 
indicator that all is not going as planned and that it is less easy to control from the 
centre than envisaged. Enforcement of policy that is vague and lacks substance is 
much more difficult than enforcement of licensing, billing and registration that 
involves hard data and is part of the 'facts' as known by water experts. It is an 
acknowledgement too that policy lacks the substance needed to implement deep 











management systems into new. Whether out of willingness or necessity that the plan 
to set up CMAs in all the WMAs simply will not work, OW AF is today restructuring 
the Department to set up proto CMAs within government structures. 
Resistance to change is also linked to features of power. The retreat of the state to the 
centre could, on the other hand, be interpreted as a sign that Lowndes (2003), 
Cameron (1999) and Mutahaba et al. (1993) consider as an inability to relinquish 
control and the realisation that the separation between authority and management 
functions is not only an uncomfortable one but is nonsensical. Participatory processes 
entail far more challenges to the status quo than intended, and it is likely that the 
threat to established power and authority restrained the desire for deep change, the 
consequences of which are far greater than foretold. In other words, in 1996 the 
conception of the National Water Act, through the Water Law Review Process, was 
premature in so far as those involved did not fully envisage the effect of the rhetoric. 
Rainey's (1991) observation that successful change requires support from above, 
participative planning and flexible implementation, has resounding significance in 
explaining why the Water Law Review Principles are so difficult to implement, 'our 
budgets are being cut back and we have less staff ... ' Three of the key political 
elements that OIuwu & Wunsch (2004) identify as contributors to effective local 
government stand in the way of driving forward the project of the CMA at the local 
level and contribute to low trust: 1) the ability to identify problems, 2) to set priorities 
and 3) to mobilise resources, making, as Golola (2003) contends, 'nonsense' of earlier 
attempts by central government to devolve decision-making closest to those who it 
most affects. The problem of restriction on participative planning, as presented in 
Chapters Four and Five, is largely due to the insistence on doing new things the old 
way, embracing a scientific organisational culture which is not opening up to new 
information exchanges, intervention that prohibits flexibility and so forth. Simply 
soliciting more input from citizens does not increase local institutional autonomy and 
it does not deepen democracy. Decisions continue to be taken at the higher levels. 
Revisiting notions of trust 
The ideas about trust as a rational choice, juxtaposed as they are by some theorists 










reliant on locality, neighbourhood ties, friends and family, are problematic. In the 
contemporary setting, geographical and social landscapes are interlocked, stretching 
beyond neighbourhoods into terrains where there are benefits and costs in alliances 
between foe a friend. In the Breede WMA, a small-scale farmer as a next door 
neighbour might be threatening to a commercial farmer and the distinction between 
family, friends or neighbourhood familiarity (presumed traditional or pre-modem), as 
opposed to trust-based relationships with strangers (presumed modernity), is 
unhelpful. The RuensveldlDuivenshok rural water schemes reflect networks that are 
based on both trust and familiarity and the perpetuation of old networks or closed and 
fixated networks, although contemporary and modem, is primitive and primordial in 
its rejection of innovation, respect, mutual compassion, openness to the view of the 
other and so forth. Are the farmers in the Ruensveld and Duivenshok a product of 
modernity in their ability to articulate and participate more than other water users in 
the forums? Or are the farmers of the Ruensveld and Duivenshok rural water schemes 
and the elites and experts that are in the WMA embedded in primordial units of 
similarity, tradition, likeness? And are the villagers of Kassiesbaai less modem 
because they have network and not social capital, bound together by locality, 
neighbourhood and family/friend ties, or are they just poorer? Does being connected 
to water experts and elites propel one into modernity or is it a result of old ties and 
networks that are primitive in their inability to assimilate strangers? 
The narrative of the farmers in the Ruensveld and Duivenhoks region of the Overberg, 
presented in Chapter Five of the study, indicates that commercial farmers are 
embedded in social networks centred around issues of water management and that 
they have, over time, developed social capital both between themselves and with 
government officials. The gains of cooperating together were both economic and 
financial, but also produced feelings of pride and respectability. Although they are 
unable to bend the rule of the law and are enforced today to license and register 
despite their lack of trust in the process, they are vocal and able to raise concerns. On 
the other hand the residents of the small village of Kassiesbaai were shown to be 
lacking in opportunities to develop social networks that go beyond the ties of family 
and neighbourhood. Today their voice is absent in the water policy networks. The 
experience of mistrust and exclusion are deeply engrained in the historical memory of 











institutions in the Breede-Overberg WMA are unable to find government officials 
trustworthy in matters concerning water. The social capital of commercial farmers 
and water experts and the lack of social capital of Kassiesbaai or other poorer 
residents in the WMA, influences the construction of contemporary water institutions. 
How useful are the trust/risk ideals in understanding the empirical data? Is risk a 
driver or an impediment for trust? Is the idea that trust is an ability to believe despite 
uncertainty concerning the outcomes helpful, or is more to do with trusting someone 
else that will be fair and truthful and that has your interest at heart? Does uncertainty 
in the water sector drive trust or is it trust-averse? DWAF is faced with an enormous 
challenge because there is no blueprint or map as to how to do it and because new 
players are not yet equipped to participate meaningfully. Identifying expertise is part 
of building institutions, but expertise is considered to be 'scientific' and 'objective' 
and this expertise lies in the hands of white males. The principles that emerged from 
the Water Law Review Process were pushed forward with optimism, but today 
DWAF acknowledges that the 'big bang' way is not the way to go because the terrain 
is riddled with social uncertainty and the anticipated reform in the water sector is 
experimental in nature. 
The Water Law Review Process identifies one of the major obstacles for the success 
of Integrated Catchment Management as the lack of experience and inadequate 
involvement of all stakeholders, but it also posits that there is sufficient expertise and 
skill at the local level that can be harnessed. The unwillingness of government to trust 
and see the level of expertise that does exist in the Breede-Overberg is, according to 
Schaap & van Twist (1999) note, an inability rather than an unwillingness to see 
according to the local water user. But from the perspective of the local water user, 
local expertise is not lacking; 'we can do it by ourselves, the people here can get on 
with it and we don't need outside experts or 'Sun City' consultants', 'Pretoria is 
taking all the decisions.' Contrary to what Schaap & van Twist (1999) note, this 
speaks to a disconcerting unwillingness, rather than an inability, to acknowledge skills 
and capacity at the local level. The benefits of change for central government do not 











Policy lacks substance, and its ability to enforce overall vague notions of localised 
water user participation is restricted. The vagueness discussed in Chapter Five can be 
considered as an indicator of the reluctance to relinquish control, for participation, 
central to the achievement of the 'scientific' project of CMA construction, remains 
largely underdefined. The ideas put forward by Williams (2004). Woolcock (2004), 
Parfitt (2004) and Newman et al. (2004) demonstrate that the toolkit for participation 
has not been prepared and power relations remain unequal. Without a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between knowledge, power and agency, reform in 
the water sector will remain undeveloped. The rational choice argument assumes that 
individuals make rational choices and that one set of actions will have expected 
outcomes. Commercial farmers not willing to give up their economic benefits and the 
power that goes with them, government officials unwilling to cede power to local 
authorities, state actors unwilling to cede power to non-state actors, water users who 
have knowledge that is 'western' unwilling to cede the knowledge to those who do 
not have it, national government unwilling to cede to regions, are some of the binaries 
that have everything to do with power. 
DWAF acknowledges that there is 'a long way to go' and that 'they could do more' 
but these acknowledgments have not yet addressed the root cause of non participation. 
Throwing money and resources at the problem will not solve it. Kuhn (1962) said 
that when the answers to the problem are not within the paradigm it shows that a new 
paradigm is needed. Science is based on experimentation, testing new ways, new 
ideas, trying new avenues and alternative solutions to the same problem. At the core 
of the risk argument is the notion that modem or rational man takes a risk and lets go 
of power by putting trust in another who shares common interests. If the intention of 
policy is to drive forward its principles and to embed ideals in reality, then risk-
taking is needed. The go-it-alone strategies of commercial farmers are being 
challenged as they look beyond the mountain and the borders of their own farms to 
the wider watershed area, the previously disadvantaged are being thrown into forums 
where they are asked to trust others who are assumed to have their common interests 
at heart - but who do not show sufficient signs of this being the case but the trust 
that government has in water users is lacking. Government holds tightly to the strings 
for fear of devolving decision-making to the lowest levels with the result that the new 











state is necessary to ensure that local elites do not sabotage refonn, but on the other, 
over-involvement at the national level undennines local authorities and erodes trust 
that might develop between water users themselves, as well as between water users 
and government. 
Institutionalism and the creation of trust 
The 'spirit of the law' is undennined by the style of government that manages rather 
than nurtures change, focusing on outcome and 'getting to Pretoria' too fast, rather 
than process and being too hasty in providing templates, answers and agendas. 
Because the fonnal spaces are confined, water users gossip and bemoan in the 
'betwixt and between' spaces outside the fonnal venues. Instead of producing trust 
between groups and promoting changes in social configurations, old patterns of the 
past are only too present. Despite the heterogeneity within groups, uncertainty and 
distrust is muffled across group and only expressed within segments. Because trust is 
produced or reinstated within group, vicious rather than virtuous cycles that are noted 
by Putnam (2000), Ingelhart (1999) and Krishna (2002), or what Mishler (1997) refers 
to as bad and good cholesterol, match only too well with the reality in the Breede-
Overberg refonn process. Power is equalized and knowledge shared within groups, 
reconstructing and reproducing familiar patterns rather than creating new ones. Many 
of the exchanges take place in infonnal spaces where DW AFs influence is limited and 
because there is so much uncertainty, the benefits of taking risks with 'strangers' or 
newcomers do not outweigh the costs. 
The need to maintain the new organization with old patterns drives mechanisms of 
participation that are expedient and immediately most effective, but the empirical 
data shows that the idea that Selznick (1949) put forward of restrictive pressure on the 
exercise of democracy is real. Unfortunately, as Selznick (1949) warned, uncontested, 
organisational action once initiated tends to push on. It is for this reason that the 
reconsideration of the way to Pretoria and that only five forerunners are likely 
candidates for CMAs - is a positive signal that there is an alternative to pushing on. 
Generalised low trust 
During the investigation similar problems were emerging within different contexts 











was generalized. For instance, within the setting ofWUAs, water users with 
entrenched habits, practices and networks, focus on infrastructure capital has not been 
replaced by a focus on social assets. These forums repetitively render impotent the 
claims of many water users and amplify the voices of others. The decisions that are 
being taken concerning water upgrades for the village of Kassiesbaai, whether or not 
they reiorm and improve access to water for those who do not have it, are made with 
or without the voice of the water users. In the Breede-Overberg Stakeholder Forum or 
Breede-Overberg Reference Group, trust between small pockets of elites and 
government is high, but trust is low between water experts and government and 
between non-experts and experts. It is between non-experts and experts that shame-
based feelings are most apparent. In the Greater Hermanus Water Conservation 
Project, trust between departments at the municipal level is low because bureaucrats 
are resistant to change and the project of furthering innovative new policies is not 
adequately supported at the higher levels. At the level of planning for catchment 
strategies for localised catchments within the WMA, trust is low because of 
uncertainty of roles and functions of local water users and because the authority has 
not been devolved although management functions such as ensuring licensing, paying 
for Alien Invasive Vegetation Clearing activities, collection of waste discharge fees 
and so forth are the responsibility of local water users. The production of trust is 
threatened because the style of government is interventionist and decisions are made 
at higher levels that affect the regional and local stakeholders. Not only is innovation 
blocked but trust is undermined as local consumers feel their contribution to the CMA 
building process is not taken seriously. The interventionist impulses also have the 
effect of activating shame-based feelings in water users who were previously 
excluded from decision-making in the water sector. Water users who feel shame are 
unable to engage with other water users and trust is curtailed. 
The absence of trust-based relations within water catchment areas endures into the 
post-apartheid era despite the fact that the National Water Act (no 36 of 1998) 
promotes greater cooperation within water management systems. The creation of 
social capital, and in particular the attitudinal and cognitive component of the 
construct, does not occur through legislative fiat. The manifestation of shame as a 
social behavioural form by the still-marginalized underclass reflects the fact that the 











deference to the technically informed and the bureaucratic, specialized language that 
is utilized within water policy discussions operates either intentionally or 
unintentionally both of which are likely, to exclude potential newcomers. 
Changing social and political environments brings with it a constant questioning and 
has the potential to reconfigure social patterns. The issues of trust and shame are 
invisible but of importance in the establishment of new patterns of belonging and in 
readjusting new identities and social solidarity. The discussions put forward in this 
study have highlighted the usefulness of the construct shame in investigating certain 
types of social action and have argued for its place alongside trust because it impacts 
on negotiations, issues of trust and the forging of new identities in administrative 
systems. The role of the state in the production of trust is critical. 
Delivery now includes not only the reticulation of pipelines but the reticulation of 
people. When a process of integration takes place, the willingness of the actors to 
perceive the 'facts' happens when scientific and technical language is translated into 
language that is simpler, meanings can be shared and meeting-ground is possible. In 
the water sector certain areas will remain highly technical, and in some specialized 
domains it would be inappropriate to expect all water users to have the same 
expertise. But it is realistic to expect exchanges in both domains and that substantial 
knowledge by local water users and knowledge of local water users is expected. 
Expert and technical closedness is possible because of the highly technical nature of 
discourse around, amongst other issues, irrigation systems. Pursuing the argument of 
the exactness of science presented above, scientific discourse is inquisitive and its 
legitimacy depends on it inventing alternatives. The meaning attached to notions of 
change and reform will determine the nature and extent of the transformation. It is 
unlikely that the changes will be as radical as expected. 
Summative remarks 
The conclusion has shown that there are ways in which the inquisitive inquiry pursued 
by state and non-state actors is activated and that there are ways it is stifled. It has 












In order for the National Water Act to be effectively implemented, an improved, more 
accessible system of network communication is essential, along with a reduction of 
the highly technical and formalistic language used in documents and at meetings. 
Water management bodies need to more assertively seek to enhance the building of 
trust relations and reduce feelings of shame among ordinary water users and small 
farmers. Thus far, from the observations that have been made during the course of 
this study, the power relationships have played a role in restricting opportunities for 
the production of trust and they have, in some cases, activated or produced shame and 
an environment that is disabling for reform. Water policy reform requires a more 
substantive and meaningful expansion of network structures in a participatory and 
inclusive direction. 
Trust is a valuable but volatile resource and the broader set of analytic tools have 
provided a scaffolding using the set of analytic themes: style of government, way in 
which bureaucrats accept or resist change, ability of non-state and state actors to 
develop synergistic relationships, equalising of power, meaningful transfer of 
knowledge and creation of an agency enhancing and agency-enabling environment. 
Trust is a product of a set of 'ideal' conditions, public officials being trustworthy, 
trading credit slips between water users, having a sense of agency and being able to 
understand and share information and equalise power. The ideals of trust present trust 
as a product of democratic processes and that in these ideal conditions trust, as an 
experience, is reproduced and smoothes relationships. But trust belongs to the 
cognitive/emotional deference system where it is constantly reconstructed, 
renegotiated and reinstated. In order to better understand the politics of trust and 
social uncertainty, a wider set of analytic tools is necessary. High trust exists between 
elites and public officials who speak the same language and exchange credit slips in 
ways that advance the project of building the CMA. It appears that the process is 
being propelled forward by a small group of elites and that water users who are part of 
the knowledge regime and understand the rules of the game are able to participate, 
• 
albeit it with a trust that is more uneasy. At the Willowpark symposium (April 2004), 
DWAF's acknowledgement that 'public trust is earned through openness, outreach, 
consistency and sharing information' is critical, but it remains an ideal that DW AF 
struggles to implement. Pockets of trust and manifestation of shame-based feelings in 











knowledge, rather than generalised trust amongst water users, suggests that the 
democratic project of transformation in the water sector is more problematic for many 
water users than anticipated. 
The six themes highlighted above are latent in much of the trust literature, but 
deconstructing these themes and including ideas on shame, has provided a more 
robust toolkit for the investigation of the attitudinal component of social capital and 
has avoided some of the problematics identified by theorists that trust is too vague, 
means different things to different people or is too loose a term to be helpful. It also 
addresses head-on some of the critical shortcomings of measuring trust by providing a 
set of variables and indicators that go to the core of the trust problem. 
The conclusion has considered the 'facts' from several angles. Questions remain 
unanswered. Is non-participation a manifestation of high trust amongst water users 
and a signal that the project of deepening democracy is being realised? Is the retreat 
of the state a failed project of localisation and an illustration of an inability to 
relinquish power? Or on the contrary, does it show remarkable cognisance of the 
complexity and social uncertainty that cannot be driven forward with quick fixes as 
was anticipated? In other words, can the restructuring of the Department to manage 
proto-CMAs from within government be considered an achievement of state and non-
state actor synergy or the contrary? The expansion of the analytic tools has provided 
a model for assessing whether or not reform has been successful and where and in 
what ways the project of reform has attained its goals. Successful reform cannot be 
measured only in terms of farmer compliance with licensing, because this is a 
measure of the achievement of enforceability of the law and not evidence of the 
production of trust. The difficulty of enforcement in social processes is a reflection of 
the difficulty to provide a 'quick fix' for intangible goods and the intended or 
unintended vagueness around what is needed. It is not surprising that the 
achievements in reform are in the domain of the 'scientific' and that the social 
elements remain largely impenetrable and incoherent. The study has brought the 
unintelligible to the fore and, in so doing invites a more 'scientific' understanding of 











Step by step 
Personal journey of exclusion and inclusion 
A restless ambivalent relationship with my identity as a white South African woman 
sent me roaming through the hills of Quercy in France where, embedding myself in a 
network of French farmers, producers of wine, goats milk cheese and tobacco, I lived 
in an old bam with no electricity and water, replacing my own social uncertainty in a 
thorough love and easiness with the local farmers. Today, I retain my swearwords, my 
slurking soup in the bowl and my dunking bread in my tea. But I know in my bones 
the voice of the mother who calls from one side of the Quercy hills to the other, 
without a telephone, unable to read and write, washing her sheets on the old smoothe 
stones at the spring in the valley. The village dances once a year where neighbours 
forget their differences and gossip dwindles to the sound of the harmonica and organ 
grinder. This was my college oflearning, where I learnt about in-group/out-group 
patterns, the fear of the outsider, the heterogeneity of communities, the liminal spaces 
of gossip and cracks, the changes and resistance to modernity as tractors were fitted 
with DVDs and drop pits were replaced with flush toilets. And importantly, I learnt to 
bury my shame, the feeling of not belonging, of being different, that had chased me to 
another continent where my identity took 'puzzling distortions' that played 
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Area of interest 
The area of interest is the Breede Water Management Area as defined in Government 
Notice 1160 of 1 October 1999. The area is defined as: 
Tertiary drainage regions G40 (excluding quaternary catchment G40A, G50, HlO, 
H20, H30, H40, H50, H60 and H70 
The Breede WMA comprises the entire Breede River Basin which is the secondary 
catchments HI - H7 and the coastal catchments of the Western and Eastern Overberg 
which is comprised of secondary catchments G4 and G5. The Breede WMA is 
bounded by the Berg WMA to the west, the Olifant-Doorn WMA in the northwest, 
the Gouritz WMA to the north and east and the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in the 
south. 
The proposed name, by the CMA Reference Group for the CMA is the Breede-
Overberg Catchment Mangement Agency. 
The area is defined as the catchment areas of the Breede River, The Sonderend River, 
the Sout River, the Bot River, the Palmiet River, including the coastal areas from 
Rooiels in the west to San Sebastian in the east. 
Two major impoundments in the Breede River Basin are the Greater Brandvlei Dam 
and the Theewaterskloof Dam. A large number of farm dams command substantial 
portions of the catchments in the Ceres Basin and the upper Breede. In the steeper 
valleys found in the Hex River and Riviersonderend catchments, farm dams are used 
to store run off from mountain streams. In the broad, flat middle Breede valley, farm 
dams are used for balancing storage and are fed from an extensive system of canals 
and pumping schemes conveying water from the Brandvlei Dam. The only significant 
dam constructed since 1995 is the new Ceres Dam on the Koekdouw River 
immediately upstream from Ceres. All towns in the area are supplied from surface 
water resources. Larger towns are supplied from dams. Most of the dams also supply 
water for irrigated agriculture in the surrounding area. 
In contrast to the Breede River Basin, and to some extent the Western Overberg, 
towns and farms in the Eastern Overberg are heavily dependent on groundwater 
supplies to meet existing water requirements. Surface water supplies are mainly 
received from the Ruensveld West and East schemes which supply water from the 
Riviersonderend River to the rural areas. The Overberg Water Board operates these 
schemes. Both of these schemes are operating at or near design capacity. The upgrade 
of these schemes to supply coastal towns such as Waenhuiskrans, is currently under 
consideration.2 
I Source: Process of development of a Proposal for the Establishment of a catchment management 
agency for the Breede Water Management Area. Document prepared by Louis Bruwer Consulting 
Engineers 
2 Source: This section has been sourced largely from the proposal for the establishment of the Breede-















Approximately 85% of the total volume of water supplied to towns and communities 
in the Western Overberg is from conventional surface water resources. The town of 
Stanford is fully supplied from a spring, while Gansbaai mainly relies on groundwater 
as well as an allocation from the Kraaibosch Dam. Water supplies to Pearly Beach 
and Stanford will require augmentation within the next ten years. 
Institutions responsible for water management in the Breede WMA in 1999 were: 
DWAF, Overberg Water Board, Irrigation boards (61) - in the process of transforming 
to Water User Associations -, municipalities and water and sanitation committees. 
By 24 January 2001 eight irrigation boards had been completely transformed into 
water user associations: Mathinusvlei WUA, Central Breede River WUA, 
Agterkliphoogte WUA, Noree WUA, Willemnelsrivier WUA. 
The following table shows the municipalities, towns and villages in the Breede WMA 
. District Municipality New Municpality Towns & Villages 
Boland District Municipality 
.--.-~ 
Witzenberg Municipality Ceres 
i Prince Alfred Hamlet 
Wolseley, Tulbach3 









Overberg Distric~ Municipality 
--~ 









1 .--. Overstrand Municppaolity HangkliplKleinmond Greater Hermanus 
I Stanford 7 A",llw M'midp~ity Gansbaai Napier 
Bredarsdorp 
I Swellendam Municipality Struisbaai Barrydale 
Swellendam 
I Suurbraak 






















Other institutions involved in water management and water related matters in the area 
are: 
• Provincial Administration: Western Cape 
• Provincial Department of Agriculture 
• District councils 
• Department of Environmental Affairs 
• Cape Nature Conservation 
• National Parks Board 
There are also informal committees managing small water abstraction works, mainly 
situated higher up in the mountain valleys above the reaches of pumping schemes 
Water forums such as the Ceres Water Forum 












Stakeholders in the Overberg 
The formal CMA proposal development process began in October 1999 and 
culminated in a series of six public meetings held from 10 to 25 November 1999. A 
second round of 6 public meetings was held during the period 9 February 2000 to 1 
March 2000 
A final round of six public meetings was held in November 2001 before finalisation 
of the Proposal for the Establishment of a Catchment Management Agency for the 
Breede Management Area. 
The following Catchment Steering Committee meetings were held: 
Onrus River (March, May and June 2000) 
Palmiet River (March, April, May, June 2000) 
Bot River (March, May 2000) 
Klein River (March, May 2000) 
Overberg East (April 2000, May 2000) 
Uilkraals River (May 2000) 
On 20 June 2000 all members of the Steering Committees were invited to a 
stakeholder meeting for the whole Overberg Area. Membership for the Overberg 
Stakeholder Committee was finalised. 
This committee met six times between August 2000 and November 2001. The 
meetings discussed membership of the CMA Reference Group and prepared members 
for the CMA proposal development process. The Overberg Stakeholder Group was 
disbanded after April 2002 when the first proposal was submitted for approvaL The 
meetings are continuing and have been held at least three times a year but the name of 
each committee, aligning itself with terminology of the National Water Act, has now 
changed to a Catchment Forum from the previous name of Steering Committee. 
The table below shows the existing fora and main issues that are discussed in the 
Overberg. 
Appendix Table One: Overbe.'X.£!ltchment Forum: status and issues ~ 
Name of I, Main issues No of members represented I 
catchment on Over berg Stakeholder 
forum Committee I 
---+-3~ -----j Palmiet River Focus on controversial development in the catchment and I 
concerns about transfers to the metro. Has drawn up a 
catchment management strategy and is waiting for the 
establishment of the CMA to implement it 
Bot River Ceased to exist 
Onrus River 
L_. 
The most water stressed catchment in the Overberg. Water 
demand management is considered a priority for both farmers 
and domestic water users. Considering tbnning a WUA to 
I fonnalise the provision of water from the Onrus River and the 
! various groundwater resources in the catchment 
4 
4 











Klein River Possible source of transfer to Onrus River catchment. Local 
authority commissioned a "State of the Klein River 
: Catchment Report". Decrease in river flow could have impact 
4 
Uilkraals River 
on ecolo ieall sensitive Klein R::.:iv--=-er,-,l:.::iag~~oc::con:.o.;'--:-__ --:-_-+-c _______ '_~'_--I 
Was instrumental in securing water and sanitations services to 4 
Baardskeerdersbos, a small village that evolved on a farm in 
the area. The forum's main focus has been the lack of support 
from DWAF and the Western Cape Nature Conservation 
I Overberg East 
Board in clearing alien vt:getation in the ca"-tc'-"h--'m'-'-en'--'t ___ -+ _______ .~ ____ _i 
Dr~~~of the Overberg East Catchment Re:ccP..:..ort=-=--_ . .L....oO-4 ______ ~~_-' 
Stakeholders in the Breede River Basin 
The public participation process in the Breede River Basin was tied closely to the 
Breede River Basin Study (BRBS) which began in 1999 and was completed in June 
2002. It was conducted under the auspices of DWAF. A close link was established 
between the BRBS and the CMA proposal development process. The BRBS 
Stakeholder Committee was used as a key constituent of the CMA Reference Group, 
together with the Overberg Stakeholder Committee. 
The first public meeting was held in November 1999 and the second in Robertson in 
March 2000. 
The BRBS stakeholder committee met for the first time in April 2000 and again in 
September 2000. In August 2001 an ad hoc meeting ofthe BRBS Stakeholder 
Committee was held in Robertson. The final BRBS report took place in October 2001 
and November 2001. There were a series of individual meetings to discuss the second 
draft of the proposal between October 2001 and November 2001. 
The following geographic regions were represented on the BRBS Stakeholder 
Committee 






Collective of Breede and Overberg Stakeholders2 
The BRBS and Overberg Stakeholder Committees came together for the first time in 
November 2000 as the Breede WMA Stakeholder Forum. It was agreed that a smaller 
committee called the CMA Reference Group should take the CMA proposal 
development process further in close cooperation with DW AF and the support team. 
The CMA Reference Group met six times between February 2001 and October 2001 











The Sreede WMA Stakeholder Forums met for the second time in November 2001 to 
discuss the second draft of the Proposal as well as membership of the Governing 
Soard of a proposed CMA. 
The draft proposal was submitted to DWAF head office during 2003. DWAF 
requested several changes. 
The CMA Reference Group met in December 2003 to discuss the proposed changes, 
especially with regard to the way in which the financial viability of the future CMA 
had previously been calculated. The role of the Advisory Committee was discussed 















Category: Town engineers, Organisation 
ublic officials 
I Location of 
meetinK 
I Date .. I 
I ~ James van der Linde ~ Overstrand Municipality I Hermanus, Robertson, 
: Worcester 
I 
November 2000, October 200 I, A'iiriIi 
2003, January 2004 
, Bredarsdorp 
Municipality 
[ 2~ Henk Matthee ~-~----~ (:)Verberg DistnCi.- , October 200 I 
I 3, Andre Schutte-~_____ Ceres MtIIli~~iJa1itL __ .~~c~er~es~~;;-:::==tJF~e~b~rugary'~2~00~2-=========~ 
I 4. Dawie Kr~ Provincial Planning -l Cape Town . 2Q()1 
1/ 5. Carl Koegeienberg-- Theewaterskloo"f·...><----+Cc::-aledon June 2001 
. ___ ~nicipality . +-,---c-----+-:----,,------:-------c-:--
r6, Pilla van Groenewald Aghulhas Municipality Bredarsdorp October 2001, November 2001, July 2003, 
7. Louis Jordaan . [Agj;i.i1haSMunicipality 
Western Cape Provincial 
Government 
August 2004 
I Bredarsdorp October 2001, November 2001 
8, Marina van der Merwe ~rcape Town January 2002 . 
~I ~97,~T~re~v~o~r~R~u~be~I~Ii ______ ~E~ili~e~k~w~in~i~M~u~ni~c~~i=!a~li~it~~~'~D~u=r~b~an~----j_7M7arch2003,August20~04~ ______ ~ 
II--'-1.::..0.~N"'e':'-il.cM.-'-c'='le.;:,;o;..:d:.........-----+~E::_th:__e...,.k'_;wini Municipality. Durban ___ FM-7"ar:.;::c;.:.h.:.:2~00~3:_',-'cA:=.::u::s;g>.::u:::st:..:2:"'0_::0_:_4----.---
~1~I.~T.::..ed~d~yG~o~u~d~e~n.-------_+-'-E~th~e~kw-~in-'-i-M~un-i~c~ip~a~lity.~~_1_Du~r-b_an __ ------+-M;~ar-c-h-2-00~3~,~A-u~g~u_~_2_0~0_4~~ __ --~--~ 
12. Tony Myles Onrus Catchment Steering Onrus I February 2001, September 2002 
~~~~~~--____ ----~~C~o~m~m~I~·tt~ee----------~1 
113, Randel Adriaans .~~ :~_~~:._=_C~i~ty_~_O~f~C~lIP~·=-ie_-'cT_:;,.o_wn~~_=__=__=__=__=_--1_tI--C~-a_p_e~_T_own 
DWAF and non-OWAF 
I March 2002---: ___ ~_· __ ] 
~.,. makers ---~'~~D-W'~A'-F:-,--~-----r-::-c----:-----t--:----:-:-::-:~---------,,----.~~.-
14. Bill Rowlston Johannesburg April200.;-4=-:-_________ _ 
I S. Francois Junod Non-DWAF advisor Pretoria March 2004 
"'I' ";'6,--::W-"i'I'~h'-' e-;E:;"nr-17gh"--:"'t -- ----'D\VAF~..;c;...=;.;;;:.:~----+-C""'a"'p.c;e..;,T""o-w-n-----+ N""o""ve;";m""'be:;';"';r-=2-C:O-=-00""',"":F::C"e""b-ru-ary-2"""0:-:0"'j-, "'"M"-ar-c-c-h -
2001, August 2001, November 2001, 
April 2002, November 2002, April 2003, 
+-::~~ __ ~ ____ + __ ;:::---;o;--_.~_-+--;.;M.;:a:L.:::2-,,:-00:.;;3:.:.;' F'l':.bruary 2004, July 2004 
: 17. John Roberts Cape Town November 2000, February 2001, 
~ 
+~.~._:--___ . ___ ~_+-=:c_=-_____ -+-ccN . <!.~!~£~!:}OO1. February 2004 ... -----1 
_~~a:.:..n ____ _+.:;;:,..;~=c~~_---. __ -_-t-:::.=..::... March 2001, Se£.ll'!!TltJt:I]003 ___ _ 
19. Derek Weston Pretoria April 2004 
120. Eiman Karar . JohaIl.~--- A ril 2004 
f2T'SiIaS Mbedzi lohannesbur A Til 2004 
I 22, Christo Marais Cape To~n January 2002, Augus/.-2002, March 2003, 
August 20()4_~=-:--:-
DW~- J C-"'ape""-:T'-'o_w;.;,n __ -+-c-M'c-ar....;c""h::':2:-'-'00.:l,1'<:b~~()i,uly 2004 
World Bank __ =-_____ ~ashington I July 2001 
~.,;-~"-'-':;c:,:cc.:..:c"-c------~-+-:C=-·e""n:.::..:tral Breede River Robertson August200-CSeptember 2001,~~ePtembcr 
: Water Users Association 2003 
26. Tony MyleslChairperson Onrus . '(Jr]rus November 2000, February 2001 
. Ste,<:Ting C0!Tl!Tlittee ·---I-----------f--c 
;~: ~:~~eS~~:~;__---- g~~r Water Board . ~~:; ;'::66::.°1:'.1------------1 
AWARD ., Johannesburg i April 2004 .----_.-, 
Ninham Shand . Robertson I August 2001 
I
, Onrus Catchment Onrus I February 2.001, o .. etober 2001, February 
I 
-----I... 2002, September 2002 
r32, DriesPot~ ______ ~Ov~e=r~b=cr~g~W~'=&~e~r~B~oa=r~d----~H~e~id~e~lb~e~rg~-----~M~aLY.:.:2~Oo~i~-----~----------------~ 
133. Danie Theron Overberg Water B,o,:.:;a:..:rd"_c__~F~~le::.:id=e:::lb::ce::rl2--_I-..:.;=-<-=:;~-;:-;:----~---~ - ."'C 
I 34.L0uisB:=ru:.:.w:..::e:.:.r _____ -Ir::B:.:.ru~w:.:.e=r...:C;;.:o:.::;n::::.su::;I"'tan;::.;;;.t-
. 35, Guy Pegram Pegasus Strategic 
L __ -:--=..".-____ Man~~em_e_n_t ___ _ 
36, Kevin Wall CSIR .-_______ --'r--:,p...,re_to_n_·a-:-__ .--t_AM:Parriclh2020040'2A, SUegUtSetm2boeOr42002 
37, George Constantine~ Johannesburg 
38. Dennis Toens Toeri~rtners Arniston I Jm;,Uary 2002, Augus12002, April 2003, 
. --i--. .----1 Se tember 2003 
39. Doreen February I Nosipho Consuitant February 2001, November 2001, February 
~o, Dirk VerSVeld-----=h 
41. Bea Whittaker ' Milkwood 





Au ust 2002 


















IvoryPark SC2tember 2003 
I 44. Randall Stevens Kassiesbaai July 2003, Febru~ 2004, uly 2004 
I 45. Evelyn Swart Kassiesbaai December 2003, July 2003, Jull: 2004 I 
i 46. M Skenjana Worcester August 200J I 
r . ;------.-.~.~. - .• ~ 
IFarmers 
.. ~--.-.~.~ I 47. Sebastian Beaumont Beaumont Wines Botriver September 2001, October 2001, April 
I 2003, 
~:~iel Giliomee . Amiston November 2002, Janllary 2003, July 2004 
h~' Martin !leydom Prinskraal Amiston 
I 
January 2003 .-......, 
50. John Solomon Crocadile Valley Estates NelsJl.ruit January 2004, Seetember 2004, 
-l f5i~ R van Dijk ~ , Cogmanskloof Irrigation Montague September 2001, February 2002 
is2. 
~~ard .~ B Prins Robertson August 2001 
rs:l. C Olivier 'r-- Hexvalley January 2001 =1 I 54. C Du Plessis ~ . Robertson September 2001 . . ~. I 55. T Delport Overberg Farmers November 2000, August 200 I 
I Association F Rastafarian CentraJ Breede River Robertson November 200 I, September 2003, I 
~r Users Association I October 2003 
.~. 
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